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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises from an antitrust action brought by ZF 
Meritor, LLC (―ZF Meritor‖) and Meritor Transmission 
Corporation (―Meritor‖) (collectively, ―Plaintiffs‖) against 
Eaton Corporation (―Eaton‖) for allegedly anticompetitive 
practices in the heavy-duty truck transmissions market.  The 
practices at issue are embodied in long-term agreements 
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between Eaton, the leading supplier of heavy-duty truck 
transmissions in North America, and every direct purchaser of 
such transmissions.  Following a four-week trial, a jury found 
that Eaton‘s conduct violated Section 1 and Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  Eaton filed a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that 
its conduct was per se lawful because it priced its products 
above-cost.  The District Court disagreed, reasoning that 
notwithstanding Eaton‘s above-cost prices, there was 
sufficient evidence in the record to establish that Eaton 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct—specifically that Eaton 
entered into long-term de facto exclusive dealing 
arrangements—which foreclosed a substantial share of the 
market and, as a result, harmed competition.  We agree with 
the District Court and will affirm the District Court‘s denial 
of Eaton‘s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
 We are also called upon to address several other 
issues.  Although the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Plaintiffs on the issue of liability, prior to trial, the District 
Court granted Eaton‘s motion to exclude the damages 
testimony of Plaintiffs‘ expert.  The District Court also denied 
Plaintiffs‘ request for permission to amend the expert report 
to include alternate damages calculations.  Consequently, the 
issue of damages was never tried and no damages were 
awarded.  Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the District Court‘s 
order granting Eaton‘s motion to exclude and the District 
Court‘s subsequent denial of Plaintiffs‘ motion for 
clarification.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the District Court‘s orders to the extent that they excluded 
Plaintiffs‘ expert‘s testimony based on the damages 
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calculations in his initial expert report, but reverse to the 
extent that the District Court denied Plaintiffs‘ request to 
amend the report to submit alternate damages calculations.  
Finally, although the District Court awarded no damages, it 
did enter injunctive relief against Eaton.  On appeal, Eaton 
argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief 
because they are no longer in the heavy-duty truck 
transmissions market, and have expressed no concrete desire 
to re-enter the market.  We agree and will vacate the District 
Court‘s order issuing injunctive relief. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual Background 
1.  Market Background 
 The parties agree that the relevant market in this case 
is heavy-duty ―Class 8‖ truck transmissions (―HD 
transmissions‖) in North America.  Heavy-duty trucks include 
18-wheeler ―linehaul‖ trucks, which are used to travel long 
distances on highways, and ―performance‖ vehicles, such as 
cement mixers, garbage trucks, and dump trucks.  There are 
three types of HD transmissions: three-pedal manual, which 
uses a clutch to change gears; two-pedal automatic; and two-
or-three-pedal automated mechanical, which engages the 
gears mechanically through electronic controls.  Linehaul and 
performance transmissions, which comprise over 90% of the 
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market, typically use manual or automated mechanical 
transmissions.
1
 
There are only four direct purchasers of HD 
transmissions in North America:  Freightliner, LLC 
(―Freightliner‖), International Truck and Engine Corporation 
(―International‖), PACCAR, Inc. (―PACCAR‖), and Volvo 
Group (―Volvo‖).  These companies are referred to as the 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (―OEMs‖).  The ultimate 
consumers of HD transmissions, truck buyers, purchase 
trucks from the OEMs.  Truck buyers have the ability to 
select many of the components used in their trucks, including 
the transmissions, from OEM catalogues called ―data books.‖  
Data books list the alternative component choices, and 
include a price for each option relative to the ―standard‖ or 
―preferred‖ offerings.  The ―standard‖ offering is the 
component that is provided to the customer unless the 
customer expressly designates another supplier‘s product, 
while the ―preferred‖ or ―preferentially-priced‖ offering is the 
lowest priced component in data book among comparable 
products.  Data book positioning is a form of advertising, and 
standard or preferred positioning generally means that 
customers are more likely to purchase that supplier‘s 
components.  Although customers may, and sometimes do, 
request components that are not published in a data book, 
doing so is often cumbersome and increases the cost of the 
                                              
1
 A third category of heavy-duty trucks, ―specialty‖ 
vehicles, such as fire trucks, typically use automatic 
transmissions. 
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component.  Thus, data book positioning is essential in the 
industry. 
 Eaton has long been a monopolist in the market for 
HD transmissions in North America.
2
  It began making HD 
transmissions in the 1950s, and was the only significant 
manufacturer until Meritor entered the market in 1989 and 
began offering manual transmissions primarily for linehaul 
trucks.  By 1999, Meritor had obtained approximately 17% of 
the market for sales of HD transmissions, including 30% for 
linehaul transmissions.  In mid-1999, Meritor and ZF 
Friedrichshafen (―ZF AG‖), a leading supplier of HD 
transmissions in Europe, formed the joint venture ZF Meritor, 
and Meritor transferred its transmissions business into the 
joint venture.
3
  Aside from Meritor, and then ZF Meritor, no 
significant external supplier of HD transmissions has entered 
the market in the past 20 years.
4
 
One purpose of the ZF Meritor joint venture was to 
adapt ZF AG‘s two-pedal automated mechanical 
                                              
2
 At trial, Eaton disputed that it was a monopolist, but 
on appeal, does not challenge the jury‘s finding that it 
possessed monopoly power in the HD transmissions market 
in North America. 
3
 ZF AG is not a party to this lawsuit. 
4
 ―External‖ transmission sales do not include 
transmissions manufactured by Volvo Group for use in its 
own trucks. 
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transmission, ASTronic, which was used exclusively in 
Europe, for the North American market.  The redesign and 
testing took 18 months, and ZF Meritor introduced the 
adapted ASTronic model into the North American market in 
2001 under the new name FreedomLine.  FreedomLine was 
the first two-pedal automated mechanical transmission to be 
sold in North America.
5
  When FreedomLine was released, 
Eaton projected that automated mechanical transmissions 
would account for 30-50% of the market for all HD 
transmission sales by 2004 or 2005. 
2.  Eaton’s Long-Term Agreements 
 In late 1999 through early 2000, the trucking industry 
experienced a 40-50% decline in demand for new heavy-duty 
trucks.  Shortly thereafter, Eaton entered into new long-term 
agreements (―LTAs‖) with each OEM.  Although long-term 
supply contracts were not uncommon in the industry, and 
were also utilized by Meritor in the 1990s, Eaton‘s new LTAs 
were unprecedented in terms of their length and coverage of 
the market.  Eaton signed LTAs with every OEM, and each 
LTA was for a term of at least five years. 
Although the LTAs‘ terms varied somewhat, the key 
provisions were similar.  Each LTA included a conditional 
rebate provision, under which an OEM would only receive 
rebates if it purchased a specified percentage of its 
                                              
5
 Eaton did not produce a two-pedal automated 
mechanical transmission at the time, and would not fully 
release one until 2004. 
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requirements from Eaton.
6
  Eaton‘s LTA with Freightliner, 
the largest OEM, provided for rebates if Freightliner 
purchased 92% or more of its requirements from Eaton.
7
  
Under Eaton‘s LTA with International, Eaton agreed to make 
an up-front payment of $2.5 million, and any additional 
rebates were conditioned on International purchasing 87% to 
97.5% of its requirements from Eaton.  The PACCAR LTA 
provided for an up-front payment of $1 million, and 
conditioned rebates on PACCAR meeting a 90% to 95% 
market-share penetration target.  Finally, Eaton‘s LTA with 
Volvo provided for discounts if Volvo reached a market-share 
penetration level of 70% to 78%.
8
  The LTAs were not true 
                                              
6
 We will refer to these as ―market-share‖ discounts or 
―market-penetration‖ discounts.  It is important to distinguish 
such discounts from quantity or volume discounts.  Quantity 
discounts provide the buyer with a lower price for purchasing 
a specified minimum quantity or volume from the seller.  In 
contrast, market-share discounts grant the buyer a lower price 
for taking a specified minimum percentage of its purchases 
from the seller.  Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶ 768, at 169 (3d ed. 2008). 
7
 In 2003, Freightliner and Eaton modified the 
agreement from a fixed 92% goal to a sliding scale, which 
entitled Freightliner to different rebates at different market-
penetration levels. 
8
 The share penetration targets in the Volvo LTA were 
lower because Volvo also manufactured transmissions for use 
in its own trucks.  The commitment to Eaton, plus Volvo‘s 
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requirements contracts because they did not expressly require 
the OEMs to purchase a specified percentage of their needs 
from Eaton.  However, the Freightliner and Volvo LTAs gave 
Eaton the right to terminate the agreements if the share 
penetration goals were not met.  Additionally, if an OEM did 
not meet its market-share penetration target for one year, 
Eaton could require repayment of all contractual savings. 
Each LTA also required the OEM to publish Eaton as 
the standard offering in its data book, and under two of the 
four LTAs, the OEM was required to remove competitors‘ 
products from its data book entirely.  Freightliner agreed to 
exclusively publish Eaton transmissions in its data books 
through 2002, but reserved the right to publish ZF Meritor‘s 
FreedomLine through the life of the agreement.  In 2002, 
Freightliner and Eaton revised the LTA to allow Freightliner 
to publish other competitors‘ transmissions, but the revised 
LTA provided that Eaton had the right to ―renegotiate the 
rebate schedule‖ if Freightliner chose to publish a 
competitor‘s transmission.  Subsequently, Freightliner agreed 
to a request by Eaton to remove FreedomLine from all of its 
data books.  Eaton‘s LTA with International also required that 
International list exclusively Eaton transmissions in its 
electronic data book.  International did, however, publish ZF 
Meritor‘s manual transmissions in its printed data book.  The 
Volvo and PACCAR LTAs did not require that Eaton 
products be the exclusive offering, but did require that Eaton 
products be listed as the preferred offering.  Both Volvo and 
                                                                                                     
own manufactured products, accounted for more than 85% of 
Volvo‘s needs. 
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PACCAR continued to list ZF Meritor‘s products in their data 
books.  In the 1990s, Meritor‘s products were listed in all 
OEM component data books, and in some cases, had 
preferred positioning. 
The LTAs also required the OEMs to ―preferential 
price‖ Eaton transmissions against competitors‘ equivalent 
transmissions.  Eaton claims that it sought preferential pricing 
to ensure that its low prices were passed on to truck buyers.  
However, there were no express requirements in the LTAs 
that savings be passed on to truck buyers (i.e., that Eaton‘s 
prices be reduced) and there is evidence that the ―preferential 
pricing‖ was achieved by both lowering the prices of Eaton‘s 
products and raising the prices of competitors‘ products.  
Eaton notes that it was ―common‖ for price savings to be 
passed down to truck buyers, and a Volvo executive testified 
that some of the savings from Eaton products were passed 
down while others were kept to improve profit margins.  
Plaintiffs, however, emphasize that according to an email sent 
by Eaton to Freightliner, the Freightliner LTA required that 
ZF Meritor‘s products be priced at a $200 premium over 
equivalent Eaton products.  Likewise, International agreed to 
an ―artificial[] penal[ty]‖ of $150 on all of ZF Meritor‘s 
transmissions as of early 2003, and PACCAR imposed a 
penalty on customers who chose ZF Meritor‘s products. 
Finally, each LTA contained a ―competitiveness‖ 
clause, which permitted the OEM to purchase transmissions 
from another supplier if that supplier offered the OEM a 
lower price or a better product, the OEM notified Eaton of the 
competitor‘s offer, and Eaton could not match the price or 
quality of the product after good faith efforts.  The parties 
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dispute the significance of the ―competitiveness‖ clauses.  
Eaton maintains that Plaintiffs were free to win the OEMs‘ 
business simply by offering a better product or a lower price, 
while Plaintiffs argue and presented testimony from OEM 
officials that, due to Eaton‘s status as a dominant supplier, the 
competitiveness clauses were effectively meaningless. 
3.  Competition under the LTAs and  
Plaintiffs’ Exit from the Market 
 
After Eaton entered into its LTAs with the OEMs, ZF 
Meritor shifted its marketing focus from the OEM level to a 
strategy targeted at truck buyers.  Also during this time 
period, both ZF Meritor and Eaton experienced quality and 
performance issues with their transmissions.  For example, 
Eaton‘s Lightning transmission, which was an initial attempt 
by Eaton to compete with FreedomLine, was ―not perceived 
as a good [product]‖ and was ultimately taken off the market.  
ZF Meritor‘s FreedomLine and ―G Platform‖ transmissions 
required frequent repairs, and in 2002 and 2003, ZF Meritor 
faced millions of dollars in warranty claims. 
During the life of the LTAs, the OEMs worked with 
Eaton to develop a strategy to combat ZF Meritor‘s growth.  
On Eaton‘s urging, the OEMs imposed additional price 
penalties on customers that selected ZF Meritor products, 
―force fed‖ Eaton products to customers, and sought to 
persuade truck fleets using ZF Meritor transmissions to shift 
to Eaton transmissions.  At all times relevant to this case, 
Eaton‘s average prices were lower than Plaintiffs‘ average 
prices, and on several occasions, Plaintiffs declined to grant 
price concessions requested by OEMs.  Although Eaton‘s 
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prices were generally lower than Plaintiffs‘ prices, Eaton 
never priced at a level below its costs. 
By 2003, ZF Meritor determined that it was limited by 
the LTAs to no more than  8% of the market, far less than the 
30% that it had projected at the beginning of the joint venture.  
ZF Meritor officials concluded that the company could not 
remain viable with a market share below 10% and therefore 
decided to dissolve the joint venture.  After ZF Meritor‘s 
departure, Meritor remained a supplier of HD transmissions 
and became a sales agent for ZF AG to ensure continued 
customer access to the FreedomLine.  However, Meritor‘s 
market share dropped to 4% by the end of fiscal year 2005, 
and Meritor exited the business in January 2007. 
B.  Procedural History 
 On October 5, 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit against Eaton 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, 
alleging that Eaton used unlawful agreements in restraint of 
trade, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1; acted unlawfully to maintain a monopoly, in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and entered into 
illegal restrictive dealing agreements, in violation of Section 3 
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14.  Specifically, Plaintiffs 
alleged that Eaton ―used its dominant position to induce all 
heavy duty truck manufacturers to enter into de facto 
exclusive dealing contracts with Eaton,‖ and that such 
agreements foreclosed Plaintiffs from over 90% of the market 
for HD transmission sales.  Plaintiffs sought treble damages, 
pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and 
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injunctive relief, pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 26. 
 On February 17, 2009, Plaintiffs‘ expert, Dr. David 
DeRamus (―DeRamus‖), submitted a report on both liability 
and damages.  On May 11, 2009, Eaton filed a motion, 
pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993), to exclude DeRamus‘s testimony.  The 
District Court ruled that DeRamus would be allowed to testify 
regarding liability, but excluded DeRamus‘s testimony on the 
issue of damages on the basis that his damages opinion failed 
the reliability requirements of Daubert and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 646 F. Supp. 
2d 663 (D. Del. 2009).  Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
clarification, requesting that DeRamus be allowed to testify to 
alternate damages calculations based on other data in his 
expert report, or in the alternative, seeking permission for 
DeRamus to amend his expert report to present his alternate 
damages calculations.  The District Court decided to defer 
resolution of the damages issue and bifurcate the case. 
The parties proceeded to trial on liability.  On October 
8, 2009, after a four-week trial, the jury returned a complete 
verdict for Plaintiffs, finding that Eaton had violated Sections 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  
Following the verdict, Plaintiffs asked the District Court to 
set a damages trial, but no damages trial was set at that time.  
On October 30, 2009, Plaintiffs supplemented their earlier 
motion for clarification, incorporating additional arguments 
based on developments at trial. 
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On November 3, 2009, Eaton filed a renewed motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a 
new trial.  Eaton‘s principal argument was that Plaintiffs 
failed to establish that Eaton engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct because Plaintiffs did not show, nor did they attempt 
to show, that Eaton priced its transmissions below its costs.  
Sixteen months later, on March 10, 2011, the District Court 
denied Eaton‘s motion, reasoning that Eaton‘s prices were not 
dispositive, and that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to 
conclude that Eaton‘s conduct unlawfully foreclosed 
competition in a substantial portion of the HD transmissions 
market.  ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 684 
(D. Del. 2011). 
On August 4, 2011, the District Court denied 
Plaintiffs‘ motion for clarification, and denied Plaintiffs‘ 
request to allow DeRamus to amend his expert report to 
include alternate damages calculations.  The same day, the 
District Court entered an order awarding Plaintiffs $0 in 
damages.  On August 19, 2011, the District Court entered an 
injunction prohibiting Eaton from ―linking discounts and 
other benefits to market penetration targets,‖ but stayed the 
injunction pending appeal.  Eaton filed a timely notice of 
appeal and Plaintiffs filed a timely cross-appeal. 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 We exercise plenary review over an order denying a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law.  LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 
324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  A motion for 
judgment as a matter of law should be granted ―only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could find liability.‖  Id. at 145-46 
(quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 
1166 (3d Cir. 1993)).  We review questions of law underlying 
a jury verdict under a plenary standard of review.  Id. at 146 
(citing Bloom v. Consol. Rail Corp., 41 F.3d 911, 913 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  Underlying legal questions aside, ―[a] jury verdict 
will not be overturned unless the record is critically deficient 
of that quantum of evidence from which a jury could have 
rationally reached its verdict.‖  Swineford v. Snyder Cnty., 15 
F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 We review a district court‘s decision to exclude expert 
testimony for abuse of discretion.  Montgomery Cnty. v. 
Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2003).  To the 
extent the district court‘s decision involved an interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, our review is plenary.  
Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 2000).  We 
also review a district court‘s decisions regarding discovery 
and case management for abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 176 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1982). 
We review legal conclusions regarding standing de 
novo, and the underlying factual determinations for clear 
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error.  Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Effect of the Price-Cost Test 
 The most significant issue in this case is whether 
Plaintiffs‘ allegations under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act are subject to the price-
cost test or the ―rule of reason‖ applicable to exclusive 
dealing claims.  Under the rule of reason, an exclusive 
dealing arrangement will be unlawful only if its ―probable 
effect‖ is to substantially lessen competition in the relevant 
market.  Tampa Elec. Coal Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 
U.S. 320, 327-29 (1961); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 
F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005); Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., 978 F.2d 98, 110 (3d Cir. 1992).  In contrast, under the 
price-cost test, to succeed on a challenge to the defendant‘s 
pricing practices, a plaintiff must prove ―that the 
[defendant‘s] prices are below an appropriate measure of [the 
defendant‘s] costs.‖  Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
9
 
                                              
9
 Although Plaintiffs brought claims under three 
statutes (Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 
of the Clayton Act), our analysis regarding the applicability 
of the price-cost test is the same for all of Plaintiffs‘ claims.  
In order to establish an actionable antitrust violation, a 
plaintiff must show both that the defendant engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct and that the plaintiff suffered 
 18 
                                                                                                     
antitrust injury as a result.  Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339-40 (1990).  Because a lack 
of anticompetitive conduct precludes a finding of antitrust 
injury, the key question for us is whether Eaton engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct.  See id. at 339 (―Antitrust injury 
does not arise . . . until a private party is adversely affected by 
an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant‘s conduct.‖). 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of 
the Clayton Act each include an anticompetitive conduct 
element, although each statute articulates that element in a 
slightly different way.  Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant was a party to a 
contract, combination or conspiracy that ―imposed an 
unreasonable restraint on trade.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1; In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314-15 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Under Section 2, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant willfully acquired or maintained its monopoly 
power in the relevant market.  15 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1966).  ―A monopolist 
willfully acquires or maintains monopoly power when it 
competes on some basis other than the merits.‖  LePage’s Inc. 
v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585, 605 n.32 (1985)).  Finally, Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
makes it unlawful for a person to enter into an exclusive 
dealing contract where the effect of such an agreement is to 
substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.  15 
U.S.C. § 14. 
 19 
Eaton urges us to apply the price-cost test, arguing that 
Plaintiffs failed to establish that Eaton engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct or that Plaintiffs suffered an antitrust 
injury because Plaintiffs did not prove—or even attempt to 
prove—that Eaton priced its transmissions below an 
appropriate measure of its costs.  We decline to adopt Eaton‘s 
unduly narrow characterization of this case as a ―pricing 
practices‖ case, i.e., a case in which price is the clearly 
predominant mechanism of exclusion.  Plaintiffs consistently 
argued that the LTAs, in their entirety, constituted de facto 
exclusive dealing contracts, which improperly foreclosed a 
substantial share of the market, and thereby harmed 
competition.  Accordingly, as we will discuss below, we must 
evaluate the legality of Eaton‘s conduct under the rule of 
reason to determine whether the ―probable effect‖ of such 
conduct was to substantially lessen competition in the HD 
transmissions market in North America.  Tampa Elec., 365 
U.S. at 327-29.  The price-cost test is not dispositive. 
1.  Law of Exclusive Dealing 
                                                                                                     
Exclusive dealing claims may be brought under 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act.  LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 157.  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has held that the price-cost test is not confined 
to any one antitrust statute, and applies to pricing practices 
claims under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the 
Robinson-Patman Act.  Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1993); Atl. 
Richfield, 495 U.S. at 339-40.  Thus, regardless of which test 
applies, that test is applicable to each of Plaintiffs‘ claims. 
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An exclusive dealing arrangement is an agreement in 
which a buyer agrees to purchase certain goods or services 
only from a particular seller for a certain period of time.  
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1800a, at 3 (3d ed. 
2011).  The primary antitrust concern with exclusive dealing 
arrangements is that they may be used by a monopolist to 
strengthen its position, which may ultimately harm 
competition.  Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 191.  Generally, a 
prerequisite to any exclusive dealing claim is an agreement to 
deal exclusively.  Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 326-27; see 
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 193-94; Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110 & 
n.24.
10
  An express exclusivity requirement, however, is not 
necessary, LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 157, because we look past 
the terms of the contract to ascertain the relationship between 
the parties and the effect of the agreement ―in the real world.‖  
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 191, 194.  Thus, de facto exclusive 
dealing claims are cognizable under the antitrust laws.  
LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 157. 
Exclusive dealing agreements are often entered into for 
entirely procompetitive reasons, and generally pose little 
threat to competition.  Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing 
                                              
10
 Evidence of an agreement is expressly required 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 14.  However, an 
agreement is not necessarily required under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, which can provide a vehicle for challenging a 
dominant firm‘s unilateral imposition of exclusive dealing on 
customers.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law ¶ 1821a, at 183 (3d ed. 2011). 
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Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 76 (3d Cir. 2010) (―[I]t is widely 
recognized that in many circumstances, [exclusive dealing 
arrangements] may be highly efficient—to assure supply, 
price stability, outlets, investment, best efforts or the like—
and pose no competitive threat at all.‖) (quoting E. Food 
Servs. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 8 
(1st Cir. 2004)).  For example, ―[i]n the case of the buyer, 
they may assure supply, afford protection against rises in 
price, enable long-term planning on the basis of known costs, 
and obviate the expense and risk of storage in the quantity 
necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating demand.‖  
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).  
From the seller‘s perspective, an exclusive dealing 
arrangement with customers may reduce expenses, provide 
protection against price fluctuations, and offer the possibility 
of a predictable market.  Id. at 306-07; see also Ryko Mfg. Co. 
v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1234 n.17 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that exclusive dealing contracts can help prevent 
dealer free-riding on manufacturer-supplied investments to 
promote rival‘s products).  As such, competition to be an 
exclusive supplier may constitute ―a vital form of rivalry,‖ 
which the antitrust laws should encourage.  Race Tires, 614 
F.3d at 83 (quoting Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-
Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
However, ―[e]xclusive dealing can have adverse 
economic consequences by allowing one supplier of goods or 
services unreasonably to deprive other suppliers of a market 
for their goods[.]‖  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., concurring), 
abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. 
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Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 236 
(explaining that ―under certain circumstances[,] foreclosure 
might discourage sellers from entering, or seeking to sell in, a 
market at all, thereby reducing the amount of competition that 
would otherwise be available‖).  Exclusive dealing 
arrangements are of special concern when imposed by a 
monopolist.  See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187 (―Behavior that 
otherwise might comply with antitrust law may be 
impermissibly exclusionary when practiced by a 
monopolist.‖).  For example: 
[S]uppose an established manufacturer has long 
held a dominant position but is starting to lose 
market share to an aggressive young rival.  A 
set of strategically planned exclusive-dealing 
contracts may slow the rival‘s expansion by 
requiring it to develop alternative outlets for its 
product, or rely at least temporarily on inferior 
or more expensive outlets.  Consumer injury 
results from the delay that the dominant firm 
imposes on the smaller rival‘s growth. 
Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1802c, 
at 64 (2d ed. 2002).  In some cases, a dominant firm may be 
able to foreclose rival suppliers from a large enough portion 
of the market to deprive such rivals of the opportunity to 
achieve the minimum economies of scale necessary to 
compete.  Id.; see LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 159. 
Due to the potentially procompetitive benefits of 
exclusive dealing agreements, their legality is judged under 
the rule of reason.  Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327.  The 
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legality of an exclusive dealing arrangement depends on 
whether it will foreclose competition in such a substantial 
share of the relevant market so as to adversely affect 
competition.  Id. at 328; Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110.  In 
conducting this analysis, courts consider not only the 
percentage of the market foreclosed, but also take into 
account ―the restrictiveness and the economic usefulness of 
the challenged practice in relation to the business factors 
extant in the market.‖  Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110-11 
(quoting Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 
1230, 1251-52 n.75 (3d Cir. 1975)).  As the Supreme Court 
has explained: 
[I]t is necessary to weigh the probable effect of 
the contract on the relevant area of effective 
competition, taking into account the relative 
strength of the parties, the proportionate volume 
of commerce involved in relation to the total 
volume of commerce in the relevant market 
area, and the probable immediate and future 
effects which pre-emption of that share of the 
market might have on effective competition 
therein. 
Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329.  In other words, an exclusive 
dealing arrangement is unlawful only if the ―probable effect‖ 
of the arrangement is to substantially lessen competition, 
rather than merely disadvantage rivals.  Id.; Dentsply, 399 
F.3d at 191 (―The test [for determining anticompetitive effect] 
is not total foreclosure, but whether the challenged practices 
bar a substantial number of rivals or severely restrict the 
market‘s ambit.‖). 
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There is no set formula for evaluating the legality of an 
exclusive dealing agreement, but modern antitrust law 
generally requires a showing of significant market power by 
the defendant, Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329; Race Tires, 614 
F.3d at 74-75; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 158, substantial 
foreclosure, Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327-28; United States 
v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 
contracts of sufficient duration to prevent meaningful 
competition by rivals, CDC Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 
186 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1999); Omega Envtl., Inc. v. 
Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1997), and an 
analysis of likely or actual anticompetitive effects considered 
in light of any procompetitive effects, Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 
75; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 194; Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 111.  
Courts will also consider whether there is evidence that the 
dominant firm engaged in coercive behavior, Race Tires, 614 
F.3d at 77; SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 
1056, 1062 (3d Cir. 1978), and the ability of customers to 
terminate the agreements, Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 193-94.  The 
use of exclusive dealing by competitors of the defendant is 
also sometimes considered.  Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 309, 
314; NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
2.  Brooke Group and the Price-Cost test 
We turn now to some fundamental principles regarding 
predatory pricing claims and the price-cost test.  ―Predatory 
pricing may be defined as pricing below an appropriate 
measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in 
the short run and reducing competition in the long run.‖  
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986); 
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see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 584 n.8 (1986); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1995).  The Supreme Court 
has expressed deep skepticism of predatory pricing claims.  
See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121 n.17 (―Although the 
commentators disagree as to whether it is ever rational for a 
firm to engage in such conduct, it is plain that the obstacles to 
the successful execution of a strategy of predation are 
manifold, and that the disincentives to engage in such a 
strategy are accordingly numerous.‖) (citations omitted); 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589 (―[P]redatory pricing schemes 
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.‖) (citations 
omitted).  In the typical predatory pricing scheme, a firm 
reduces the sale price of its product to below-cost, intending 
to drive competitors out of the business.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318 
(2007).  Then, once competitors have been eliminated, the 
firm raises its prices to supracompetitive levels.  Id.  For such 
a scheme to make economic sense, the firm must recoup the 
losses suffered during the below-cost phase in the 
supracompetitive phase.  Id.; see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589 
(explaining that success under such a scheme is ―inherently 
uncertain‖ because the firm must sustain definite short-term 
losses, but the long-run gain depends on successfully 
eliminating competition). 
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. at 222-24, the Supreme Court fashioned a 
two-part test that reflected this ―economic reality.‖  
Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 318.  The Court held that, to 
succeed on a predatory pricing claim, the plaintiff must 
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prove:  (1) ―that the prices complained of are below an 
appropriate measure of [the defendant‘s] costs‖; and (2) that 
the defendant had ―a dangerous probability . . . of recouping 
its investment in below-cost prices.‖  Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. 
at 222-24 (citations omitted).  We are concerned only with the 
first requirement, which has become known as the price-cost 
test.  In adopting the price-cost test, the Court rejected the 
notion that above-cost prices that are below general market 
levels or below the costs of a firm‘s competitors are 
actionable under the antitrust laws.  Id. at 223.  ―Low prices 
benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and 
so long as they are above predatory levels [i.e., above-cost], 
they do not threaten competition.‖  Id. (quoting Atl. Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)).  Low, 
but above-cost, prices are generally procompetitive because 
―the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of 
cost [generally] reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged 
predator, and so represents competition on the merits[.]‖  Id.; 
see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 488 (1977) (―The antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‗the 
protection of competition, not competitors.‘‖) (quoting Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).  The 
Court acknowledged that there may be situations in which 
above-cost prices are anticompetitive, but stated that it ―is 
beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal‖ to ascertain 
whether above-cost pricing is anticompetitive ―without 
courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.‖  
Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223 (citing Phillip Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 714.2, 714.3 (Supp. 
2002)).  ―To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors 
from the loss of profits due to [above-cost] price competition 
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would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut 
prices in order to increase market share.  The antitrust laws 
require no such perverse result.‖  Id. (quoting Cargill, 479 
U.S. at 116).  Significantly, because ―[c]utting prices in order 
to increase business often is the very essence of competition . 
. . , [i]n cases seeking to impose antitrust liability for prices 
that are too low, mistaken inferences are ‗especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct that antitrust laws are 
designed to protect.‘‖  Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine 
Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009) (quoting 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594) (additional citations omitted). 
3.  Effect of the Price-Cost Test on  
Plaintiffs’ Exclusive Dealing Claims 
Eaton argues that principles from the predatory pricing 
case law apply in this case because Plaintiffs‘ claims are, at 
their core, no more than objections to Eaton offering prices, 
through its rebate program, which Plaintiffs were unable to 
match.  Eaton contends that Plaintiffs have identified nothing, 
other than Eaton‘s pricing practices, that incentivized the 
OEMs to enter into the LTAs, and because price was the 
incentive, we must apply the price-cost test.  We 
acknowledge that even if a plaintiff frames its claim as one of 
exclusive dealing, the price-cost test may be dispositive.  
Implicit in the Supreme Court‘s creation of the price-cost test 
was a balancing of the procompetitive justifications of above-
cost pricing against its anticompetitive effects (as well as the 
anticompetitive effects of allowing judicial inquiry into 
above-cost pricing), and a conclusion that the balance always 
tips in favor of allowing above-cost pricing practices to stand.  
See linkLine, 555 U.S. at 451; Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223.  
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Thus, in the context of exclusive dealing, the price-cost test 
may be utilized as a specific application of the ―rule of 
reason‖ when the plaintiff alleges that price is the vehicle of 
exclusion.  See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 
207 F.3d 1039, 1060-63 (8th Cir. 2000). 
Here, Eaton argues that the price-cost test is 
dispositive, and therefore that Plaintiffs‘ claims must fail 
because Plaintiffs failed to show that the market-share rebates 
offered by Eaton pursuant to the LTAs resulted in below-cost 
prices.  We do not disagree that predatory pricing principles, 
including the price-cost test, would control if this case 
presented solely a challenge to Eaton‘s pricing practices.11  
                                              
11
 Despite the arguments of amicus curiae, the 
American Antitrust Institute, our decision in LePage’s v. 3M 
does not indicate otherwise.  In LePage’s, we declined to 
apply the price-cost test to a challenge to a bundled rebate 
scheme, reasoning that such a scheme was better analogized 
to unlawful tying than to predatory pricing.  See 324 F.3d at 
155.  In that case, the plaintiff (LePage‘s) was the market 
leader in sales of ―private label‖ (store brand) transparent 
tape.  Id. at 144.  As LePage‘s market share fell, it brought 
suit against 3M, alleging that 3M, which manufactured 
Scotch tape, some private label tape, and a number of other 
products, leveraged its monopoly power over Scotch brand 
tape and other products to monopolize the private label tape 
market.  Id. at 145.  Specifically, LePage‘s challenged 3M‘s 
multi-tiered bundled rebate program, which offered 
progressively higher rebates when customers increased 
purchases across 3M‘s different product lines.  Id.  The rebate 
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programs also set customer-specific target growth rates.  Id. at 
154.  The sizes of the rebates were linked to the number of 
product lines in which the targets were met; if a customer 
failed to meet the target for any one product, it would lose the 
rebates across all product lines.  Id.  LePage‘s could not offer 
these discounts because it did not sell the same diverse array 
of products as 3M.  Id. at 155. 
Relying on Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), 3M argued that its 
bundled rebate program was lawful because the rebates never 
resulted in below-cost pricing.  We disagreed, reasoning that 
the principal anticompetitive effect of 3M‘s bundled rebates 
was analogous to an unlawful tying arrangement: when 
offered by a monopolist, the rebates ―may foreclose portions 
of the market to a potential competitor who does not 
manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who 
therefore cannot make a comparable offer.‖  LePage’s, 324 at 
155. 
For several reasons, we interpret LePage’s narrowly.  
Most important, in light of the analogy drawn in LePage’s 
between bundled rebates and unlawful tying, which ―cannot 
exist unless two separate product markets have been linked,‖ 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 
(1984), abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), LePage’s is inapplicable 
where, as here, only one product is at issue and the plaintiffs 
have not made any allegations of bundling or tying.  The 
reasoning of LePage’s is limited to cases in which a single-
product producer is excluded through a bundled rebate 
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program offered by a producer of multiple products, which 
conditions the rebates on purchases across multiple different 
product lines.  Accordingly, we join our sister circuits in 
holding that the price-cost test applies to market-share or 
volume rebates offered by suppliers within a single-product 
market.  See NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452 (6th 
Cir. 2007); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 
1039, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983). 
Additionally, several of the bases on which we 
distinguished Brooke Group have been undermined by 
intervening Supreme Court precedent, which counsels caution 
in extending LePage’s.  For example, we indicated in 
LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 151, that Brooke Group might be 
confined to the Robinson-Patman Act, but the Supreme Court 
has made clear that the standard adopted in Brooke Group 
also applies to predatory pricing claims under the Sherman 
Act.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318 n.1 (2007).  Additionally, LePage’s, 
324 F.3d at 151-52, suggested that Brooke Group is not 
applicable in cases involving monopolists, but the Supreme 
Court has since applied Brooke Group‘s price-cost test to 
claims against a monopolist, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine 
Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-48 (2009), and a 
monopsonist, Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 320-25.  Finally, we 
observed in LePage’s that, in the years following Brooke 
Group, the Supreme Court had only cited the case four times 
(and for unrelated propositions), but since LePage’s, the 
Court has reaffirmed and extended Brooke Group.  See 
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The lesson of the predatory pricing case law is that, generally, 
above-cost prices are not anticompetitive, and although there 
may be rare cases where above-cost prices are 
anticompetitive in the long run, it is ―beyond the practical 
ability‖ of courts to identify those rare cases without creating 
an impermissibly high risk of deterring legitimate 
procompetitive behavior (i.e., price-cutting).  linkLine, 555 
U.S. at 452; Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 318-19; Brooke Grp., 
509 U.S. at 223.  These principles extend to above-cost 
discounting or rebate programs, which condition the 
discounts or rebates on the customer‘s purchasing of a 
specified volume or a specified percentage of its requirements 
from the seller.  See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying 
price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by 
a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such 
payments were ―nothing more than ‗price reductions offered 
to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores 
under multi-year contracts‘‖); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 
1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and 
market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry 
Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to 
uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also 
                                                                                                     
linkLine, 555 U.S. at 447-48; Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 325.  
In doing so, the Court emphasized the importance of Brooke 
Group in light of ―developments in economic theory and 
antitrust jurisprudence,‖ and downplayed the significance of 
seemingly inconsistent circuit court antitrust precedent from 
the 1950s and 1960s, some of which we referenced in 
LePage’s.  See linkLine, 555 U.S. at 452 n.3. 
 32 
Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (―[I]t is no more an act of 
coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a 
supplier] . . . to offer more money to [a customer] than it is 
for such [a] supplier[] to offer the lowest . . . prices.‖). 
Moreover, a plaintiff‘s characterization of its claim as 
an exclusive dealing claim does not take the price-cost test off 
the table.  Indeed, contracts in which discounts are linked to 
purchase (volume or market share) targets are frequently 
challenged as de facto exclusive dealing arrangements on the 
grounds that the discounts induce customers to deal 
exclusively with the firm offering the rebates.  Hovenkamp ¶ 
1807a, at 132.  However, when price is the clearly 
predominant mechanism of exclusion, the price-cost test tells 
us that, so long as the price is above-cost, the procompetitive 
justifications for, and the benefits of, lowering prices far 
outweigh any potential anticompetitive effects.  See Brooke 
Grp., 509 U.S. at 223; Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062 
(noting that there is always a legitimate business justification 
for lowering prices: attempting to attract additional business). 
 In each of the cases relied upon by Eaton, the Supreme 
Court applied the price-cost test, regardless of the way in 
which the plaintiff cast its grievance, because pricing itself 
operated as the exclusionary tool.  For example, in Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., the plaintiff argued that a 
proposed merger between vertically integrated firms violated 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act because the result of the merger 
would have been to substantially lessen competition or create 
a monopoly.  479 U.S. at 114.  The plaintiff offered, as a 
theory of antitrust injury, that it faced a threat of lost profits 
stemming from the possibility that the defendant, after the 
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merger, would lower its prices to a level at or above-cost.  Id. 
at 114-15.  The plaintiff claimed that it would have to respond 
by lowering its prices, which would cause it to suffer a loss in 
profitability.  Id. at 115.  The Supreme Court held that such a 
theory did not present a cognizable antitrust injury, reasoning 
that ―the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect 
small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued 
[above-cost] competition.‖  Id. at 116. 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. involved 
an allegation that a vertical price-fixing agreement was 
unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  495 U.S. at 
331.  In that case, the plaintiff was an independent retail 
marketer of gasoline, which bought gasoline from major 
petroleum companies for resale under its own name.  Id.  The 
defendant was an integrated oil company, which sold directly 
to consumers through its own stations, and sold indirectly 
through brand dealers.  Id.  Facing competition from 
independent marketers like the plaintiff, the defendant 
adopted a new marketing strategy, under which it encouraged 
its dealers to match the retail prices offered by independents 
by offering discounts and reducing the dealers‘ costs.  Id. at 
331-32.  The plaintiff brought suit under the Sherman Act, 
alleging that the defendant conspired with its dealers to sell 
gasoline at below-market levels.  Id. at 332.  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that 
the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant engaged in 
predatory pricing, and thus had not shown any antitrust 
injury.  Id. at 333.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, USA Petroleum Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 
859 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 1988), reasoning that a showing 
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of predatory pricing was not necessary to establish antitrust 
injury; rather, the antitrust laws were designed to ensure that 
market forces alone determine what goods and services are 
offered, and at what price they are sold, and thus, an antitrust 
injury could result from a disruption in the market.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that where a firm (or a 
group of firms) lowers prices pursuant to a vertical 
agreement, but maintains those prices above predatory levels, 
any business lost by rivals cannot be viewed as an 
anticompetitive consequence of the agreement.  Atl. Richfield, 
495 U.S. at 337.  ―A firm complaining about the harm it 
suffers from nonpredatory price competition is really 
claiming that it is unable to raise prices.‖  Id. at 337-38. 
In Brooke Group, the plaintiff and the defendant were 
competitors in the cigarette market in the early 1980s.  509 
U.S. at 212.  At that time, demand for cigarettes in the United 
States was declining and the plaintiff, once a major force in 
the industry, had seen its market share drop to 2%.  Id. at 214.  
In response, the plaintiff developed a line of generic 
cigarettes, which were significantly cheaper than branded 
cigarettes.  Id.  The plaintiff promoted the generic cigarettes 
at the wholesale level by offering rebates that increased with 
the volume of cigarettes ordered.  Id.  Losing volume and 
profits on its branded products, the defendant entered the 
generic cigarette market.  Id. at 215.  At the retail level, the 
suggested price of the defendant‘s generic cigarettes was the 
same as that of the plaintiff‘s cigarettes, but the defendant‘s 
volume discounts to wholesalers were larger.  Id.  The 
plaintiff responded by increasing its wholesale rebates, and a 
price war ensued.  Id. at 216.  Subsequently, the plaintiff filed 
 35 
a complaint against the defendant under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), alleging that the defendant‘s volume 
rebates amounted to unlawful price discrimination.  Id.  The 
plaintiff explained that it would have been unable to reduce 
its wholesale rebates without losing substantial market share.  
Id.  Accordingly, because the ―essence‖ of the plaintiff‘s 
claim was that its ―rival ha[d] priced its products in an unfair 
manner with an object to eliminate or retard competition and 
thereby gain and exercise control over prices in the relevant 
market,‖ the plaintiff had an obligation to show that the 
defendant‘s prices were below its costs.  Id. at 222. 
Here, in contrast to Cargill, Atlantic Richfield, and 
Brooke Group, Plaintiffs did not rely solely on the 
exclusionary effect of Eaton‘s prices, and instead highlighted 
a number of anticompetitive provisions in the LTAs.  
Plaintiffs alleged that Eaton used its position as a supplier of 
necessary products to persuade OEMs to enter into 
agreements imposing de facto purchase requirements of 
roughly 90% for at least five years, and that Eaton worked in 
concert with the OEMs to block customer access to Plaintiffs‘ 
products, thereby ensuring that Plaintiffs would be unable to 
build enough market share to pose any threat to Eaton‘s 
monopoly.  Therefore, because price itself was not the clearly 
predominant mechanism of exclusion, the price-cost test 
cases are inapposite, and the rule of reason is the proper 
framework within which to evaluate Plaintiffs‘ claims. 
We recognize that Eaton‘s rebates were part of 
Plaintiffs‘ case.  DeRamus testified about the exclusionary 
effect of the rebates, OEM officials testified that Eaton 
offered lower prices, and Plaintiffs‘ counsel stated in oral 
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argument that part of the reason ZF Meritor could not 
increase sales above a certain level was that ―the OEMs were 
trying to hit those [share-penetration] targets to get their 
money from Eaton.‖  Eaton‘s post-rebate prices were 
attractive to the OEMs, and Eaton‘s low prices may, in fact, 
have been an inducement for the OEMs to enter into the 
LTAs.  That fact is not irrelevant, as it may help explain why 
the OEMs agreed to otherwise unfavorable terms and it may 
help to rebut an argument that the agreements were 
inefficient.  Hovenkamp ¶ 1807b, at 134.  However, contrary 
to Eaton‘s assertions, that fact is not dispositive. 
Plaintiffs presented considerable evidence that Eaton 
was a monopolist in the industry and that it wielded its 
monopoly power to effectively force every direct purchaser of 
HD transmissions to enter into restrictive long-term 
agreements, despite the inclusion in such agreements of terms 
unfavorable to the OEMs and their customers.  Significantly, 
there was considerable testimony that the OEMs did not want 
to remove ZF Meritor‘s transmissions from their data books, 
but that they were essentially forced to do so or risk financial 
penalties or supply shortages.  Several OEM officials testified 
that exclusive data book listing was not a common practice in 
the industry and, in fact, it was probably detrimental to 
customers.  An email between Freightliner employees stated:  
―From a customer perspective, publishing [ZF Meritor‘s] 
product is probably the right thing to do and [it] should never 
have been taken out of the book.  It is a good product with 
considerable demand in the marketplace.‖  The email went on 
to conclude, however, that including ZF Meritor‘s products 
would not be ―prudent‖ because it would jeopardize 
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Freightliner‘s relationship with Eaton.  Eaton itself even 
acknowledged that the OEMs were dissatisfied.  Internal 
Eaton correspondence reveals that PACCAR complained that 
the LTAs were preventing it from promoting a competitive 
product (FreedomLine), which was being demanded by truck 
buyers.  In fact, PACCAR felt that Eaton was holding it 
―hostage.‖ 
Plaintiffs also introduced evidence that not only were 
the rebates conditioned on the OEMs meeting the market 
penetration targets, but so too was Eaton‘s continued 
compliance with the agreements.  As one OEM executive 
testified, if the market penetration targets were not met, the 
OEMs ―would have a big risk of cancellation of the contract, 
price increases, and shortages if the market [was] difficult.‖  
Eaton was a monopolist in the HD transmissions market, and 
even if an OEM decided to forgo the rebates and purchase a 
significant portion of its requirements from another supplier, 
there would still have been a significant demand from truck 
buyers for Eaton products.  Therefore, losing Eaton as a 
supplier was not an option. 
Accordingly, this is not a case in which the 
defendant‘s low price was the clear driving force behind the 
customer‘s compliance with purchase targets, and the 
customers were free to walk away if a competitor offered a 
better price.  Compare Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1063 (in 
deciding to apply price-cost test, noting that customers were 
free to walk away at any time and did so when the 
defendant‘s competitors offered better discounts), with 
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 189-96 (applying exclusive dealing 
analysis where the defendant threatened to refuse to continue 
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dealing with customers if customers purchased rival‘s 
products, and no customer could stay in business without the 
defendant‘s products).  Rather, Plaintiffs introduced evidence 
that compliance with the market penetration targets was 
mandatory because failing to meet such targets would 
jeopardize the OEMs‘ relationships with the dominant 
manufacturer of transmissions in the market.  See Dentsply, 
399 F.3d at 194 (noting that ―[t]he paltry penetration in the 
market by competitors over the years has been a refutation 
of‖ the theory that a competitor could steal the defendant‘s 
customers by offering a better deal or a lower price ―by 
tangible and measurable results in the real world‖); id. at 195 
(explaining that an exclusivity policy imposed by a dominant 
firm is especially troubling where it presents customers with 
an ―all-or-nothing‖ choice). 
Although the Supreme Court has created a safe harbor 
for above-cost discounting, it has not established a per se rule 
of non-liability under the antitrust laws for all contractual 
practices that involve above-cost pricing.  See Cascade 
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 901 (9th Cir. 
2007) (stating that the Supreme Court‘s predatory pricing 
decisions have not ―go[ne] so far as to hold that in every case 
in which a plaintiff challenges low prices as exclusionary 
conduct[,] the plaintiff must prove that those prices were 
below cost‖).  Nothing in the case law suggests, nor would it 
be sound policy to hold, that above-cost prices render an 
otherwise unlawful exclusive dealing agreement lawful.  We 
decline to impose such an unduly simplistic and mechanical 
rule because to do so would place a significant portion of 
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anticompetitive conduct outside the reach of the antitrust laws 
without adequate justification.  
―[T]he means of illicit exclusion, like the means of 
legitimate competition, are myriad.‖  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 
58; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 152 (―‗Anticompetitive conduct‘ 
can come in too many different forms, and is too dependent 
on context, for any court or commentator ever to have 
enumerated all the varieties.‖) (quoting Caribbean Broad 
Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 
(D.C. Cir. 1998)).  The law has long recognized forms of 
exclusionary conduct that do not involve below-cost pricing, 
including unlawful tying, Jefferson Parish, 446 U.S. at 21; 
Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 305-06, enforcement of a legal 
monopoly provided by a patent procured through fraud, 
LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 152 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. 
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)), 
refusal to deal, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601-02 (1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. 
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), exclusive dealing, Tampa 
Electric, 365 U.S. at 327; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 184, and 
other unfair tortious conduct targeting competitors, Conwood 
Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 
F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 Despite Eaton‘s arguments to the contrary, we find 
nothing in the Supreme Court‘s recent predatory pricing 
decisions to indicate that the Court intended to overturn 
decades of other precedent holding that conduct that does not 
result in below-cost pricing may nevertheless be 
anticompetitive.  Rather, as we explained above, Brooke 
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Group and the cases preceding it each involved an allegation 
that the defendant‘s pricing itself operated as the exclusionary 
tool.  See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 212-22; Atl. Richfield, 495 
U.S. at 331-38; Cargill, 409 U.S. at 114-16.  Eaton places 
particular emphasis on two recent cases, arguing that such 
cases demonstrate the Supreme Court‘s willingness to extend 
the price-cost test beyond the traditional predatory pricing 
context.  However, neither of these cases suggests that the 
price-cost test applies to the exclusive dealing claims at issue 
in our case. 
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. at 315, 320, the Supreme Court applied 
the price-cost test to a case involving an allegation of 
predatory bidding by a monopsonist.
12
  In a predatory bidding 
scheme, a purchaser of inputs bids up the market price of a 
critical input to such high levels that rival buyers cannot 
survive, and as a result acquires or maintains monopsony 
power.  Id.  Then, ―if all goes as planned,‖ once rivals have 
been driven out, the predatory bidder will reap monopsonistic 
profits to offset the losses that it suffered during the high-
bidding stage.  Id. at 321.  Therefore, the Court explained, 
predatory pricing and predatory bidding claims are 
―analytically similar.‖  Id.  ―Both claims involve the 
                                              
12
 Monopsony power is market power on the buy (or 
input) side of the market.  Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 320.  
―As such, a monopsony is to the buy side of the market what 
a monopoly is to the sell side[.]‖  Id. (citing Roger Blair & 
Jeffrey Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 Cornell 
L. Rev. 297, 301, 320 (1991)). 
 41 
deliberate use of unilateral pricing measures for 
anticompetitive purposes.‖  Id. at 322.  Moreover, the Court 
noted, bidding up input prices, like lowering costs, is often 
―the very essence of competition.‖  Id. at 323 (citing Brooke 
Grp., 509 U.S. at 226).  ―Just as sellers use output prices to 
compete for purchasers, buyers use bid prices to compete for 
scarce inputs.  There are myriad legitimate reasons—ranging 
from benign to affirmatively procompetitive—why a buyer 
might bid up input prices.‖  Id.  Furthermore, high bidding 
will often benefit consumers because it will likely lead to the 
firm‘s acquisition of more inputs, which will generally lead to 
the manufacture of more outputs, and an increase in outputs 
generally results in lower prices for consumers.  Id. at 324.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court adopted a variation of the 
price-cost test for allegations of predatory bidding:  ―[a] 
plaintiff must prove that the alleged predatory bidding led to 
below-cost pricing of the predator‘s outputs.‖  Id. at 325.  In 
other words, the firm‘s predatory bidding must have caused 
the cost of the relevant output to increase above the revenues 
generated by the sale of such output.  Id. 
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine 
Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court relied, in part, on 
the price-cost test to hold that the plaintiffs‘ price-squeezing 
claim was not cognizable under the Sherman Act.  555 U.S. at 
457.  In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, an 
integrated firm that sold inputs at wholesale and sold finished 
goods at retail, drove its competitors out of the market by 
raising the wholesale price while simultaneously lowering the 
retail price.  Id. at 442.  The Court held that, pursuant to 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 
 42 
409-10, the wholesale claim was not cognizable because the 
defendant had no antitrust duty to deal with its competitors at 
the wholesale level, and pursuant to Brooke Group, the retail 
claim was not cognizable because the defendant‘s retail prices 
were above cost.  linkLine, 555 U.S. at 457.  As to the retail 
claim, the Court explained that ―recognizing a price-squeeze 
claim where the defendant‘s retail price remains above cost 
would invite the precise harm‖ the price-cost test was 
designed to avoid: a firm might refrain from aggressive price 
competition to avoid potential antitrust liability.  Id. at 451-
52.  Recognizing that the plaintiffs were trying to combine 
two non-cognizable claims into a new form of antitrust 
liability, the Court explained that ―[t]wo wrong claims do not 
make one that is right.‖  Id. at 457. 
Contrary to Eaton‘s argument, neither Weyerhaeuser 
nor linkLine stands for the proposition that the price-cost test 
applies here.  Weyerhaeuser established the straightforward 
principle that the exercise of market power on prices for the 
purpose of driving out competitors should be judged by the 
same standard, whether such power is exercised on the input 
or output side of the market.  See 549 U.S. at 321, 325.  And 
linkLine did no more than hold that two antitrust theories 
cannot be combined to form a new theory of antitrust liability.  
See 555 U.S. at 457.  The plaintiffs‘ retail-level claim in 
linkLine was a traditional pricing practices claim, and 
therefore indistinguishable from the pricing practices claims 
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in Brooke Group, Atlantic Richfield, and Cargill.  555 U.S. at 
451-52, 457.
13
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 Eaton also relies heavily on the Supreme Court‘s 
statement in Atlantic Richfield v. USA Petroleum Co. that 
price-cost principles apply ―regardless of the type of antitrust 
claim involved.‖  495 U.S. at 340.  When read in context, 
however, it is clear that this statement means that the price-
cost test applies regardless of the statute under which a 
pricing practices claim is brought, not that the price-cost 
applies regardless of the type of anticompetitive conduct. 
In Atlantic Richfield, the plaintiffs argued that no 
showing of below-cost pricing was required to establish 
antitrust injury for a claim of illegal price-fixing under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the price agreement 
itself was illegal, and any losses that stem from such an 
agreement, by definition, flow from that which makes the 
defendant‘s conduct unlawful.  Id. at 338.  The Supreme 
Court rejected that argument, reasoning that although price-
fixing is unlawful under Section 1, a plaintiff does not suffer 
antitrust injury unless it is adversely affected by an 
anticompetitive aspect of the defendant‘s conduct, and ―in the 
context of pricing practices, only predatory pricing has the 
requisite anticompetitive effect.‖  Id. at 339 (citing Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977)) 
(additional citations omitted).  It was in this in context, in 
rejecting an argument that Section 1 was somehow exempt 
from the price-cost test, that the Supreme Court made the 
broad statement that it has ―adhered to . . . [price-cost] 
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In contrast to the price-cost test line of cases, here, 
Plaintiffs do not allege that price itself functioned as the 
exclusionary tool.  As such, we conclude that the price-cost 
test is not adequate to judge the legality of Eaton‘s conduct.  
Although prices are unlikely to exclude equally efficient 
rivals unless they are below-cost, exclusive dealing 
arrangements can exclude equally efficient (or potentially 
equally efficient) rivals, and thereby harm competition, 
irrespective of below-cost pricing.  See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 
191.  Where, as here, a dominant supplier enters into de facto 
exclusive dealing arrangements with every customer in the 
                                                                                                     
principle[s] regardless of the type of antitrust claim 
involved.‖  See id. at 340. 
The Court‘s discussion following this statement 
supports our interpretation.  The Court went on to explain 
that, for purposes of determining whether a plaintiff has 
suffered antitrust injury in a pricing practices case, Section 1 
is no different than, for example, the plaintiff‘s allegation in 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. that the defendants‘ 
unlawful merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act caused 
antitrust injury.  Id. at 340 (citing Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116) 
(―To be sure, the source of the price competition in the instant 
case was an agreement allegedly unlawful under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act rather than a merger in violation of § 7 of the 
Clayton Act.  But that difference is not salient.‖).  Moreover, 
Atlantic Richfield was decided before LePage’s and we did 
not interpret the ―regardless of the type of antitrust claim 
involved‖ language as mandating the application of the price-
cost test to 3M‘s bundled rebates. 
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market, other firms may be driven out not because they 
cannot compete on a price basis, but because they are never 
given an opportunity to compete, despite their ability to offer 
products with significant customer demand.  See id. at 191, 
194.  Therefore, Eaton‘s attempt to characterize this case as a 
pricing practices case, subject to the price-cost test, is 
unavailing.  We hold that, instead, the rule of reason from 
Tampa Electric and its progeny must be applied to evaluate 
Plaintiffs‘ claims. 
B.  Proof of Anticompetitive  
Conduct and Antitrust Injury 
 We turn now to Eaton‘s contention that even leaving 
aside the price-cost test, Plaintiffs failed to prove that Eaton‘s 
LTAs were anticompetitive or that they caused antitrust 
injury to Plaintiffs.  The rule of reason governs Plaintiffs‘ 
claims under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  See LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 157 
& n.10 (explaining that exclusive dealing claims are 
cognizable under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, and evaluated under the same 
rule of reason); see also Section III.A, supra, at n.9.  Under 
the rule of reason, an exclusive dealing arrangement is 
anticompetitive only if its ―probable effect‖ is to substantially 
lessen competition in the relevant market, rather than merely 
disadvantage rivals.  Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 328-29. 
In addition to establishing a statutory violation, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that it suffered antitrust injury.  
Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 75.  To establish antitrust injury, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate:  ―(1) harm of the type the antitrust 
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laws were intended to prevent; and (2) an injury to the 
plaintiff which flows from that which makes defendant‘s acts 
unlawful.‖  Id. at 76 (quoting Gulfstream III Assocs. Inc. v. 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 
1993)) (additional citation omitted). 
Our inquiry on appeal has several components.  First, 
we examine whether the LTAs could reasonably be viewed as 
exclusive dealing arrangements, despite the fact that the 
LTAs covered less than 100% of the OEMs‘ purchase 
requirements and contained no express exclusivity provisions.  
Second, because the unique characteristics of the HD 
transmissions market bear heavily on our inquiry, we review 
Eaton‘s monopoly power, the concentrated nature of the 
market, and the ability of a monopolist in Eaton‘s position to 
engage in coercive conduct.  Third, we discuss the 
anticompetitive effects of the various provisions in the LTAs, 
and consider Eaton‘s procompetitive justifications for the 
agreements.  Finally, we consider whether Plaintiffs 
established that they suffered antitrust injury as a result of 
Eaton‘s conduct. 
1.  De Facto Partial Exclusive Dealing 
A threshold requirement for any exclusive dealing 
claim is necessarily the presence of exclusive dealing.  Eaton 
argues that Plaintiffs‘ claims must fail because the LTAs were 
not ―true‖ exclusive dealing arrangements in that they did not 
contain express exclusivity requirements, nor did they cover 
100% of the OEMs‘ purchases.  Neither contention is 
persuasive because de facto partial exclusive dealing 
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arrangements may, under certain circumstances, be actionable 
under the antitrust laws.
14
 
First, the law is clear that an express exclusivity 
requirement is not necessary because de facto exclusive 
dealing may be unlawful.  Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 326; 
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 193; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 157.  For 
example, in United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., we 
held that transactions which were ―technically only a series of 
independent sales‖ could form the basis for an exclusive 
dealing claim because the large share of the market held by 
the defendant and its conduct in excluding competitors, 
―realistically made the arrangements . . . as effective as those 
in written contracts.‖  399 F.3d at 193 (citing Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1984)).  
Likewise, in LePage’s, we held that bundled rebates and 
discounts offered to major suppliers were designed to and did 
                                              
14
 Our dissenting colleague objects to the phrase ―de 
facto partial exclusive dealing‖ as constituting a creative 
neologism that ―distorts the English language‖ and 
infrequently appears in a search of an online legal database.  
Dissenting Op., Part II.  ―De facto partial exclusive dealing‖ 
is certainly a neologism, but it also accurately represents that 
an exclusive dealing claim does not require a contract that 
imposes an express exclusivity obligation, Tampa Elec., 365 
U.S. at 326; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 193; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 
157, nor a contract that covers 100% of the buyer‘s needs, 
Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 328 (―[T]he competition foreclosed 
by the contract must be found to constitute a substantial share 
of the relevant market.‖) (emphasis added). 
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operate as exclusive dealing arrangements, despite the lack of 
any express exclusivity requirements.  324 F.3d at 157-58. 
Here, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury 
could infer that, although the LTAs did not expressly require 
the OEMs to meet the market penetration targets, the targets 
were as effective as mandatory purchase requirements.  See 
Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 326 (noting that ―even though a 
contract does ‗not contain specific agreements not to use the 
(goods) of a competitor,‘ if ‗the practical effect is to prevent 
such use,‘ it comes within the condition of [Section 3] as to 
exclusivity‖) (citing United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United 
States, 258 U.S. 451, 457 (1922)); Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 193-
94.  Evidence presented at trial indicated that not only were 
lower prices (rebates) conditioned on the OEMs meeting the 
market-share targets, but so too was Eaton‘s continued 
compliance with the LTAs.  For example, Eaton‘s LTAs with 
Freightliner, the largest OEM, and Volvo explicitly gave 
Eaton the right to terminate the agreements if the market-
share targets were not met.  And despite the fact that Eaton 
did not actually terminate the agreements on the rare occasion 
when an OEM failed to meet its target, the OEMs believed 
that it might.
15
  Critically, due to Eaton‘s position as the 
dominant supplier, no OEM could satisfy customer demand 
without at least some Eaton products, and therefore no OEM 
could afford to lose Eaton as a supplier.  Accordingly, we 
agree with the District Court that a jury could have concluded 
                                              
15
 In 2003, for example, PACCAR failed to meet its 
market penetration target, and although Eaton withdrew all 
contractual savings, it did not terminate the agreement. 
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that, under the circumstances, the market penetration targets 
were as effective as express purchase requirements ―because 
no risk averse business would jeopardize its relationship with 
the largest manufacturer of transmissions in the market.‖  ZF 
Meritor, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 692. 
Second, an agreement does not need to be 100% 
exclusive in order to meet the legal requirements of exclusive 
dealing.  We acknowledge that ―partial‖ exclusive dealing is 
rarely a valid antitrust theory.  See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 
110 n.24 (―An agreement affecting less than all purchases 
does not amount to true exclusive dealing.‖) (citation 
omitted); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1044, 1062-63 (noting 
that the defendant‘s discount program, which conditioned 
incremental discounts on customers purchasing 60-80% of 
their needs from the defendant, did not constitute exclusive 
dealing because customers were not required to purchase all 
of their requirements from the defendant, and in fact, could 
purchase up to 40% of their requirements from other sellers 
without foregoing the discounts); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that contract requiring buyer to purchase a fixed quantity of 
goods that amounted to roughly 60-80% of its needs was not 
unlawful ―[b]ecause the agreements contained no exclusive 
dealing clause and did not require [the buyer] to purchase any 
amounts of [the defendant‘s product] that even approached 
[its] requirements‖) (citations omitted).  Partial exclusive 
dealing agreements such as partial requirements contracts and 
contracts stipulating a fixed dollar or quantity amount are 
generally lawful because market foreclosure is only partial, 
and competing sellers are not prevented from selling to the 
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buyer.  See Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062-63; Magnus 
Petroleum, 599 F.2d at 200-01. 
However, we decline to adopt Eaton‘s view that a 
requirements contract covering less than 100% of the buyer‘s 
needs can never be an unlawful exclusive dealing 
arrangement.  See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67 
(―Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions 
rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in 
antitrust law.‖).  ―Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to 
the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at 
issue.‖  Verizon Commc’ns, 540 U.S. at 411.  Therefore, just 
as ―total foreclosure‖ is not required for an exclusive dealing 
arrangement to be unlawful, nor is complete exclusivity 
required with each customer.  See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 191.  
The legality of such an arrangement ultimately depends on 
whether the agreement foreclosed a substantial share of the 
relevant market such that competition was harmed.  Tampa 
Elec., 365 U.S. at 326-28. 
In our case, although the market-share targets covered 
less than 100% of the OEMs‘ needs, a jury could nevertheless 
find that the LTAs unlawfully foreclosed competition in a 
substantial share of the HD transmissions market.  See id.  
There are only four direct purchasers of HD transmissions in 
North America, and Eaton, long the dominant supplier in the 
industry, entered into long-term agreements with each of 
them.  Compare Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1044 (noting the 
defendant was the market leader, but there were at least ten 
other competing manufacturers).  Each LTA imposed a 
market-penetration target of roughly 90% (with the exception 
of Volvo, which manufactured some of its own transmissions 
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for use in its own trucks), which we explained above, could 
be viewed as a requirement that the OEM purchase that 
percentage of its requirements from Eaton.  Although no 
agreement was completely exclusive, the foreclosure that 
resulted was no different than it would be in a market with 
many customers where a dominant supplier enters into 
complete exclusive dealing arrangements with 90% of the 
customer base.  Under such circumstances, the lack of 
complete exclusivity in each contract does not preclude 
Plaintiffs‘ de facto exclusive dealing claim.16 
2.  Market Conditions in HD Transmissions Market 
Exclusive dealing will generally only be unlawful 
where the market is highly concentrated, the defendant 
possesses significant market power, and there is some 
element of coercion present.  See Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 
329; Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 77-78; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 
159.  For example, if the defendant occupies a dominant 
position in the market, its exclusive dealing arrangements 
invariably have the power to exclude rivals.  Tampa Elec., 
365 U.S. at 329; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187.  Here, the jury 
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 Additionally, the District Court instructed the jury 
that Plaintiffs did not allege ―actual‖ exclusive dealing, but 
instead alleged that ―the long-term supply contracts with 
defendant, in effect, committed the OEMs to purchase at least 
a substantial share of their transmissions from defendant.‖  
The District Court defined such an arrangement as a ―‗de 
facto‘ exclusive dealing contract.‖  Eaton does not challenge 
this instruction on appeal. 
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found that Eaton possessed monopoly power in the HD 
transmissions market, and Eaton does not contest that finding 
on appeal. 
A hard look at the nature of the market in which the 
parties compete is equally important.  Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. 
at 329.  An exclusive dealing arrangement is most likely to 
present a threat to competition in a situation in which the 
market is highly concentrated, such that long-term contracts 
operate to ―foreclose so large a percentage of the available 
supply or outlets that entry‖ or continued operation in ―the 
concentrated market is unreasonably constricted.‖  Race 
Tires, 614 F.3d at 76 (quoting E. Food Servs., 357 F.3d at 8); 
see Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 184 (noting that the relevant market 
was ―marked by a low or no-growth potential‖ and the 
defendant had long dominated the industry with a 75-80% 
market share).  Here, the HD transmissions market had long 
been dominated by Eaton.  Except for Meritor‘s production of 
manual transmissions in the 1990s and the ZF Meritor joint 
venture, no significant external supplier has entered the 
market for the last twenty years.  A jury could certainly infer 
that Eaton‘s dominance over the OEMs created a barrier to 
entry that any potential rival manufacturer would have to 
confront.  See Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1059 (―If entry 
barriers to new firms are not significant, it may be difficult 
for even a monopoly company to control prices through some 
type of exclusive dealing arrangement because a new firm or 
firms easily can enter the market to challenge it [but] [i]f 
there are significant entry barriers . . . , a potential competitor 
would have difficulty entering.‖) (citations omitted).  The 
record shows that the barriers to entry in the North American 
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HD transmission market are especially high:  HD 
transmissions are expensive to produce; transmissions 
developed for other geographic markets must be substantially 
modified for the North American market; and all HD 
transmission sales must pass through the highly concentrated 
intermediate market in which the OEMs operate.  Eaton‘s 
theory that ZF Meritor or any new HD transmissions 
manufacturer would be able to ―steal‖ an Eaton customer by 
offering a superior product at a lower price ―simply has not 
proved to be realistic.‖  Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 194 (citation 
omitted); compare NicSand, 507 F.3d at 454 (in finding 
exclusive dealing arrangements lawful, noting that the 
plaintiff was the market leader, and lost business due to a new 
entrant‘s competition).  ―The paltry penetration in the market 
by competitors over the years has been a refutation of 
[Eaton‘s] theory by tangible and measurable results in the real 
world.‖  Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 194; see Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 
55 (noting importance of significant barriers to entry in 
maintaining monopoly power, in spite of the plaintiffs‘ self-
imposed problems). 
Although we generally ―assume that a customer will 
make [its] decision only on the merits,‖ Santana Prods., Inc. 
v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 
F.3d 518, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1999)), a monopolist may use its 
power to break the competitive mechanism and deprive 
customers of the ability to make a meaningful choice.  See 
Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 77 (noting that coercion ―has played a 
key, if sometimes unexplored, role‖ in antitrust law); 
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 184 (observing that the defendant 
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―imposed‖ an exclusivity policy on its customers); LePage’s, 
324 F.3d at 159 (explaining that because 3M occupied a 
dominant position in several different product markets, it was 
able to effectively force customers in the ―private label‖ tape 
market to deal with 3M exclusively, despite the plaintiff‘s 
competitiveness in that market).  A highly concentrated 
market, in which there is one (or a few) dominant supplier(s), 
creates the possibility for such coercion.  And here, there was 
evidence that Eaton leveraged its position as a supplier of 
necessary products to coerce the OEMs into entering into the 
LTAs.  Plaintiffs presented testimony from OEM officials 
that many of the terms of the LTAs were unfavorable to the 
OEMs and their customers, but that the OEMs agreed to such 
terms because without Eaton‘s transmissions, the OEMs 
would be unable to satisfy customer demand.
17
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 Eaton emphasizes that the OEMs are multi-billion 
dollar companies (or at least owned by multi-billion dollar 
parent companies), and therefore claims that the OEMs 
dictated terms to Eaton – not the other way around.  
Significantly, in United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., 
we found coercion even though the relationship between the 
customers and the defendant was not totally one-sided.  399 
F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the defendant 
considered bypassing dealers and selling directly to customers 
but abandoned that strategy out of fear that dealers might 
retaliate by refusing to buy other products manufactured by 
the defendant).  Moreover, even assuming that the evidence 
could support a conclusion that the OEMs had more power in 
the relationship, the fact that two reasonable conclusions 
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Accordingly, this case involves precisely the 
combination of factors that we explained would be present in 
the rare case in which exclusive dealing would pose a threat 
to competition.  See Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 76. 
3.  Sufficiency of the Evidence: Anticompetitive Conduct 
 We turn now to a discussion of whether there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Eaton engaged 
in anticompetitive conduct.  Our inquiry in a sufficiency of 
the evidence challenge is limited to determining whether, 
―viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
[winner at trial] and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could find liability.‖  Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted).  Eaton argues that even under the 
extraordinarily deferential standard, there was insufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Eaton engaged 
in conduct that harmed competition.  Guided by the principles 
set forth in Section III.A.1, supra, we disagree. 
i.  Extent of Foreclosure 
First, the extent of the market foreclosure in this case 
was significant.  ―The share of the market foreclosed is 
important because, for the contract to have an adverse effect 
upon competition, ‗the opportunities for other[s] . . . to enter 
                                                                                                     
could be drawn from the evidence does not make the jury‘s 
adoption of Plaintiffs‘ view unreasonable. 
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into or remain in that market must be significantly limited.‘‖  
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 69 (citing Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 
328).  Substantial foreclosure allows the dominant firm to 
prevent potential rivals from ever reaching ―the critical level 
necessary‖ to pose a real threat to the defendant‘s business.  
Dentsply, 339 F.3d at 191.  Here, Eaton entered into long-
term agreements with every direct purchaser in the market, 
and under each agreement, imposed what could be viewed as 
mandatory purchase requirements of at least 80%, and up to 
97.5%.  The OEMs generally met these targets, which, as 
Plaintiffs‘ expert testified, resulted in approximately 15% of 
the market remaining open to Eaton‘s competitors by 2003.18  
See LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 159 (noting that foreclosure of 
40% to 50% is usually required to establish an exclusive 
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 ZF Meritor‘s expert, Dr. David DeRamus, testified 
at trial that Eaton‘s market share was consistently above 80% 
from 2000 through 2007.  Later in his testimony, DeRamus 
concluded that Eaton‘s increased market share from 2000 to 
2007 was the result of the LTAs.  Furthermore, DeRamus 
showed that ZF Meritor‘s market share percentages in the 
linehaul transmissions market (i.e., the only portion of the 
overall HD transmissions market in which ZF Meritor 
competed), dropped from 32% to 24% between 2000 and 
2002, and dropped even further from 24% to 12% between 
2002 and 2003, before ultimately falling to 0% in 2007.  
DeRamus concluded that the loss of ZF Meritor‘s linehaul 
transmissions market share and its eventual exit from the 
market were due to Eaton‘s conduct and, specifically, the 
LTAs. 
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dealing violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (citing 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70)).  From 2000 through 2003, 
Plaintiffs‘ overall market share ranged from 8-14%, and by 
2005, Plaintiffs‘ market share had dropped to 4%. 
ii.  Duration of LTAs 
Second, the LTAs were not short-term agreements, 
which would present little threat to competition.  See, e.g., 
Christofferson Dairy, Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 
1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding exclusive dealing 
arrangement of ―short duration‖); Roland Mach. Co. v. 
Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(noting that exclusive dealing contracts of less than one year 
are presumptively lawful); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 237 
(citing two-year term in upholding requirements contract).  
Rather, each LTA was for a term of at least five years, and the 
PACCAR LTA was for a seven-year term.
19
  See FTC v. 
Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 393-96 
(1953) (upholding contracts of one year or less, but 
condemning contract terms ranging from two to five years).  
Although long exclusive dealing contracts are not per se 
unlawful, ―[t]he significance of any particular contract 
duration is a function of both the number of such contracts 
and market share covered by the exclusive-dealing contracts.‖  
Hovenkamp ¶ 1802g, at 98.  Here, Eaton entered into long-
term contracts with every direct purchaser in the market, 
which locked up over 85% of the market for at least five 
                                              
19
 Eaton and Freightliner revised their original LTA to 
increase the duration to ten years. 
 58 
years.  Although long-term agreements had previously been 
used in the HD transmissions industry, it was unprecedented 
for a supplier to enter into contracts of such duration with the 
entire customer base. 
Eaton acknowledges, as it must, the unprecedented 
length of the LTAs, but maintains that the LTAs were not 
anticompetitive because they were easily terminable.  See, 
e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 111 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (finding challenged contracts lawful, in part, 
because they were terminable at will); Omega Envtl., 127 
F.3d at 1164 (noting easy terminability of agreements).  Each 
LTA included a ―competitiveness‖ clause, which permitted 
the OEM to purchase from another supplier or terminate the 
agreement if another supplier offered a better product or a 
lower price.  However, Plaintiffs presented evidence that any 
language giving OEMs the right to terminate the agreements 
was essentially meaningless because Eaton had assured that 
there would be no other supplier that could fulfill the OEMs‘ 
needs or offer a lower price.  Thus, a jury could very well 
conclude that ―in spite of the legal ease with which the 
relationship c[ould] be terminated,‖ the OEMs had a strong 
economic incentive to adhere to the terms of the LTAs, and 
therefore were not free to walk away from the agreements and 
purchase products from the supplier of their choice.  
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 194. 
iii.  Additional Anticompetitive Provisions in LTAs 
Third, the LTAs were replete with provisions that a 
reasonable jury could find anticompetitive.  To begin, a jury 
could have found that the data book provisions were 
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anticompetitive in that they limited the ability of ZF Meritor 
to effectively market its products, and limited the ability of 
truck buyers to choose from a full menu of available 
transmissions.  See id. (discussing anticompetitive effect of 
limitations on customer choice).  Eaton downplays the 
significance of the data book provisions, arguing that truck 
buyers always remained free to request unlisted 
transmissions, and ZF Meritor remained free to market 
directly to truck buyers.  However, the mere existence of 
potential alternative avenues of distribution, without ―an 
assessment of their overall significance to the market,‖ is 
insufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs‘ opportunities to 
compete were not foreclosed.  Id. at 196.  An OEM‘s data 
book was the ―most important tool‖ that any buyer selecting 
component parts for a truck would use.  If a product was not 
listed in a data book, it was ―a disaster for the supplier.‖  
Although truck buyers could request unpublished 
components, doing so involved additional transaction costs, 
and in practice, meant that truck buyers were far more likely 
to select a product listed in the data book.  See id. at 193 
(explaining that the key question was not whether alternative 
distribution methods allowed a competitor to ―survive‖ but 
whether the alternative methods would ―pose[] a real threat‖ 
to the defendant‘s monopoly) (citing Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 
71).  Additionally, prior to the LTAs, it was not common 
practice for one supplier to be given exclusive data book 
listing.  Historically, data books had included all product 
offerings, including Meritor transmissions, and the OEMs 
acknowledged that removing ZF Meritor products, especially 
FreedomLine, from the data books was ―from a customer 
perspective,‖ the wrong thing to do so because they were 
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―good product[s] with considerable demand in the 
marketplace.‖ 
A jury could also have found that the ―preferential 
pricing‖ provisions in the LTAs were anticompetitive.  
Although it was ―common‖ for price savings to be passed 
down to truck buyers in the form of lower prices, and there 
are indications that at least some of the savings from Eaton 
transmissions were indeed passed down, there is also 
evidence that the preferential prices were achieved by 
artificially increasing the prices of Plaintiffs‘ products. 
Additionally, the jury could have determined that the 
―competitiveness‖ clauses were of little practical import 
because Eaton‘s conduct ensured that no rival would be able 
to offer a comparable deal.  There was also evidence that the 
competitiveness clauses were met with stiff resistance by 
Eaton. 
iv.  Anticompetitive Effects vs. Procompetitive Effects 
 Finally, the only procompetitive justification offered 
by Eaton on appeal is that the LTAs were crafted to meet 
customer demand to reduce prices, as well as engineering and 
support costs.  See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 111 (explaining 
that courts must ―evaluate the restrictiveness and the 
economic usefulness of the challenged practice in relation to 
the business factors extant in the market‖) (citations omitted).  
In response to the economic downturn in the heavy-duty 
trucking industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s, each 
OEM sought to negotiate lower prices, and some sought to 
reduce the number of suppliers.  During this time, oversupply 
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was a problem, as were low truck prices, and an 
unavailability of drivers.  It appears that Eaton responded 
well to the downturn; despite persistent quality control 
problems and a relatively late introduction of two-pedal 
automated mechanical transmissions, the company cut costs 
and increased market share. 
However, no OEM ever asked Eaton to be a sole 
supplier, and there was considerable testimony from OEM 
officials that it was in an OEM‘s interest to have multiple 
suppliers.  Although long-term agreements offering market-
share or volume discounts had been used in the industry in the 
past (for transmissions and for other truck components), OEM 
executives consistently testified that Eaton‘s new LTAs 
represented a substantial departure from past practice.  For 
example, the longest supply agreements Freightliner and 
Volvo had ever signed previously were for two-year terms.  
Likewise, OEM officials testified that the provisions in the 
LTAs requiring exclusive data book listing and ―preferential 
pricing‖ were not common.  Critically, there was considerable 
evidence from which a jury could infer that the primary 
purpose of the LTAs was not to meet customer demand, but 
to take preemptive steps to block potential competition from 
the new ZF Meritor joint venture.  Eaton devised the 
unprecedented LTAs only after Meritor formed the joint 
venture with ZF AG, which Eaton viewed as a ―serious 
competitor.‖  Eaton feared that the ZF Meritor joint venture 
would put Eaton‘s ―[North American] position at risk‖ by 
introducing a new product (FreedomLine) for which there 
was significant customer demand, but for which Eaton did not 
produce a comparable alternative. 
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In sum, the LTAs included numerous provisions 
raising anticompetitive concerns and there was evidence that 
Eaton sought to aggressively enforce the agreements, even 
when OEMs voiced objections.
20
  Accordingly, we hold that 
there was more than sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude 
that the cumulative effect of Eaton‘s conduct was to adversely 
affect competition.
21
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 Judge Greenberg, in dissent, objects that our rule of 
reason analysis fails to consider that Eaton‘s prices were 
above cost.  Dissenting Op., Part II.  However, contrary to 
this objection, and even though ZF Meritor does not contend 
that Eaton‘s prices operated as an exclusionary tool, we do 
not view Eaton‘s prices as irrelevant to the rule of reason 
analysis.  Rather than analyzing the alleged exclusionary 
provisions in a vacuum, we analyze these provisions in the 
larger context of the LTAs as a whole, and we recognize that 
Eaton maintained above-cost prices.  We conclude that ZF 
Meritor presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that, 
even though not every provision was exclusionary, the LTAs 
as a whole functioned as exclusive dealing agreements that 
adversely affected competition. 
21
 It is worth noting that despite Eaton‘s contention 
that Plaintiffs‘ higher prices and quality problems led to their 
decline in market share, the OEMs felt differently.  In 2002, a 
Freightliner executive wrote:  ―[t]his is a dangerous situation.  
We have already killed Meritor‘s transmission business.  It is 
just a matter of time before they close their doors.‖  Likewise, 
a 2006 Volvo presentation states: ―With all its OEM 
customers, Eaton has established long term supply contracts 
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4.  Sufficiency of the Evidence: Antitrust Injury 
Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could determine that the LTAs functioned 
as unlawful exclusive dealing agreements, we have no 
difficulty concluding that there was likewise sufficient 
evidence that Plaintiffs suffered antitrust injury.  See Atl. 
Richfield, 495 U.S. at 344 (explaining that a plaintiff suffers 
antitrust injury if its injury ―stems from a competition-
reducing aspect or effect of the defendant‘s behavior‖).  
Eaton‘s conduct unlawfully foreclosed a substantial share of 
the HD transmissions market, which would otherwise have 
been available for rivals, including Plaintiffs.  ZF Meritor 
exited the market in 2003, followed by Meritor in 2006, 
because they could not maintain high enough market shares to 
remain viable.  A jury could certainly conclude that Plaintiffs‘ 
inability to grow was a direct result of Eaton‘s exclusionary 
conduct.  
C.  Expert Testimony 
1.  Expert Testimony on Liability 
 Eaton raises two challenges to the District Court‘s 
decision to admit DeRamus‘s testimony on liability.  First, 
Eaton argues that DeRamus failed to employ any recognized 
or reliable economic test for determining whether Eaton‘s 
                                                                                                     
. . . [which] ha[ve] led to . . . Eaton‘s only North American 
competitor, Meritor, [being] gradually marginalized to its 
current market position with a 10% market share.‖ 
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conduct harmed competition and caused antitrust injury.  
Second, Eaton contends that DeRamus‘s opinion was 
contradicted by the facts.  We disagree with both 
contentions.
22
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise if: (a) the expert‘s scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony 
is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles 
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case. 
Under Rule 702, the district court acts as a ―gatekeeper‖ to 
ensure that ―the expert‘s opinion [is] based on the methods 
and procedures of science rather than on subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.‖  Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 
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 Eaton also argues that DeRamus‘s testimony was 
contrary to law because he did not employ a price-cost test.  
However, as we explained above, no price-cost test was 
required in this case. 
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1994)).  Here, as the District Court noted, DeRamus relied on 
the exclusionary nature of the LTAs to form his opinion.  He 
defined the relevant market, determined whether Eaton has 
monopoly power, and engaged in an analysis of Eaton‘s 
conduct, taking into account market conditions and the extent 
of the exclusive dealing.  He examined the effect of the LTAs 
on prices and consumer choice, and considered whether 
foreclosure of the market could be attributed to factors other 
than the LTAs, such as market conditions or quality issues 
with Plaintiffs‘ products.  We find no error in the District 
Court‘s acceptance of DeRamus‘s methodologies as reliable 
under Rule 702.  See LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 154-64 (analyzing 
exclusive dealing by looking to many of the same factors 
considered by DeRamus). 
Eaton also argues that DeRamus‘s opinion was 
contradicted by the facts.  ―When an expert opinion is not 
supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the 
law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise 
render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury‘s 
verdict.‖  Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 242; Phila. Newspapers, 
51 F.3d at 1198.  In an antitrust case, an expert opinion 
generally must ―incorporate all aspects of the economic 
reality‖ of the relevant market.  Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 
1057.  Here, the District Court properly rejected Eaton‘s 
argument that DeRamus‘s testimony should have been 
excluded on the basis that it was contradicted by other facts.  
Eaton‘s argument on this point really amounts to nothing 
more than a complaint that DeRamus did not adopt Eaton‘s 
view of the case.  The District Court correctly noted that, 
although some of DeRamus‘s testimony may have been 
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contradicted by other evidence, including the testimony of 
Eaton‘s expert, the existence of conflicting evidence was not 
a basis on which to exclude DeRamus‘s testimony.  The 
respective credibility of Plaintiffs‘ and Eaton‘s experts was a 
question for the jury to decide.  LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 165.  
DeRamus was extensively cross-examined and Eaton 
presented testimony from its own expert, who opined that the 
LTAs had no anticompetitive effect.  In the end, the jury 
apparently found DeRamus to be more credible.  ―[Eaton]‘s 
disappointment as to the jury‘s finding of credibility does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion by the District Court in 
allowing [DeRamus‘s] testimony.‖  Id. at 166. 
2.  Expert Testimony on Damages 
 In their cross-appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the District 
Court erred in excluding DeRamus‘s testimony on the issue 
of damages.  The core of DeRamus‘s damages analysis was 
one page (titled ―Five Year Product Line Profit and Loss‖) of 
ZF Meritor‘s Revised Strategic Business Plan (―SBP‖) for 
fiscal years 2002 through 2005, which was presented to ZF 
Meritor‘s Board of Directors in November 2000.23  The 
District Court determined that, although DeRamus used 
methodologies regularly employed by economists, his opinion 
nevertheless failed the reliability requirements of Daubert and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence because the underlying data 
                                              
23
 The SBP contained a five-year forecast of profit and 
loss estimates based on estimated unit sales, unit prices, 
manufacturing costs, operating expenses, and other 
considerations. 
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was not sufficiently reliable.  The District Court 
acknowledged that experts often rely on business plans in 
forming damages estimates, but concluded that DeRamus‘s 
reliance on the SBP in this case was improper because he did 
not know either the qualifications of the individuals who 
prepared the SBP estimates or the assumptions upon which 
the estimates were based.  Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
clarification, which asked the District Court to allow 
DeRamus to testify based on his existing expert report to 
damages estimates independent of the SBP, or, in the 
alternative, to allow him to amend his report to include the 
alternate damages estimates.  The District Court did not 
resolve the damages issue at that time, and bifurcated the 
case.  After the trial on liability, Plaintiffs supplemented their 
pre-trial motion for clarification, adding several new 
arguments based on developments at trial, and renewing their 
request that DeRamus be allowed to testify based on alternate 
calculations.  The District Court denied Plaintiffs‘ motion and 
awarded $0 in damages. 
 Our inquiry on appeal is two-fold.  Initially, we must 
determine whether the District Court erred in excluding the 
expert opinion of DeRamus on the basis that it was not 
sufficiently reliable.  Then, we must consider whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs‘ 
request to allow DeRamus to testify to alternative damages 
calculations.  We will address these issues in turn. 
i.  DeRamus‘s original damages calculations  
First, we will consider Plaintiffs‘ contention that the 
District Court erred in determining that DeRamus‘s damages 
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opinion was not sufficiently reliable.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, as amended in 2000 to incorporate the 
standards set forth in Daubert, imposes an obligation upon a 
district court to ensure that expert testimony is not only 
relevant, but reliable.  Fed. R. Evid. 702; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 
744.  As we have made clear, ―the reliability analysis 
[required by Daubert] applies to all aspects of an expert‘s 
testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert‘s 
opinion, [and] the link between the facts and the conclusion.‖  
Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999); 
see also id. (―Not only must each stage of the expert‘s 
testimony be reliable, but each stage must be evaluated 
practically and flexibly without bright-line exclusionary (or 
inclusionary) rules.‖).  As we explain below, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that DeRamus‘s 
damages estimate, which was based heavily on the SPB 
projections, bore insufficient indicia of reliability to be 
submitted to a jury. 
To determine the damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a 
result of Eaton‘s anticompetitive conduct, DeRamus 
conducted a two-part analysis.  He computed Plaintiffs‘ lost 
profits for the period between 2000 and 2009, as well as the 
lost enterprise value of Plaintiffs‘ HD transmissions business.  
To calculate Plaintiffs‘ lost profits, DeRamus first estimated 
the incremental revenues that Plaintiffs would have earned 
―but for‖ Eaton‘s anticompetitive conduct, and then 
subtracted from that figure the incremental cost that Plaintiffs 
would have had to incur to achieve such incremental sales. 
Ordinarily, such an approach would be appropriate 
because ―an expert may construct a reasonable offense-free 
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world as a yardstick for measuring what, hypothetically, 
would have happened ‗but for‘ the defendant‘s unlawful 
activities.‖  LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 165 (citations omitted).  
However, the District Court‘s primary criticism of 
DeRamus‘s report was that he did not construct an offense-
free world based on actual financial data, but instead relied on 
a one-page set of profit and volume projections without 
knowing the circumstances under which such projections 
were created or the assumptions on which they were based.  
In some circumstances, an expert might be able to rely on the 
estimates of others in constructing a hypothetical reality, but 
to do so, the expert must explain why he relied on such 
estimates and must demonstrate why he believed the 
estimates were reliable.  See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 592-95; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 748 n.18 (―Arguably, 
[third-party estimates] that an expert relies on are not his 
underlying data, but rather the data that went into the [third-
party estimates] in the first place are his underlying data.‖). 
Plaintiffs contend that DeRamus‘s reliance on the SBP 
estimates was appropriate because a company‘s internal 
financial projections, like those in the SBP, are regularly and 
reasonably relied upon by economists in formulating opinions 
regarding a company‘s performance in an offense-free world.  
Plaintiffs are certainly correct that ―internal projections for 
future growth‖ often serve as legitimate bases for expert 
opinions.  See LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 165; Autowest, Inc. v. 
Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that 
damages testimony was admissible because the financial 
projections on which the testimony was based ―were the 
product of deliberation by experienced businessmen charting 
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their future course‖).  Businesses are generally well-informed 
about the industries in which they operate, and have 
incentives to develop accurate projections.  As such, experts 
frequently use a plaintiff‘s business plan to estimate the 
plaintiff‘s expected profits in the absence of the defendant‘s 
misconduct.  See Litigation Services Handbook: The Role of 
the Financial Expert 24:13 (4th ed. 2007).  However, there is 
no per se rule of inclusion where an expert relies on a 
business plan; district courts must perform a case-by-case 
inquiry to determine whether the expert‘s reliance on the 
business plan in a given case is reasonable.  See Heller, 167 
F.3d at 155. 
Here, the District Court concluded that the SBP could 
not serve as a reliable basis for DeRamus‘s opinion because 
he was unaware of the qualifications of the individuals who 
prepared the document, or the assumptions on which the 
estimates were based.  Plaintiffs argue that these factual 
findings are contradicted by the record.  Admittedly, the 
record indicates that DeRamus did not, as the District Court 
suggested, blindly accept the SBP estimates without question.  
DeRamus was aware that the SBP had been presented to ZF 
Meritor‘s Board of Directors, and that it was revised several 
times to ―address and resolve queries management had about 
the reasonableness of the assumptions, projections, [and] 
forecasts.‖  He also knew that the Board had relied on the 
SBP in making business decisions.  Moreover, ZF Meritor‘s 
former president testified that he ―did not submit SBPs to 
management for review unless [he] believed the projections, 
forecasts, and assumptions therein to be reliable.‖ 
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However, contrary to Plaintiffs‘ assertions, these 
excerpts from the record do not contradict the District Court‘s 
ultimate findings.  The record amply supports the District 
Court‘s concern that, although DeRamus was generally aware 
of the circumstances under which the SBP was created and 
the purposes for which it was used, he lacked critical 
information that would be necessary for Eaton to effectively 
cross-examine him.  An expert‘s ―lack of familiarity with the 
methods and the reasons underlying [someone else‘s] 
projections virtually preclude[s] any assessment of the 
validity of the projections through cross-examination.‖  TK-7 
Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 732 (10th Cir. 
1993); compare Autowest, 434 F.2d at 566 (holding that 
projections of company officials were admissible where such 
officials ―set out at length the bases from which they derived 
their figures, and consequently, [the opposing party] was able 
to cross-examine them vigorously‖).  Here, DeRamus knew 
that the SBP was presented to the Board by experienced 
management professionals, but he did not know who initially 
calculated the SBP figures.  He did not know whether the 
SBP projections were calculated by ZF Meritor management, 
lower level employees at ZF Meritor, or came from some 
outside source.  Nor did DeRamus know the methodology 
used to create the SBP or the assumptions on which the SBP‘s 
price and volume estimates were based.
24
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 As the District Court noted, it is especially important 
for an expert to identify and justify the assumptions 
underlying financial projections when dealing with a new 
company.  Here, although Meritor had been in the HD 
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Under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we 
will not disturb a district court‘s decision to exclude 
testimony unless we are left with ―a definite and firm 
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of 
judgment.‖  In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citation omitted).  Plaintiffs cannot clear that high 
hurdle.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
acted within its discretion in determining that one page of 
financial projections for a nascent company, the assumptions 
underlying which were relatively unknown, did not provide 
―good grounds,‖ Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 590), for DeRamus to generate his damages 
estimate.  Compare LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 165 (noting that 
plaintiff‘s expert considered the defendant‘s internal 
projections for growth, but also closely examined the market 
conditions, including the past performance of competitors). 
Plaintiffs raise two additional challenges to the District 
Court‘s exclusion of DeRamus‘s testimony.  First, Plaintiffs 
contend that because the SBP was admitted into evidence at 
trial, Rule 703 does not provide a basis for exclusion.  
However, this argument is based on the flawed assumption 
that the District Court excluded DeRamus‘s testimony under 
Rule 703, rather than Rule 702.  Plaintiffs assume that 
because the District Court stated that ―DeRamus manipulated 
the SBP using methodologies employed by economists,‖ ZF 
Meritor, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 667, the District Court necessarily 
                                                                                                     
transmissions industry for over a decade, ZF Meritor was 
offering a brand new line of transmissions that had never 
before been sold in the North American market. 
 73 
concluded that Rule 702, which focuses on methodologies, 
was satisfied.  However, the District Court explicitly stated 
that ―the fundamental query‖ was ―whether the [SBP] 
estimates pass[ed] the reliability requirements of Rules 104, 
702, and 703.‖  Id.  Although it is not entirely clear from the 
District Court‘s opinion which rule the District Court relied 
upon in finding DeRamus‘s testimony inadmissible, we may 
affirm evidentiary rulings on any ground supported by the 
record, Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001), 
and we conclude that DeRamus‘s opinion was properly 
excluded because it failed the reliability requirements of Rule 
702.
25
 
Plaintiffs‘ suggestion that the reasonableness of an 
expert‘s reliance on facts or data to form his opinion is 
somehow an inappropriate inquiry under Rule 702 results 
                                              
25
 We base our affirmance of the District Court‘s 
decision entirely on the fact that DeRamus‘s opinion failed 
Rule 702, and do not decide whether Rule 703 provides an 
additional basis for exclusion.  We note, however, that 
Plaintiffs‘ argument that Rule 703 somehow constrains a 
district court‘s ability to conduct an assessment of reliability 
under Rule 702 is misplaced.  After all, a piece of evidence 
may be relevant for one purpose, and thus admissible at trial, 
but not be the type of information that can form the basis of a 
reliable expert opinion.  As the District Court stated, ―the fact 
that [a piece of evidence] [i]s part of [the] plaintiffs‘ ‗story‘ 
does not mean, ipso facto,‖ that an expert opinion relying on 
such evidence is admissible.  ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 
800 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (D. Del. 2011). 
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from an unduly myopic interpretation of Rule 702 and ignores 
the mandate of Daubert that the district court must act as a 
gatekeeper.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Heller, 167 F.3d at 
153 (―While ‗the focus, of course, must be solely on 
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate,‘ a district court must examine the expert‘s 
conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably 
flow from the facts known to the expert and the methodology 
used.‖) (emphasis added) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).  
Where proffered expert testimony‘s ―factual basis, data, 
principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently 
into question, . . . the trial judge must determine whether the 
testimony has ‗a reliable basis in the knowledge and 
experience of the relevant discipline.‘‖  Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 592).  A district court‘s inquiry under Rule 702 is ―a 
flexible one‖ and must be guided by the facts of the case.  
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 594.  Here, the District Court‘s 
analysis fell squarely within its flexible gatekeeping function 
under Daubert and Rule 702.  See Kumho Tire Co. 526 U.S. 
at 149; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 748 n.18; see also Elcock, 233 
F.3d at 754 (explaining that an expert‘s testimony regarding 
damages must be based on a sufficient factual foundation); 
Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 142 
(4th Cir. 1994) (―An expert‘s opinion should be excluded 
when it is based on assumptions which are speculative and 
not supported by the record.‖). 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court did not 
provide fair notice that it intended to exclude DeRamus‘s 
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.  Again, this 
 75 
argument rests on the flawed assumption that the District 
Court relied solely on Rule 703.  However, even assuming the 
District Court mistakenly believed that its Rule 702 reliability 
analysis actually fell under Rule 703, Plaintiffs‘ notice 
argument would still be meritless.  A district court must give 
the parties ―an adequate opportunity to be heard on 
evidentiary issues.‖  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli 
I), 916 F.2d 829, 854 (3d Cir. 1990).  Here, there was 
extensive briefing regarding DeRamus‘s damages opinion, 
much of which focused on Eaton‘s argument that DeRamus‘s 
reliance on the SBP was improper.  The District Court held 
not one, but two in limine hearings, in which DeRamus 
testified for several hours.  Compare id. at 854-55 (holding 
that the district court did not give the plaintiffs an adequate 
opportunity to be heard where it failed to conduct an in limine 
hearing and denied oral argument on the evidentiary issues).  
As such, Plaintiffs were well aware of, and had ample 
opportunity to be heard on, the question of whether 
DeRamus‘s reliance on the SBP rendered his testimony 
inadmissible. 
ii.  Alternate damages calculations 
The District Court‘s opinion excluding DeRamus‘s 
damages testimony focused exclusively on DeRamus‘s 
damages estimates based on the SBP projections regarding 
ZF Meritor‘s market share and profit margin.  However, his 
expert report also set forth market-share estimates based on 
an econometric model.  The econometric model did not 
consider the SBP, but instead used economic variables, such 
as the number of heavy-duty trucks built and sold in the North 
American market, an index of consumer confidence in the 
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United States, the average wholesale price of oil in the United 
States, and interest rates.  The model also considered ZF 
Meritor‘s market share from the previous month ―in order to 
capture market dynamics.‖ 
To reach his ultimate damages estimate, DeRamus 
averaged several damages calculations, each of which used a 
different combination of inputs for market share and profit 
margin.  Following the District Court‘s order excluding 
DeRamus‘s testimony due to his reliance on the SBP, 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for clarification, asking the District 
Court to allow DeRamus to calculate damages using the same 
methodologies from his expert report, but using data 
independent of the SBP.  Specifically, Plaintiffs proposed 
several revisions to DeRamus‘s damages estimate.  First, 
Plaintiffs indicated that DeRamus could revise his ―Eaton 
Operating Profit Method,‖ which used as principal inputs the 
SBP estimates for market share and Eaton‘s actual operating 
profits for profit margin.  Plaintiffs stated that DeRamus had 
recalculated lost profits using the same methodology, but 
replacing the market-share data from the SBP with market-
share data from his econometric model.  Second, Plaintiffs 
explained that DeRamus could similarly revise his 
―Econometric Method‖ of calculating lost profits, which used 
the econometric model for market share, and data from the 
SBP for profit margin.  He could use the same methodology 
and replace the profit margin data from the SBP with profit 
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margin data from Plaintiffs‘ actual sales data from 1996 
through 2000.
26
 
Noting that all of the data necessary for DeRamus‘s 
recalculations were already in the expert report, Plaintiffs 
requested that DeRamus be able to testify to the alternate 
calculations using the existing expert report.  Allowing 
DeRamus to testify to alternate damages numbers without 
amending his expert report would have left Eaton without 
advance notice of the new calculations, and thus would have 
been improper.  As such, the District Court did not err in 
ruling that DeRamus could not testify to new calculations 
based on the existing expert report.  However, the District 
Court‘s refusal to allow DeRamus to amend his expert report 
presents a much more difficult question, one that we will 
explore in depth. 
Before beginning our analysis, it is necessary to 
provide some context regarding the procedural history 
because the way in which the damages issue was handled by 
the District Court is significant to our determination that the 
District Court abused its discretion.  After the District Court 
granted Eaton‘s motion to exclude DeRamus‘s damages 
testimony, it granted leave for Plaintiffs to file a motion for 
clarification to identify damages calculations in DeRamus‘s 
expert report that were not based on the SBP.  On September 
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 Although the District Court did not address 
DeRamus‘s lost enterprise value calculations, Plaintiffs 
indicated in their motion for clarification that DeRamus could 
make similar revisions to those calculations. 
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9, 2009, ten days before trial was set to begin, Plaintiffs filed 
the motion, acknowledging that new calculations would be 
required, but submitting that all of the necessary data was 
already in the report.  The next day, the District Court held a 
pretrial conference, in which it considered Plaintiffs‘ motion, 
and determined that it had two options: to ―basically punt‖ on 
the damages issue and bifurcate the case, or to allow 
Plaintiffs‘ new damages theory to go forward and allow Eaton 
to depose DeRamus to examine his new theories.  The 
District Court concluded that the ―cleanest‖ option was to 
defer the damages issue, bifurcate, and proceed to trial on 
liability.  That way, the District Court stated, the damages 
issue would only need to be resolved if ―the jury c[ame] back 
with a plaintiffs‘ verdict, which [was] [up]held on appeal.‖  In 
opting to defer a decision on damages, the District Court 
noted that it ―did not . . . at the moment, have the time to 
parse [DeRamus‘s report] as carefully‖ as would be necessary 
to satisfactorily address the parties‘ arguments regarding 
damages. 
 The jury delivered its verdict on liability on October 8, 
2009, and the District Court entered judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs on October 14.  Two days later, Plaintiffs requested 
that the District Court set a trial on damages.  Eaton opposed 
Plaintiffs‘ request, asserting that the judgment on liability was 
a final appealable decision.  Although the District Court 
apparently agreed with Eaton initially, stating that it ―d[id] 
not intend to address damages until liability has been finally 
resolved by the Third Circuit,‖ the District Court 
subsequently issued an amended judgment, which stated that 
because damages had not been resolved, there was no final 
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appealable order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  
On November 3, 2009, Eaton filed its renewed motion for 
judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.  The District Court 
did not rule on the motion until March 2011.
27
 
Following the District Court‘s denial of Eaton‘s 
motion, Plaintiffs renewed their request for a damages trial.  
On July 25, 2011, the District Court held a status conference, 
in which it heard arguments on whether the liability issue was 
appealable as a judgment on fewer than all claims under Rule 
54(b).  Although the District Court initially indicated that it 
would proceed under Rule 54(b), and once again defer 
resolution of the damages issue, after both parties agreed that 
the judgment on liability was not appealable under Rule 54(b) 
(and that it was unlikely that this Court would grant an 
interlocutory appeal), the District Court acknowledged that it 
would ―need to go back to the papers and see how I extract 
myself from the procedural morass that I put myself in.‖  The 
District Court then signaled the way in which it would extract 
itself, stating ―so let‘s assume that I am going to resurrect a 
motion that is two years old [Plaintiffs‘ September 3, 2009 
motion for clarification], and let‘s assume that I deny it, and 
we‘re left with the situation we have now.  At that point, 
would it make sense to have a cross-appeal on liability, on the 
Daubert decision, and get it up to the Third Circuit?‖ 
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 It is unclear from the record why sixteen months 
passed between Eaton‘s motion and the District Court‘s 
decision on the motion. 
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Several days later, on August 4, 2011, the District 
Court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying 
Plaintiffs‘ motion for clarification, and awarding $0 in 
damages.  The District Court‘s entire analysis of Plaintiffs‘ 
request to modify DeRamus‘s report consisted of one 
paragraph.  The District Court concluded that allowing 
Plaintiffs to amend DeRamus‘s expert report ―would be 
tantamount to reopening expert discovery‖ because DeRamus 
would need to be deposed again and Eaton would have to 
prepare another rebuttal expert report.  The District Court also 
noted that, when it granted leave for Plaintiffs to move for 
clarification, leave was granted only for Plaintiffs to show 
that DeRamus‘s report already contained an alternate 
damages calculation, and that Plaintiffs‘ motion requested 
permission to submit additional damages calculations.  
Therefore, the District Court concluded, ―[a]t this stage of the 
litigation,‖ it would not give Plaintiffs an opportunity to 
modify their damages estimate. 
We provide this extensive review of the procedural 
history to make a basic point: while we appreciate the District 
Court‘s attempt to conserve judicial resources and refrain 
from addressing the damages issue unless absolutely 
necessary, it is apparent from the record that Plaintiffs‘ 
request for permission to submit alternative damages 
calculations was given little more than nominal consideration.  
We are mindful that the District Court has considerable 
discretion in matters regarding expert discovery and case 
management, and a party challenging the district court‘s 
conduct of discovery procedures bears a ―heavy burden.‖  In 
re Fine Paper, 685 F.2d at 817-18 (―We will not interfere 
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with a trial court‘s control of its docket ‗except upon the 
clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual 
and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.‘‖) 
(citation omitted); see Schiff, 602 F.3d at 176.  Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), a party is required to 
disclose an expert report containing ―a complete statement of 
all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons 
for them.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).  
Any additions or changes to the information in the expert 
report must be disclosed by the time the party‘s pretrial 
disclosures are due.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).  Here, Plaintiffs 
were required to make all mandatory disclosures six months 
before trial, including all damages calculations.  The damages 
estimates in DeRamus‘s report were found to be unreliable, 
and Plaintiffs sought, after the date by which discovery 
disclosures were due, to modify the estimates to reflect 
reliance on different data.  Ordinarily, we will not disrupt a 
district court‘s decision to deny a party‘s motion to add 
information to an expert report under such circumstances.  
Schiff, 602 F.3d at 176; In re Fine Paper, 685 F.3d at 817.  A 
plaintiff omits evidence necessary to sustain a damages award 
at its own risk.  See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco 
Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 504 (3d Cir. 1993). 
However, exclusion of critical evidence is an 
―extreme‖ sanction, and thus, a district court‘s discretion is 
not unlimited.  Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 
710, 719 (3d Cir. 1997); see also E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Dynamics 
Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a 
continuance, as opposed to exclusion, is the ―preferred 
means‖ of dealing with a party‘s attempt to offer new 
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evidence after the time for discovery has closed).  There are 
indeed times, even when control of discovery is at issue, that 
a district court will ―exceed[] the permissible bounds of its 
broad discretion.‖  Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 
(3d Cir. 2010).  In Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home 
Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 905 (3d Cir. 1977), 
overruled on other grounds by Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 
777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985), we set forth five factors that 
should be considered in deciding whether a district court‘s 
exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction constitutes an 
abuse of discretion.  Here, although the District Court‘s 
decision was not a discovery sanction nor an exclusion of 
proffered evidence, but rather an exercise of discretion to 
control the discovery process and a refusal to allow 
submission of additional evidence, we find the Pennypack 
factors instructive, and thus they will guide our inquiry.  See 
Trilogy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Times Fiber Commc’ns, Inc., 109 
F.3d 739, 744-45 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying factors similar to 
those set forth in Pennypack to evaluate whether a district 
court erred in denying the plaintiff‘s motion to supplement its 
expert report with additional data); see also Hunt v. Cnty. of 
Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying similar 
factors to determine whether the district court abused its 
discretion in denying a motion to amend a pretrial order). 
In considering whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying Plaintiffs‘ request to submit alternate 
damages calculations, we will consider:  (1) ―the prejudice or 
surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded 
witnesses would have testified‖ or the excluded evidence 
would have been offered; (2) ―the ability of that party to cure 
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the prejudice‖; (3) the extent to which allowing such 
witnesses or evidence would ―disrupt the orderly and efficient 
trial of the case or of other cases in the court‖; (4) any ―bad 
faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court‘s 
order‖; and (5) the importance of the excluded evidence.  
Pennypack, 559 F.2d at 904-05.  The importance of the 
evidence is often the most significant factor.  See Sowell v. 
Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 302 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Pennypack, 559 F.2d at 904 (observing ―how important [the 
excluded] testimony might have been and how critical [wa]s 
its absence‖). 
Applying the Pennypack factors to this case, we 
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying Plaintiffs‘ request to allow DeRamus to submit his 
alternate damages estimates.  As to the first and second 
factors, Eaton would not have suffered substantial prejudice if 
DeRamus were allowed to amend his expert report.  
DeRamus‘s new calculations will be based on data from the 
initial report, which Eaton has been aware of for nearly three 
years, and DeRamus will employ methodologies that the 
District Court has already recognized as being regularly and 
reliably applied by economists.  As Plaintiffs noted in their 
motion for clarification, it would be ―a straightforward matter 
of arithmetic‖ to substitute data from the econometric model 
and actual sales data for the SBP projections.  For this reason, 
the District Court‘s concern that granting Plaintiffs‘ request 
would be ―tantamount to reopening discovery‖ seems 
unfounded.  Although Eaton will have to respond to new 
calculations, it will not have to analyze any new data, or 
challenge any new methodologies.  Moreover, Plaintiffs 
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specifically set forth in their motion for clarification the 
changes that DeRamus would make, and because the changes 
only involved the substitution of inputs, Eaton would not be 
unfairly surprised by the new damages estimates. 
As to the third Pennypack factor, allowing DeRamus 
to submit additional damages calculations will not disrupt the 
orderly and efficient flow of the case.  In fact, our ruling on 
the liability issues and remand to the District Court to resolve 
damages is precisely what the District Court and the parties 
envisioned all along.  Eaton, well aware of the District 
Court‘s desire to have this Court determine the liability issues 
before setting a damages trial, suggested that the best way to 
accomplish the District Court‘s objective was to amend the 
JMOL order to include ―zero damages and no injunctive 
relief.‖  As the District Court stated at the July 25, 2011 status 
conference, ―[t]he way I handle complex litigation generally, 
when I bifurcate, is that I enter a final judgment pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) . . . and once the Circuit Court determines liability, 
if there is a reason to have a damages trial, we have a 
damages trial.‖  Thus, it cannot seriously be a surprise to any 
of the parties that they will once again be required to address 
damages in this case.  Additionally, Eaton repeatedly states in 
its brief that Plaintiffs seek to reopen discovery ―on the eve of 
trial.‖  Although that may have been true when Plaintiffs‘ 
original motion for clarification was filed, it is no longer true.  
Trial ended in October 2009 and thus, when the District Court 
finally ruled on Plaintiffs‘ motion, there was no longer any 
time-crunch problem.  Any concern that granting Plaintiffs‘ 
motion would prevent Eaton from being able to effectively 
prepare to address DeRamus‘s new damages estimates at trial 
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is no longer relevant, nor is there any risk that granting 
Plaintiffs‘ motion would excessively delay a trial on liability. 
As to the fourth factor, there is no evidence of any bad 
faith on the part of Plaintiffs.  However, under this fourth 
factor, we may also consider the Plaintiffs‘ justifications for 
failing to include alternative damages calculations in the 
event calculations based on the SBP were found to be 
insufficient.  See Pennypack, 559 F.2d at 905; Gen. Dynamics 
Corp., 999 F.2d at 115-16.  Given that DeRamus‘s report 
already included the data necessary to develop alternate 
damages estimates, he could very easily have provided such 
estimates.  Plaintiffs have provided no persuasive explanation 
for his failure to do so, other than that he believed his existing 
estimates were sufficiently reliable.  It is not the district 
court‘s responsibility to help a party correct an error or a poor 
exercise of judgment, and thus, Plaintiffs‘ conscious choice to 
rely so heavily on data that was ultimately found to be 
unreliable weighs against a finding of abuse of discretion.  
This is especially true in a case such as this, where the party 
submitting the flawed expert report is a large corporation with 
significant resources represented by highly competent 
counsel. 
However, perhaps the most important factor in this 
case is the critical nature of the evidence, and the 
consequences if permission to amend is denied.  Expert 
testimony is necessary to establish damages in an antitrust 
case.  As such, without additional damages calculations, it is 
clear that Plaintiffs will be unable to pursue damages, despite 
the fact that they won at the liability stage.  Compare Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d at 116-17 (finding an abuse of 
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discretion in the district court‘s exclusion of expert testimony, 
in part, because the total exclusion of such testimony ―was 
tantamount to a dismissal of the [plaintiff‘s] . . . claim‖), with 
Sowell, 926 F.2d at 302 (finding no abuse of discretion in 
district court‘s exclusion of proffered expert testimony, in 
large part, because ―the record [was] totally devoid of any 
indication of . . . how th[e] testimony might have bolstered 
[the plaintiff‘s] case,‖ and thus, there was ―no basis whatever 
for believing that the admission of expert testimony would 
have influenced the outcome of th[e] case‖).  The District 
Court‘s decision therefore would clearly influence the 
outcome of the case.  See Sowell, 926 F.2d at 302. 
Significantly, in the antitrust context, a damages award 
not only benefits the plaintiff, it also fosters competition and 
furthers the interests of the public by imposing a severe 
penalty (treble damages) for violation of the antitrust laws.  
See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 
(1972) (―Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the 
free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. . . .  In 
enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal 
to penalize violators.  It could have, for example, required 
violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments 
for the estimated damage to their respective economies 
caused by the violations.  But, this remedy was not selected.  
Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to 
recover three times their actual damages . . . .  By [so doing], 
Congress encouraged these persons to serve as ‗private 
attorneys general.‘‖) (citations omitted); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 655 
(1985) (―A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a 
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private matter.  The Sherman Act is designed to promote the 
national interest in a competitive economy . . . .‖) (quotation 
omitted).  Thus, if Plaintiffs are not able to pursue damages, 
not only will they be unable to recover for the antitrust injury 
Eaton caused, the policy of deterring antitrust violations 
through the treble damages remedy will also be frustrated.  
See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 750 (―[T]he likelihood of finding an 
abuse of discretion is affected by the importance of the 
district court‘s decision to the outcome of the case and the 
effect it will have on important rights.‖). 
In sum, after weighing the Pennypack factors and 
taking into account the circumstances under which Plaintiffs‘ 
motion for clarification was ultimately denied, we conclude 
that the District Court abused its discretion in not permitting 
Plaintiffs to submit alternate damages calculations.
28
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 We express no opinion as to the reliability or 
admissibility of DeRamus‘s alternate damages calculations.  
That is a matter left to the District Court on remand.  
However, we note that Plaintiffs‘ motion for clarification only 
sought to include damages calculations based on data already 
in the expert report, and that fact is crucial to our holding that 
prejudice to Eaton can be easily cured.  Nothing in our 
opinion should be read as requiring the District Court to allow 
Plaintiffs to bring in entirely new data for the revised 
damages estimates. 
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D.  Article III Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief 
 Finally, we turn to Eaton‘s contention that Plaintiffs 
lack standing to seek injunctive relief.  Eaton argues that 
Plaintiffs‘ complete withdrawal from the HD transmissions 
market in 2006 and their failure to present evidence showing 
anything more than a mere possibility that they will reenter 
the market precludes a finding of Article III standing as to 
injunctive relief.  Although the District Court did not directly 
address standing, it noted in a footnote that, ―[w]hile 
[P]laintiffs are no longer in business and are unable to 
directly benefit from an injunction, here, an injunction is 
appropriate because of the public‘s interest in robust 
competition and the possibility that [P]laintiffs may one day 
reenter the market.‖  ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2011).  We agree with Eaton that 
this determination was improper, and we will therefore vacate 
the injunction issued by the District Court.
29
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 Even though Meritor was still technically in the HD 
transmissions business at the time the complaint in this case 
was filed, it is still appropriate to frame this issue as one of 
standing, rather than one of mootness.  Plaintiffs‘ complaint, 
which was filed on October 5, 2006, stated that Meritor 
intended to exit the HD transmissions business in January 
2007, and did not indicate any intent to reenter.  Thus, even at 
the time the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs could not 
demonstrate the requisite likelihood of future injury sufficient 
to confer standing.  See Davis v. F.E.C., 554 U.S. 724, 734 
(2008) (―[T]he standing inquiry [is] focused on whether the 
party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the 
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 A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he has 
Article III standing for each type of relief sought.  Summers v. 
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).  In order to have 
standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show:  
(1) that he is under a threat of suffering ―‗injury in fact‘ that is 
concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical‖; (2) a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable judicial decision will 
prevent or redress the injury.  Id. (citing Friends of Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).  
Even if the plaintiff has suffered a previous injury due to the 
defendant‘s conduct, the equitable remedy of an injunction is 
―unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a 
requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of 
any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged 
again[.]‖  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 
(1983); see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) 
(―Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if 
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.‖).  
Accordingly, a plaintiff may have standing to pursue 
                                                                                                     
outcome when the suit was filed.‖) (citations omitted); U.S. 
Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (―The 
requisite personal interest that must exist at the 
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue 
throughout its existence (mootness).‖) (citation omitted).  
Moreover, even if we treated this as a mootness question, our 
conclusion would remain the same. 
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damages, but lack standing to seek injunctive relief.  Lyons, 
461 U.S. at 105. 
 For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the 
plaintiff sued the city, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and 
declaratory relief, for an incident in which he was allegedly 
choked by police officers.  Id. at 97.  The Supreme Court held 
that, although the plaintiff clearly had standing to seek 
damages, he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because 
he failed to establish a ―real and immediate threat‖ that he 
would again be stopped by the police and choked.  Id. at 105.  
―Absent a sufficient likelihood that he [would] again be 
wronged in a similar way, [the plaintiff] [was] no more 
entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los 
Angeles.‖  Id. at 111.  Likewise, in Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute, the Court held that an organization lacked standing 
to enjoin the application of Forest Service regulations in 
national parks where its members expressed only a ―vague 
desire‖ to return to the affected parks.  555 U.S. at 496.  
―Such some-day intentions—without any description of 
concrete plans, or indeed any specification of when the some 
day will be—do not support a finding of . . . actual or 
imminent injury.‖  Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)) (internal marks omitted); 
see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2559-60 (2011) (noting that employees who no longer 
worked for Wal-Mart lacked standing to seek injunctive or 
declaratory relief against Wal-Mart‘s employment practices). 
 Applying those principles to our case, we hold that 
Plaintiffs lack standing to seek an injunction.  They clearly 
have standing to seek damages based on Eaton‘s violation of 
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the antitrust laws while ZF Meritor and Meritor were 
competitors.  However, the ZF Meritor joint venture 
operationally dissolved in 2003, Meritor stopped 
manufacturing HD transmissions in 2006, and Meritor has 
expressed no concrete desire to revive the joint venture or 
otherwise reenter the market.  The sole evidence in the record 
of Meritor‘s future intentions is found in one page of trial 
testimony, in which a Meritor official stated that there had 
been internal discussions at the company about the possibility 
of reentry, but that no decision had been made.  The official 
testified that Meritor ―continue[d] to monitor the performance 
of the products that are in the marketplace[,] . . . ha[d] a very 
thorough understanding of how the products [we]re 
working[,] . . . and [was] actively considering what [its] 
alternatives might be.‖  He explained, however, that upon any 
attempt to reenter, Meritor would be confronted with the 
―same obstacle that caused the dissolution of the joint 
venture.‖30 
As the District Court acknowledged, this evidence 
establishes no more than a ―possibility‖ that Meritor might 
one day reenter the market.  Where the District Court went 
                                              
30
 In a post-trial status conference, the District Court 
asked Plaintiffs‘ counsel why an injunction would be 
appropriate given that Plaintiffs were no longer in the 
business.  Plaintiffs‘ counsel could give no more concrete 
information about Plaintiffs‘ plans than the witness, stating 
simply that, if Eaton‘s conduct was enjoined, ―a different set 
of calculations‖ would apply to Plaintiffs‘ discussions 
regarding reentry into the market. 
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wrong, however, was in concluding that such a possibility is 
sufficient to confer Article III standing for injunctive relief.  
See McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 242-43 
(3d Cir. 2012) (―Allegations of possible future injury are not 
sufficient to satisfy Article III.‖) (internal marks and citation 
omitted).  Plaintiffs were required to set forth sufficient facts 
to show that they were entitled to prospective relief, including 
that they were ―likely to suffer future injury.‖  McNair v. 
Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added); see McCray, 682 F.3d at 243 
(explaining that ―a threatened injury must be certainly 
impending and proceed with a high degree of certainty‖) 
(internal marks and citation omitted).  Absent a showing that 
they are likely to reenter the market and again be confronted 
with Eaton‘s exclusionary practices, Plaintiffs were ―no more 
entitled to an injunction‖ than any other entity that has 
considered the possibility of entering the HD transmissions 
market.  Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.  ―Vague‖ assertions of 
desire, ―without any descriptions of concrete plans,‖ are 
insufficient to support a finding of actual or imminent injury.  
See Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.  Although Plaintiffs claim that 
they might again enter the market, such a decision ―w[ould] 
be their choice, and what that choice may be is a matter of 
pure speculation at this point.‖  McNair, 672 F.3d at 225. 
Plaintiffs seem to suggest that there is a lower 
threshold for standing in antitrust cases.
31
  However, 
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 Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate 
standard is found in Section 16 of the Clayton Act, which 
provides that any person ―shall be entitled to sue for and have 
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Plaintiffs confuse the doctrines of constitutional standing and 
antitrust standing.  Although the doctrines often overlap in 
practice, they are, in fact, distinct.  Sullivan v. D.B. Invs., Inc., 
667 F.3d 273, 307 (3d Cir. 2011).  Regardless of any 
additional requirements applicable to a particular type of 
action, a plaintiff must always demonstrate that a justiciable 
case or controversy exists sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.  Id.  Plaintiffs‘ failure to do so here 
renders any inquiry into antitrust (statutory) standing 
unnecessary.  See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-
Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998). 
We agree with the District Court that there are strong 
public policy reasons for issuing an injunction in this case.  
However, the fact that there may be strong public policy 
reasons for enjoining Eaton‘s behavior does not mean that 
Plaintiffs are the appropriate party to seek such an injunction.  
Standing is a constitutional mandate, Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 1999), and the 
consequences that flow from a finding of lack of standing 
here, although concerning, cannot affect our analysis.
32
 
                                                                                                     
injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a 
violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same 
conditions and principles as injunctive relief . . . is granted by 
courts of equity.‖  15 U.S.C. § 26. 
32
 Because we conclude that Plaintiffs lack standing to 
pursue injunctive relief, we need not address Plaintiffs‘ 
argument that the District Court erred by refusing to allow 
them to address the scope of injunctive relief. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 First, we hold that Plaintiffs‘ claims are not subject to 
the price-cost test, and instead must be analyzed as de facto 
exclusive dealing claims under the rule of reason.  Second, 
we conclude that Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to 
support the jury‘s finding that Eaton engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct and that Plaintiffs suffered antitrust 
injury as a result.  Third, we find no error in the District 
Court‘s decision to admit DeRamus‘s testimony on the issue 
of liability.  Fourth, we hold that the District Court properly 
exercised its discretion in excluding DeRamus‘s damages 
testimony based on his expert report, but we conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion by preventing DeRamus 
from submitting alternate damages calculations based on data 
already included in his initial report.  Finally, we hold that 
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief, and 
therefore, we will vacate the injunction issued by the District 
Court.  We will remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Greenberg, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
 Notwithstanding the majority‟s thoughtful and well-
crafted opinion, I respectfully dissent as I would reverse the 
District Court‟s order that it entered following its opinion 
reported at ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 684 
(D. Del 2011), denying Eaton‟s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law.  Although the majority opinion recites in detail the 
factual background of this case, I nevertheless also set forth its 
factual predicate as I believe the inclusion of certain additional 
facts demonstrates even more clearly than the facts the majority 
sets forth why Eaton was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.
1
   
 
I.  FACTS 
A.  The HD Transmission Market 
 The parties stipulated before the District Court and do not 
now dispute that the relevant product market in this case is 
heavy-duty (“HD”) truck transmissions and that the relevant 
geographic market is the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the 
so-called “NAFTA market.”  On appeal, Eaton does not dispute 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this dissent I use the same standard of review that 
the majority sets forth.  Thus while I am exercising plenary 
review of the order denying the motion for a judgment as a 
matter of law within that review I am being deferential to the 
jury verdict. 
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that it possessed monopoly power in that market during the 
events relevant to this case. 
 HD trucks include linehaul trucks, the familiar 18-
wheelers used to travel long distances on highways, and 
performance trucks used on unfinished terrain or to carry heavy 
loads, such as cement mixers, garbage trucks, and dump trucks.  
There are three types of HD truck transmissions: manual, 
automatic, and automated mechanical.   
As the majority indicates, the NAFTA HD truck 
transmission market functions in the following way.  Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”) construct HD trucks.  
There were four OEMs during the period relevant to this 
dispute: Freightliner Trucks (“Freightliner”); International Truck 
and Engine Corporation (“International”); PACCAR; and Volvo 
Group (“Volvo”).  OEMs provide the purchasers of HD trucks 
with “data books” that list HD truck component part options, 
including transmissions, and thereby allow the customer to 
select from various options for certain parts of the HD trucks.   
The data books list one option as the “standard” offering 
with which OEMs will fit the truck unless the customer selects 
otherwise.  Additionally, the component part listed in the data 
book as the lowest-priced option is referred to as the so-called 
“preferred” or “preferentially-priced” option.2  For obvious 
                                                 
2“Standard” and “preferred” positioning are not the same thing.  
See J.A. at 2546 (PACCAR and Eaton‟s LTA) (stating that 
PACCAR will list Eaton‟s product “as Standard Equipment and 
the Preferred Option,” whereas “„Standard Equipment‟ means 
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reasons, positioning as the standard or preferred component part 
option in a data book can be beneficial and a form of promotion 
of the parts that the component part manufacturers supply.  
Evidence adduced at trial, which I explore further below, shows 
that OEMs decide which component parts to list as standard or 
preferred based, at least in part, on their determination of which 
component part is the most advantageous option for them to 
supply in terms of such factors as cost of supply pricing as to the 
OEMs and the availability and performance of the product.  
Consequently, the OEMs and component part manufacturers 
negotiate with respect to data book positioning.   
Data books, however, are not the exclusive means of 
advertising HD truck transmissions or other parts nor do they 
restrict the truck purchasers‟ choices.  Component suppliers, 
such as appellees
3
 and Eaton, market directly to purchasers, and 
purchasers of HD trucks can and do request unpublished options 
that are not listed in the data books.   
B.  The Parties and Market Conditions 
During the 1950s, Eaton began manufacturing 
transmissions for HD trucks, and eventually it developed a full 
                                                                                                             
the equipment that is provided to a customer unless the customer 
expressly designates another supplier‟s product” and “„Preferred 
Option‟ means the lowest priced option in the Data Book for 
comparable products”).   
 
3
 I refer to the plaintiffs as appellees even though they are also 
appellants in these consolidated appeals. 
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product line of transmissions in a range of speeds and styles.  
Prior to 1989, Eaton was the only domestic manufacturer of HD 
truck transmissions.  In 1989, however, Meritor entered the 
market with 9- and 10-speed HD manual transmissions for 
linehaul trucks.  But, unlike Eaton, Meritor did not offer nor did 
it develop at any point a full product line of HD truck 
transmissions.  Nevertheless, by 1999 Meritor had obtained 
approximately 18% of the market for sales of HD truck 
transmissions in North America.   
In 1999, Meritor entered into a joint venture with ZF 
Freidrichshafen (“ZF AG”), a large German company that 
previously had not sold HD truck transmissions in North 
America.  The joint venture, called ZF Meritor (“ZFM”), sought 
to adapt for the NAFTA market ZF AG‟s “ASTronic” 
transmission, a linehaul 12-speed, 2-pedal, automated 
mechanical transmission.  Meritor transferred its transmission 
business to ZFM, and ZFM introduced the ASTronic (renamed 
the “FreedomLine” for the NAFTA market) to these new 
markets around February 2001.  At that time, Eaton did not have 
a two-pedal automated mechanical transmission and did not 
intend to release one until 2004.  Appellees believe that the 
FreedomLine was technically superior to other HD truck 
transmissions available.   
In late 1999, during the same time period that appellees 
formed ZFM, there was a severe economic downturn in the 
NAFTA market area that caused a sharp decline of HD truck 
orders.  By 2001, around the time ZFM introduced the 
FreedomLine, HD truck orders had fallen by approximately 
50%, with demand plummeting from more than 300,000 new 
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HD truck orders per year to roughly 150,000 orders.   
C.  The Long-Term Agreements 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Eaton entered into supply 
agreements with each of the four OEMs.  These agreements set 
the prices for Eaton‟s transmissions and offered volume 
discounts to the OEMs, i.e., discounted prices based on the 
OEMs‟ purchase of a certain quantity of transmissions.  
Appellees do not allege that these agreements violated the 
antitrust laws.  Beginning in late 2000, however, Eaton entered 
into new supply agreements with all four of the OEMs.  Those 
agreements, to which the parties refer as long-term agreements 
(“LTAs”), are at the core of the present dispute. 
Eaton‟s LTAs offered the OEMs rebates based on 
market-share targets.  The discounts thus provided the OEMs 
with lower prices on Eaton‟s transmissions conditioned on their 
purchase of a certain percentage of their transmission needs 
from Eaton.  Although the LTAs‟ terms varied, all of the LTAs 
at issue were consistent in two respects. 
First, the LTAs were not explicitly exclusive-dealing 
contracts: each OEM remained free to buy parts from any other 
HD transmission manufacturer, including ZFM, and none of the 
LTAs conditioned Eaton‟s payment of rebates on an OEM‟s 
purchase of 100% of its transmission needs from it.  Second, 
each LTA contained a so-called “competitiveness clause” that 
permitted the OEM to exclude an Eaton product from the share 
target and to terminate its LTA altogether if another 
manufacturer offered transmissions of better quality or lower 
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price.  Because the LTAs are at the crux of ZFM‟s claims, I 
review those four contracts and the circumstances of their 
formation in some detail.   
 1.  Freightliner 
 As of 1998, both Eaton and Meritor had respective three-
year supply agreements with Freightliner, the largest of the 
OEMs.  Meritor‟s agreement provided that it would reduce the 
price of its component parts if Freightliner listed Meritor‟s parts 
as standard in its data book, while, as I have mentioned, Eaton‟s 
agreement provided volume-discount rebates to Freightliner. 
 In October 2000, Freightliner notified Meritor, which by 
then had evolved into ZFM with respect to its transmission 
business, that Eaton had offered it 10-speed transmissions at a 
price significantly lower than Meritor‟s price, Eaton was 
offering certain transmissions that Meritor did not have 
available, and Eaton‟s transmissions were superior to Meritor‟s 
in price and technology.  Pursuant to a provision in Meritor‟s 
supply agreement that required Meritor to remain competitive 
with respect to its products in terms of quality and technology, 
Freightliner notified Meritor that it had 90 days within which to 
match Eaton‟s inventory or Freightliner would delete Meritor‟s 
noncompetitive products from the agreement.  Though Meritor 
disputed Freightliner‟s contention it did not make a counteroffer 
or offer to match Eaton‟s inventory.   
 Soon thereafter, in November 2000, Eaton entered into a 
five-year LTA with Freightliner, one of the four contracts that 
appellees challenge.  The LTA provided rebates ranging from 
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$200 to $700, contingent on a 92% share target for Eaton‟s 
transmissions and clutches, an additional truck component that 
Eaton manufactured.  In 2003, Eaton and Freightliner amended 
the LTA by adopting a sliding scale that entitled Freightliner to 
varying lower rebates if it met lower market-share targets 
beginning at 86.5% and going up to 90.5%.   
In exchange for the discounted prices, the LTA required 
Freightliner to list Eaton‟s transmissions as the “preferred” 
option in its data book.  Significantly, however, Freightliner 
“reserve[d] the right to publish” the FreedomLine transmission 
“through the life of the agreement at normal retail price levels.”  
J.A. at 1948.  The LTA also provided that in 2002 Freightliner 
would publish Eaton‟s transmissions and clutches in its data 
book exclusively, but the parties amended that provision in 2001 
to allow Freightliner to continue to publish Eaton‟s competitors‟ 
products.  From 2002 onwards, Freightliner did not list ZFM‟s 
manual transmissions but it continued to list ZFM‟s other 
transmissions from 2000 to 2004.  In 2004, however, 
Freightliner removed the FreedomLine from its data books 
because Meritor
4
 had refused to pay a $1,250 rebate it had 
promised to Freightliner on that product and because 
Freightliner had experienced reliability issues with ZFM‟s 
products.  See id. at 3725 (letter from Freightliner representative 
to Meritor representative (Feb. 10, 2004)) (“Freightliner is 
outraged at ArvinMeritor in the handling of the FreedomLine 
transmissions price changes.  It is totally unacceptable that 
                                                 
4
As explained below, ZFM dissolved in December of 2003, and 
thus Meritor was handling sales of the FreedomLine 
transmission in the NAFTA market as of 2004. 
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ArvinMeritor would commit to price protection, and then seek 
to renege on that commitment.”).   
Under the LTA, Eaton had the right to terminate the 
agreement if Freightliner did not meet its share targets.  In 2002, 
however, even though Freightliner did not meet the 92% share 
target, Eaton did not terminate the agreement.  In 2003, the 
parties amended the LTA so that it would last for a total of ten 
years, extending the agreement to 2010.   
 2.  International 
Eaton entered into a five-year LTA with International in 
July 2000.  A representative from International stated that 
International entered into the LTA because it made “good 
business sense,” id. at 1532, inasmuch as the LTA provided the 
lowest purchase price for International and there was “greater 
customer preference and brand recognition for the Eaton 
product,” id. at 1528.   
In return, Eaton provided a $2.5 million payment to 
International, $1 million of which was payable in cash or in 
cost-savings initiatives.  The LTA provided sliding scale rebates 
of 0.35% to 2% beginning at a market share of 80% and up to 
97.5% and above.  It also provided for sliding rebates based on a 
market share of Eaton‟s clutches.  For current truck models, 
International agreed to list Eaton‟s transmission as the preferred 
option, and for future models, it agreed to publish Eaton‟s 
transmissions exclusively.
5
  Notwithstanding the latter 
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International already had listed Eaton as the standard option as 
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provision, International continued to list ZFM‟s manual 
transmissions in its printed data book. 
3.  PACCAR 
  In July 2000, Eaton entered into a seven-year LTA with 
PACCAR.  A PACCAR representative stated that PACCAR 
agreed to the market-share rebates because it “ma[d]e long term 
economic sense and it ha[d] a total value as to PACCAR.”  Id. at 
1555.  The PACCAR representative indicated that the “total 
value” concept incorporated such considerations as the “lower 
cost” provided by the LTAs, “providing a full product line of . . . 
transmissions,” “providing product during periods of peak 
demand and ensuring the product is available,” “warranty 
provisions,” and “aftermarket supply.”   Id. at 1555-56.   
The representative indicated that PACCAR was in 
discussions with ZFM regarding a supply agreement but 
ultimately it declined to enter into an agreement with ZFM 
because, apart from Eaton‟s more appealing offer, ZFM suffered 
from negative considerations such as ZFM‟s restricted output of 
its products, “massive transmission failure in the marketplace 
that caused market unacceptance of their transmissions earlier,” 
and ZFM‟s lack of a full product line.  Id. at 1557, 1562.  
Additionally, PACCAR “always [paid] . . . a higher cost [for a 
ZFM product] than a comparable Eaton product, independent of 
the rebate,” particularly for the FreedomLine, which, according 
                                                                                                             
of 1996 because, according to an International representative, 
Eaton provided the greatest value to International.  See J.A. at 
1533.  
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to the PACCAR representative, was “by design, a more 
expensive product” because of its European origins.  Id. at 1558-
59.  In this regard, the representative stated that Eaton‟s rebates 
were not “the only thing that made them competitive.”  Id. at 
1562.  
Under the LTA, Eaton provided price reductions, a $1 
million payment, firm pricing for seven years, and engineering 
and marketing support.  PACCAR also could obtain rebates 
ranging from 2% to 3% in exchange for meeting 90% to 95% 
market share targets in both transmissions and clutches.  In 
exchange, PACCAR was required to list Eaton as the standard 
and preferred option in its data book.  At all times PACCAR 
continued to list ZFM‟s transmissions in its data book. 
 4.  Volvo 
 Eaton entered into a five-year LTA with Volvo in 
October 2002.  A Volvo representative stated that Volvo entered 
into the LTA because it represented “the best overall value for 
Volvo” in terms of “price, delivery, quality manufacturing, and 
logistics.”  Id. at 1430.  Indeed, another Volvo representative 
stated that “[p]ricing was significantly better with Eaton [even] 
excluding rebates.”  Id. at 1295; see id. at 1293, 1296 (the same 
representative estimating the savings to Volvo from the LTA 
with Eaton to be about 12% to 15% excluding the rebates and 
stating that Volvo‟s motivation in entering the LTA was “purely 
dollars, dollars and cents”).  Volvo was in discussions with ZFM 
to sign a supply agreement, but ultimately it did not do so in 
large part because of ZFM‟s “inability to have a complete 
product offering of all transmissions.”  Id. at 1431.   
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The LTA provided sliding scale rebates of 0.5% to 1.5% 
originally set at 65% market share, and, as of 2004, a 70% to 
78% market share.  Eaton had the option of terminating the LTA 
if its market share at Volvo fell below 68%.  In turn, Volvo 
agreed to position Eaton‟s transmissions and clutches as the 
standard and preferred offering.  Volvo continued to list in its 
data books both ZFM‟s and Volvo‟s own transmissions that it 
manufactured only for installation in its own trucks.
6
 
D.  ZFM‟s Business and Exit from the Market  
 As of July 2000, before Eaton signed any of the 
challenged LTAs, ZFM had lost nearly 20% of its market share 
in transmissions, its share declining from 16.1% to 13%.  
Minutes from a ZFM Board of Directors meeting held in July 
2000 reveal that ZFM‟s President, Richard Martello, identified a 
number of factors that caused ZFM‟s falling market position, 
including:  
(i) poor product quality image, (ii) a decrease in 
Ryder business, (iii) turnover in the [c]ompany‟s 
sales organization, (iv) an increase in sales of 
Eaton Autoshift, (v) the push towards 13-speed 
transmissions, especially by Freightliner, (vi) the 
multi-year fleet business lost due to competitive 
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Eaton also entered into an LTA with the OEM Mack Trucks 
that same month.  Volvo had acquired Mack Trucks in 2001, 
and it appears that the LTAs are substantively the same.  
Accordingly, I refer only to the Volvo LTA. 
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equalization cutbacks in early 1999 and (vii) 
controlled distribution. 
J.A. at 3235. 
 Some explanation will illuminate Mr. Martello‟s 
observations.  “Competitive equalization” payments are 
incentives a component manufacturer provides directly to truck 
purchasers for them to select its products from a data book.  
ZFM‟s internal documents, included in the trial record, 
demonstrate that “[d]uring the peak periods of production 
between March 1999 and September 1999, Meritor reduced 
[competitive equalization] payment[s] on deals trying to reduce 
the incentive [to] „war‟ with Eaton” but Eaton “continued . . . to 
buy business when Meritor declined deals.”  Id. at 3028.  
“Controlled distribution” refers to the practice of purposefully 
limiting the quantity of a product available to the market — a 
practice that ZFM identified as the cause of it losing “various 
deals” due to ZFM‟s “lack of product” availability.  Id. at 3030. 
 The reference to ZFM‟s decrease in “Ryder business” appears 
to refer to the fact that ZFM lost the business of the OEM 
previously known as Mack-Ryder due to ZFM‟s controlled 
distribution practices.  See id.   
In that same meeting, Mr. Martello also observed that 
there were “significant forces in favor of direct drive, fully 
automated transmissions,” including: 
(i) major engine changes in October 2002 due to 
emissions standards changes, (ii) continued driver 
shortages, (iii) continued upward pressure on fuel 
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prices, (iv) market pressure on „guaranteed cost of 
operation‟ sales incentives and (v) continued 
technician shortages.   
Id. at 3236.  Significantly, as I already have noted, the 
FreedomLine was an automated mechanical transmission, not a 
fully automated transmission.   
Mr. Martello also noted that the industry was turning 
away from the component part manufacturers‟ traditional focus 
on advertising directly to truck purchasers as an incentive for 
them to select their component part, so-called “pull” advertising, 
to focus instead on “the creation of closer relationships with the 
OEMs.”  Id.  Along this line, Mr. Martello observed that the 
OEMs desired to have “single source, full product line 
suppliers” in an effort to reduce costs.  See id.  Additionally, Mr. 
Martello noted that OEMs were resistant to the prospect of 
engineering new products, such as the FreedomLine, into their 
trucks, and that, as sales of HD trucks declined, component part 
manufacturers provided rapidly increasing sales incentives to the 
OEMs.  See id.  To overcome these obstacles and increase 
ZFM‟s market share, Mr. Martello “recommended that a full 
line of automated products be released at every OEM and that 
[ZFM] develop a full [HD] product line.”  Id. at 3237.   
Notwithstanding ZFM‟s awareness of the declining HD 
truck market, after the 2000 meeting ZFM refused to lower its 
prices despite certain OEMs‟ repeated requests that it do so.  
See, e.g., id. at 3596 (letter from Chris Benner, ZFM, to Paul D. 
Barkus, International (Sept. 19, 2002)) (stating ZFM‟s refusal to 
lower prices despite International‟s June 2002 request that it do 
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so); id. at 1537-38 (deposition testimony of Paul D. Barkus, 
International) (indicating that ZFM refused International‟s 
request that ZFM lower its prices in December 2001); id. at 
3953 (ZFM Board minutes) (“Board did not agree with 
providing any price decreases to Volvo/Mack.”).  To the 
contrary, at the end of 2003, ZFM raised the price of the 
FreedomLine by roughly 25%, an increase that caused 
significant consternation among the OEMs.  Moreover, ZFM did 
not develop a full HD truck transmission product line as Mr. 
Martello had recommended.  Furthermore, as the majority notes, 
at least two of ZFM‟s transmissions, including its flagship 
transmission, the FreedomLine, experienced significant 
performance problems resulting in frequent repairs, and, in 2002 
and 2003, ZFM faced significant warranty claims on its products 
amounting to millions of dollars in potential liability.   
Notwithstanding the trouble it experienced in 2000, ZFM 
experienced growth in some areas.  From 2001 to 2003, the 
FreedomLine transmission went from comprising 0% of the 
linehaul market to 6% of the linehaul market, and between 2000 
and 2003, ZFM‟s market share of linehaul HD truck 
transmissions increased at three of the four OEMs.  From July 
2000 to October 2003, ZFM‟s share of the total HD transmission 
market ranged between 8% and 14%.   
In spite of its gains, ZFM believed that Eaton‟s LTAs 
limited ZFM‟s potential market share to approximately 8% of 
the transmission market, not the 30% that it had expected to gain 
as a result of the joint venture and which it needed to achieve for 
the venture to be a viable business.  In December 2003, on the 
basis of that calculation, ZFM was dissolved.  Following ZFM‟s 
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dissolution, Meritor returned to the transmission business it had 
conducted before entering into the joint venture.  In 2006, 
however, Meritor exited the HD truck transmission business 
entirely.   
E.  Eaton‟s Pricing 
At trial, appellees did not allege or introduce any 
evidence that Eaton priced its transmissions below any measure 
of cost during the relevant time period, and, on appeal, appellees 
do not contend that Eaton‟s prices were below cost.  
Furthermore, at all times relevant to the present dispute, Eaton‟s 
average transmission prices to the OEMs were lower than 
ZFM‟s average prices to the OEMs.  In other words, the OEMs 
paid more to purchase and supply ZFM‟s transmissions to the 
truck purchasers than they paid for Eaton‟s transmissions.  In 
particular, ZFM priced its FreedomLine significantly above the 
price of Eaton‟s transmissions. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 Although it frames the question differently, as the 
majority recognizes the central question that emerges in this 
appeal is what effect, if any, does appellees‟ failure to allege, 
much less prove, that Eaton engaged in below-cost pricing have 
on its claims?  Eaton, of course, contends that the effect is 
dispositive, arguing that Supreme Court precedent requires that 
courts apply the price-cost test of Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 113 S.Ct. 2578 
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(1993), in any case in which a plaintiff challenges a defendant‟s 
pricing practices.
7
  Appellees challenged Eaton‟s pricing 
practices, namely, its market-share discounts, but because 
appellees did not introduce evidence that Eaton engaged in 
below-cost pricing, Eaton contends that appellees did not 
establish that they suffered antirust injury nor did they show that 
by adopting the LTAs Eaton violated the antitrust laws.
8
 
                                                 
7
Under the Brooke Group price-cost test, a firm must first 
establish that the defendant‟s prices “are below an appropriate 
measure of its . . . costs,” and second, it must show that the 
defendant “had a reasonable prospect [under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act], or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, 
of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”  509 U.S. at 
223-24, 113 S.Ct. at 2587-88.   
 
8
Apart from meeting the requirements of Article III standing, an 
antitrust plaintiff seeking monetary or injunctive relief must 
show that it has suffered antitrust injury, i.e., an “injury of the 
type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that 
flows from that which makes [the] defendant[‟s] acts unlawful.” 
 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 
489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697 (1977).  Although courts often conflate 
the antitrust injury requirement with the determination of 
whether the defendant‟s conduct violated the antitrust laws, this 
approach is erroneous as the antitrust injury requirement 
assumes the defendant‟s conduct was unlawful (and thus 
anticompetitive) and asks whether the anticompetitive aspect of 
the unlawful conduct is the cause of plaintiff‟s injury.  See 
Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 275 n.2 
  17 
Appellees, of course, contend that their failure to show 
that Eaton engaged in below-cost pricing is entirely irrelevant to 
the success or failure of their claims.  Appellees claim that the 
obligation to show below-cost pricing applies only where a 
                                                                                                             
(3d Cir. 1999) (“The District Court erred by incorporating the 
issue of anticompetitive market effect into its standing analysis, 
confusing antitrust injury with an element of a claim under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act . . . .”); see also Daniel v. Am. Bd. 
of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that anticompetitive effects of defendant‟s behavior 
“are classic „rule of reason‟ questions, distinct from the antitrust 
standing question”) (citations omitted).  Because I conclude that 
Eaton was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as there was 
insufficient evidence for the jury‟s conclusion that Eaton 
violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of 
the Clayton Act, I do not address whether appellees satisfied the 
antitrust injury requirement.
 
 Accord L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. 
Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Because LAPD 
adequately alleges injury in fact and thus has standing under 
Article III, however, we may bypass the antitrust-injury issue to 
go straight to the merits.”); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 
F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e need not decide whether 
appellants have met the requirements for antitrust standing, 
because they have failed to establish any violation of the 
antitrust laws.”); Levine v. Cent. Fl. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 
F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We need not decide whether 
Dr. Levine has met the requirements for standing as to any of his 
antitrust claims, because as to each one he has failed to establish 
any violation of the antitrust laws.”). 
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plaintiff brings a so-called “predatory pricing” claim.9  In this 
regard, appellees contend that they were not required to show 
that Eaton engaged in below-cost pricing because they did not 
bring a “predatory pricing” claim.  In fact, appellees explicitly 
disavow any allegation that Eaton engaged in below-cost pricing 
and instead contend that the LTAs, including the market-share 
rebates they contained, amounted to unlawful de facto exclusive 
dealing agreements.
10
 
The majority appears to split the difference between the 
parties‟ two positions.  The majority concludes that the Brooke 
                                                 
9A firm engages in “predatory pricing” when it cuts its prices 
below an appropriate measure of cost to force competitors out of 
the market or to deter potential entrants from entering the 
market.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355 n.8 (1986).  “The 
success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining 
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator‟s 
losses and to harvest some additional gain.”  Id. at 589, 106 
S.Ct. at 1357 (emphasis in original).  Due to the inherently 
speculative nature of such an undertaking, “predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”  Id. 
 
10As the leading antitrust treatise points out, “to be challenged as 
unlawful exclusive dealing, . . . [a] quantity discount program 
would necessarily involve prices above cost, else the program 
would not be sustainable.”  Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 18.03b, at 18-70 
(4th ed. 2011). 
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Group price-cost test may be dispositive in a case where a 
plaintiff brings a claim challenging a defendant‟s pricing 
practices
11
 and alleges that price itself functioned as the 
exclusionary tool.  I agree completely with the majority‟s 
conclusion in this regard.  Thereafter, however, our paths 
diverge because the majority appears to conclude that where a 
plaintiff brings a claim of unlawful exclusive dealing against a 
defendant‟s pricing practices but does not contend that the 
defendant‟s prices operated as the exclusionary tool, the price-
cost test is irrelevant and has neither dispositive nor persuasive 
effect.
12
 
As I explain further below, while I do not believe that the 
Supreme Court has held that the inferior courts must impose and 
give dispositive effect to the Brooke Group price-cost test in 
every claim challenging a defendant‟s pricing practices, the 
                                                 
11
Throughout this opinion I use the term “pricing practices” to 
encompass the variety of ways in which a firm may set its 
prices, including but not limited to, straightforward price cuts 
and conditional rebates or discounts.   
 
12
I recognize that the majority states that Eaton‟s low prices are 
not irrelevant to the extent they may help explain why the OEMs 
entered the LTAs even though the LTAs allegedly included 
terms that were unfavorable to the OEMs and to rebut an 
argument that the agreements were inefficient but the majority 
does not factor the circumstance that Eaton‟s prices were above 
cost into its analysis of whether the LTAs were exclusionary and 
anticompetitive, and I believe its failure to do so is error.  
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Court‟s unwavering adherence to the general principle that 
above-cost pricing practices are not anticompetitive and its 
justifications for that position lead me to conclude that this 
principle is a cornerstone of antitrust jurisprudence that applies 
regardless of whether the plaintiff focuses its claim on the price 
or non-price aspects of the defendant‟s pricing program.  Thus, 
although the price-cost test may not bar a claim of exclusive 
dealing challenging a defendant‟s above-cost pricing practices, 
regardless of how a plaintiff casts its claim or the non-price 
elements of the pricing practices that the plaintiff identifies as 
the exclusionary conduct, where a plaintiff attacks a defendant‟s 
pricing practices — and to be clear that is what the market-share 
rebate programs at issue here are — the fact that defendant‟s 
prices were above-cost must be a high barrier to the plaintiff‟s 
success.  Accordingly, I believe that we must apply the Brooke 
Group price-cost test to the present case and give that test 
persuasive effect in the context of our broader analysis under the 
antitrust laws at issue. 
Allowing appellees that opportunity, the majority 
concludes that the plaintiffs adduced sufficient evidence at trial 
from which a jury reasonably could infer that the LTAs 
represented unlawful “de facto partial exclusive dealing.”13  In 
                                                 
13
I cannot utilize this phrase without making the point that where 
a court permits a non-exclusive, non-mandatory supply 
agreement to morph into a mandatory exclusive-dealing contract 
to legitimize a plaintiff‟s claim of unlawful “de facto partial 
exclusive dealing” the court follows antitrust plaintiffs down the 
rabbit hole a bit too far.  While “de facto partial exclusive 
dealing” is a creative neologism, the phrase not only distorts the 
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doing so, the majority concludes that despite the fact that the 
LTAs by their terms were not exclusive nor mandatory and 
despite the fact that the prices offered under them were at all 
times above-cost such that an equally-efficient competitor could 
have matched them, they were de facto partial exclusive dealing 
contracts because Eaton was a dominant supplier, the OEMs 
could not have afforded to lose Eaton as a supplier, and thus, the 
majority reasons, the OEMs were compelled to enter the LTAs 
and meet their market-share targets.  The majority reaches its 
                                                                                                             
English language (in what other realm would one refer to a 
contract as “partially exclusive”?), it takes us so far from the 
text of Section 3 of the Clayton Act and the actual concept of 
exclusive dealing that I shudder to think what will be labeled as 
exclusive dealing next.   
 
The majority concedes that “partial exclusive dealing is 
rarely a valid antitrust theory.”  Typescript at 43 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, the only thing rarer may be 
what appellees actually allege here: “de facto partial exclusive 
dealing.”  I am not aware of any Supreme Court or court of 
appeals precedent recognizing such a claim, and a Westlaw 
search of the phrase reveals only one other case recognizing the 
concept as a viable antitrust claim.  In a sign that we truly have 
come full circle, that case is a class action pending in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware brought by 
truck purchasers against Eaton, the four OEMs, and a handful of 
other entities, alleging that the same LTAs at issue here violated 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act.  See Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 814 F. Supp. 2d 428, 
442-43 (D. Del. 2011).   
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conclusion despite the absence of evidence in the record 
suggesting that Eaton would have refused to supply 
transmissions to the OEMs had the OEMs failed to meet the 
LTAs‟ market-share targets or that Eaton at any point coerced 
the OEMs into entering the LTAs or meeting the targets.  For 
reasons I set forth more fully below, I cannot join my colleagues 
in this judicial reworking of the LTAs and the unbridled 
speculation the majority‟s reasoning requires to convert the 
LTAs into exclusive dealing contracts.  Even analyzing 
appellees‟ claims under the rule of reason and the principles 
used to ascertain whether an exclusive-dealing arrangement is 
lawful and employing the deferential standard of review to 
which we subject jury verdicts, it is plain that the agreements 
could not have been and in fact were not anticompetitive. 
A.  The Supreme Court‟s Treatment of Antitrust Challenges to 
Pricing Practices   
Beginning with Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 
479 U.S. 104, 107 S.Ct. 484 (1986), the Supreme Court in a 
series of cases considering antitrust challenges to pricing 
practices has made clear that as a general matter above-cost 
pricing practices do not threaten competition.  In Cargill, the 
Court considered whether Monfort, a beef-packing business, had 
shown antitrust injury to the end that it had standing to challenge 
the merger of two of its competitors that allegedly violated 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  See id. at 106-09, 107 S.Ct. at 
487-88.  Monfort presented two theories of antitrust injury: “(1) 
a threat of a loss of profits stemming from the possibility that . . 
. [defendant], after the merger, would lower its prices to a level 
at or only slightly above its costs” and “(2) a threat of being 
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driven out of business by the possibility that . . . [defendant], 
after the merger, would lower its prices to a level below its 
costs.”  Id. at 114, 107 S.Ct. at 491.   
The Court rejected Monfort‟s first theory of injury, 
stating “the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect 
small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued 
competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices 
forbidden by the antitrust laws.”  Id. at 116, 107 S.Ct. at 492.  
Because the defendant‟s above-cost “competition for increased 
market share” was not “activity forbidden by the antitrust laws” 
but rather constituted “vigorous competition,” Monfort could 
not demonstrate antitrust injury under its first theory.  Id.  In this 
regard, the Court noted that “[t]o hold that the antitrust laws 
protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price 
competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a 
firm to cut prices in order to increase market share.”  Id.  The 
antitrust laws, the Court noted, “require no such perverse result” 
because “[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant 
firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price 
competition.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Court rejected Monfort‟s second claim that the 
defendant would engage in below-cost, i.e. predatory pricing, 
following the merger because Monfort had failed to raise and 
failed to adduce adequate proof of that claim before the district 
court.   See id. at 118-19, 107 S.Ct. at 494.   
 Four years later, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (1990), the Court 
reiterated that above-cost pricing practices generally are not 
anticompetitive, this time in the context of Section 1 of the 
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Sherman Act.  In Atlantic Richfield, USA Petroleum Company 
(“USA”), an independent retail marketer of gasoline, alleged 
that its competitor, Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”), 
which sold gasoline through its own stations and indirectly 
through dealers, violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
through a price-fixing scheme that set gasoline prices at below-
market but above-cost levels through its offer of short-term 
discounts, such as volume discounts, and the elimination of 
credit-card sales to its dealers.  See id. at 331-32, 110 S.Ct. at 
1887-88.  Only USA‟s Section 1 claim was before the Court, see 
id. at 333 n.3, 110 S.Ct. at 1888 n.3, and the question presented 
was whether USA had suffered an antitrust injury by virtue of 
ARCO‟s Section 1 violation, see id. at 335, 110 S.Ct. at 1889.  
At the time, ARCO‟s conduct was regarded as a per se violation 
of Section 1.  See id. (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 
145, 88 S.Ct. 869 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 118 S.Ct. 275 (1997)). 
 First, the Court rejected USA‟s claim that it automatically 
satisfied the antitrust injury requirement because ARCO‟s 
conduct constituted a per se violation of Section 1.  495 U.S. at 
336-37, 110 S.Ct. at 1890-91.  The Court then turned to USA‟s 
alternative claim that even if it was not entitled to a presumption 
of injury, it had suffered injury “because of the low prices 
produced by the vertical restraint.”  Id. at 337, 110 S.Ct. at 1891. 
 Rejecting this contention, the Court reasoned that “[w]hen a 
firm, or even a group of firms adhering to a vertical agreement, 
lowers prices but maintains them above predatory levels, the 
business lost by rivals cannot be viewed as an „anticompetitive‟ 
consequence of the claimed violation.”  Id.  Such injury, the 
Court concluded, “is not antitrust injury; indeed, „cutting prices 
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in order to increase business often is the very essence of 
competition.‟”  Id. at 338, 110 S.Ct. at 1891 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1359 (1986)).  
USA argued alternatively that it was “inappropriate to 
require a showing of predatory pricing before antitrust injury 
can be established when the asserted antitrust violation is an 
agreement in restraint of trade illegal under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act, rather than an attempt to monopolize prohibited by § 2.”  
Id. at 338, 110 S.Ct. at 1891.  As the Court noted, “[p]rice fixing 
violates § 1, for example, even if a single firm‟s decision to 
price at the same level would not create § 2 liability” because 
“the price agreement itself is illegal.”  Id. at 338, 110 S.Ct. at 
1891.  USA contended that therefore it had “suffered antitrust 
injury even if [ARCO‟s] pricing was not predatory under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 339, 110 S.Ct. at 1891. 
In a passage that is significant in the context of the 
present case, the Court also rejected that contention.  It 
explained:  
Although a vertical, maximum-price-fixing 
agreement is unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act, it does not cause a competitor antitrust injury 
unless it results in predatory pricing.  Antitrust 
injury does not arise for purposes of § 4 of the 
Clayton Act, until a private party is adversely 
affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the 
defendant‟s conduct; in the context of pricing 
practices only predatory pricing has the requisite 
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anticompetitive effect.  Low prices benefit 
consumers regardless of how those prices are set, 
and so long as they are above predatory levels, 
they do not threaten competition.  Hence, they 
cannot give rise to antitrust injury.  
Id. at 339-40, 110 S.Ct. at 1891-92 (citations omitted and some 
emphasis added).   
The Court observed that it had “adhered to this principle 
regardless of the type of antitrust claim involved.”  Id. at 340, 
110 S.Ct. at 1892 (citing Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116, 107 S.Ct. at 
492; Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 487, 97 S.Ct. at 696).
14
  The 
                                                 
14
As did Cargill, Brunswick Corp. involved a competitor‟s 
antitrust challenge to an allegedly illegal acquisition under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act because it would have brought a 
“„deep pocket‟ parent into a market of „pygmies.‟”  429 U.S. at 
487, 97 S.Ct. at 697.  The Court concluded that the plaintiff 
could not show antitrust injury based on the losses it would 
suffer from that acquisition because the aspect of the merger that 
made it unlawful did not cause the plaintiff‟s losses.  See id. 
 
The majority interprets the Supreme Court‟s statement it 
had adhered to the principle that “in the context of pricing 
practices only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive 
effect” “regardless of the type of antitrust claim involved” to 
mean “that the price-cost test applies regardless of the statute 
under which a pricing practice claim is brought, not that the 
price-cost [test] applies regardless of the type of anticompetitive 
conduct.”  Typescript at 38 n.13.  While the Supreme Court‟s 
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Court noted that although “the source of the price competition in 
[Atlantic Richfield] was an agreement allegedly unlawful under 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act rather than a merger in violation of § 7 
of the Clayton Act . . . that difference [wa]s not salient . . . 
[because] [w]hen prices are not predatory, any losses flowing 
from them cannot be said to stem from an anticompetitive aspect 
of the defendant‟s conduct.”  495 U.S. at 340-41, 110 S.Ct. at 
1892 (emphasis in original). 
                                                                                                             
statement undoubtedly makes clear that the principle that above-
cost pricing is not anticompetitive applies regardless of which 
provision of the antitrust laws is at issue, I believe that the 
Court‟s rather clear statement that it had adhered to this 
principle “regardless of the type of antitrust claim involved” 
means exactly what it says — that whether the plaintiff 
challenges a defendant‟s pricing practices in the context of a 
challenge to an allegedly unlawful merger or whether it does so 
in the context of a claim that a defendant has entered a price-
fixing agreement a plaintiff cannot contend that the prices 
resulting from those arrangements are anticompetitive unless 
they are below cost.  While I do not believe that the Court‟s 
statement in this regard requires that the price-cost test apply 
with dispositive force in every challenge to a defendant‟s pricing 
practices because there may be other elements of a defendant‟s 
conduct that are anticompetitive notwithstanding its above-cost 
prices, the Court‟s reasoning undoubtedly lends support to my 
conclusion that the price-cost test must factor into a court‟s 
decision when it is asked to judge the lawfulness of such a 
defendant‟s rebate program. 
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It is, of course, important to understand the significance 
of Cargill and Atlantic Richfield in the context of this case.  
Cargill and Atlantic Richfield involved the question of whether 
the plaintiffs had suffered antitrust injury, not whether above-
cost pricing practices ever can violate Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  Indeed, at the 
time the Court decided Atlantic Richfield, vertical, maximum-
price-fixing schemes were regarded as per se illegal under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the Court assumed in its 
analysis that even the above-cost scheme at issue in Atlantic 
Richfield was illegal under Section 1.  
Nevertheless, though it was writing in the context of the 
antitrust injury requirement for the actions, the Court in Cargill 
and Atlantic Richfield forcefully rejected the notion that the 
above-cost pricing practices at issue threatened competition at 
all.  See Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340, 110 S.Ct. at 1892 (“[S]o 
long as [prices] are above predatory levels, they do not threaten 
competition.”); Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116, 107 S.Ct. at 492 
(stating that Cargill‟s above-cost pricing practices aimed at 
increasing its market share was not “activity forbidden by the 
antitrust laws”) (emphasis added).  Because the antitrust laws at 
issue in this case require to fix liability on it that Eaton‟s 
behavior present a probable threat to or actually negatively 
impact competition in the relevant marketplace, these 
pronouncements are important here and should bear on our 
consideration of the question of whether the particular pricing 
practices involved in this case are anticompetitive and thus 
violate the antitrust laws.   
Along this same line, other courts of appeals have looked 
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to Atlantic Richfield‟s discussion of above-cost pricing practices 
not only in the context of considering whether the plaintiff has 
demonstrated antitrust injury but also in considering whether a 
defendant‟s conduct violates the antitrust laws.  See Cascade 
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 902-03 (9th Cir. 
2008) (relying on Atlantic Richfield, among other cases, to hold 
that bundled discounts are not exclusionary conduct under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act unless the discounts result in 
below-cost pricing); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways 
PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating in the context of 
a challenge to a volume-discount program that “[a]s long as low 
prices remain above predatory levels, they neither threaten 
competition nor give rise to antitrust injury”) (citing Atl. 
Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340, 110 S.Ct. at 1892) (emphasis added); 
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1060-
61 (8th Cir. 2000) (relying on Atlantic Richfield in concluding 
that defendant had not violated Section 2 through its above-cost 
market-share discounts).  Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
invoked Atlantic Richfield‟s discussion of below-cost pricing 
practices in considering whether pricing practices violate the 
antitrust laws. 
Indeed, three years after it decided Atlantic Richfield, the 
Court reemphasized this principle in concluding that below-cost 
pricing was necessary to establish liability under Section 2 of the 
Clayton Act in an attack on a defendant‟s pricing practices.  In 
Brooke Group, Liggett, a generic cigarette manufacturer, alleged 
that Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (“B&W”) 
violated Section 2 of the Clayton Act when it offered below-cost 
price-cuts and volume rebates on “orders of very substantial 
size” to its wholesalers on B&W‟s generic cigarettes in an effort 
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to reverse decreasing sales of its branded cigarettes.  509 U.S. at 
216-17, 113 S.Ct. at 2584.  The Court stated that “whether the 
claim alleges predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act or 
primary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, . . . , a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury 
resulting from a rival‟s low prices must prove that the prices 
complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival‟s 
costs” and “that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”  Id. at 222-24, 
113 S.Ct. at 2587-88 (emphasis added).  Because Liggett had 
failed to provide sufficient evidence that B&W had a reasonable 
prospect of recouping its allegedly predatory losses, the Court 
concluded that B&W was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  See id. at 243, 113 S.Ct. at 2598. 
Importantly, in explaining the dual requirements set forth 
above, the Court noted that it had “rejected elsewhere the notion 
that above-cost prices that are below general market levels or 
the costs of a firm‟s competitors inflict injury to competition 
cognizable under the antitrust laws.”  Id. at 223, 113 S.Ct. at 
2588 (citing Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340, 110 S.Ct. at 1892).  
In this connection, the Court reiterated Atlantic Richfield‟s 
principle that “„[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of 
how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory 
levels, they do not threaten competition . . . regardless of the 
type of antitrust claim involved.‟”  Id. (quoting Atl. Richfield, 
495 U.S. at 340, 110 S.Ct. at 1892).  The Court observed: 
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect 
of prices above a relevant measure of cost either 
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reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged 
predator, and so represents competition on the 
merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a 
judicial tribunal to control without courting 
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting. 
509 U.S. at 223, 113 S.Ct. at 2588.   
  The Court again rejected an attack on above-cost pricing 
practices with its decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320-21, 127 
S.Ct. 1069, 1075 (2007).  Weyerhaeuser involved the unusual 
situation in which there was an allegation of “predatory 
bidding,” meaning that a firm with monopoly buying power on 
the supply side drives up the price of that input to levels at 
which a competitor cannot compete.  Id. at 320, 127 S.Ct. at 
1075.  Once the monopolist has caused competing buyers to exit 
the market for the input, “it will seek to restrict its input 
purchases below the competitive level, thus reduc[ing] the unit 
price for the remaining input[s] it purchases[,]” thereby allowing 
the monopolist to reap profits that will offset any losses it 
suffered in bidding up the input prices.  Id. at 320-21, 127 S.Ct. 
at 1075-76.  The issue was whether a plaintiff alleging that a 
defendant engaged in such conduct was required to demonstrate 
that the defendant engaged in below-cost pricing through the 
alleged predatory bidding on the supply side.  Due to the 
theoretical and practical similarities between a claim of 
predatory pricing and a claim of predatory bidding, the Court 
concluded that its Brooke Group test applies to predatory 
bidding claims under Section 2 just as the test applies to Section 
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2 predatory pricing claims.  See id. at 325, 127 S.Ct. at 1078.   
In doing so, the Court noted that in Brooke Group it had 
been “particularly wary of allowing recovery for above-cost 
price cutting because allowing such claims could, perversely, 
„chil[l] legitimate price cutting,‟ which directly benefits 
consumers.”  Id. at 319, 127 S.Ct. at 1074 (quoting Brooke Grp., 
509 U.S. at 223-24, 113 S.Ct. at 2588).  Accordingly, the Court 
had “specifically declined to allow plaintiffs to recover for 
above-cost price cutting, concluding that „discouraging a price 
cut and . . . depriving consumers of the benefits of lower prices . 
. . does not constitute sound antitrust policy.‟”  Id., 127 S.Ct. at 
1074-75 (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224, 113 S.Ct. at 
2588).   
 Most recently in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009), the 
Court extended this principle to “price squeeze” claims.  Price 
squeeze claims allege that a “vertically integrated firm [that] 
sells inputs at wholesale and also sells finished goods or services 
at retail” has “simultaneously raise[d] the wholesale price of 
inputs and cut the retail price of the finished good” thereby 
“squeezing the profit margins of any competitors in the retail 
market,” and forcing the competitors to “pay more for the inputs 
they need . . . [and] cut their retail prices to match the other 
firm‟s prices.”  Id. at 442, 129 S.Ct. at 1114.  The Court noted 
that “[t]o avoid chilling aggressive price competition, [it] ha[d] 
carefully limited the circumstances under which plaintiffs can 
state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that prices are too low.”  
Id. at 451, 129 S.Ct. at 1120.  It reiterated the dual requirements 
of Brooke Group for predatory pricing claims, and noted, once 
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more, Atlantic Richfield‟s principle that “so long as [prices] . . . 
are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”  
Id. (quoting Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340, 110 S.Ct. at 1892).
15
 
The Supreme Court‟s decisions in the above cases require 
that inferior courts recognize that in general above-cost pricing 
practices are not anticompetitive and thus do not violate the 
antitrust laws.  Time and time again, the Court has made clear 
that above-cost pricing practices generally do not threaten 
competition in the marketplace.  Accord Cascade Health 
Solutions, 515 F.3d at 901 (observing in the context of challenge 
to bundled discount program that Brooke Group and 
Weyerhaeuser “strongly suggest that, in the normal case, above-
cost pricing will not be considered exclusionary conduct for 
antitrust purposes”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1061 (stating in 
the context of a challenge to a market-share discount program 
that decisions of the Supreme Court “illustrate the general rule 
that above cost discounting is not anticompetitive”); see also 
Khan, 522 U.S. at 15, 118 S.Ct. at 282 (“Our interpretation of 
the Sherman Act also incorporates the notion that condemnation 
of practices resulting in lower prices to consumers is „especially 
costly‟ because „cutting prices in order to increase business 
often is the very essence of competition.”) (internal quotation 
                                                 
15An equally important facet of the Court‟s decision in Linkline, 
in a context quite apart from that here, was its holding that a 
plaintiff may not bring a Section 2 Sherman Act price-squeeze 
claim “when the defendant is under no antitrust obligation to sell 
the inputs to the plaintiff in the first place.”  555 U.S. at 442, 
129 S.Ct. at 1115.   
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marks and citation omitted).   
  As the majority notes, it is also clear that the conditional 
nature of the price cuts or the fact that the prices and the 
conditions were memorialized in the LTAs does not render the 
precedent that I summarize above inapplicable.
16
  As noted, both 
Atlantic Richfield and Brooke Group involved conditional 
discounts of another type, namely volume rebates, and surely 
inasmuch as ARCO and B&W both were sophisticated 
companies that dealt in large-scale transactions, they certainly 
explained these discounts and the conditions they placed on 
them to the purchasers of their products whether or not they did 
so in writing.  In any event, the purchasers necessarily knew that 
they were receiving the discounts when they were afforded 
                                                 
16As noted, in the case of PACCAR‟s and International‟s 
respective LTAs, Eaton provided up-front cash payments in 
addition to market rebates.  Although these payments were not 
in the form of rebates, they cannot be distinguished from the 
market-share rebates because both practices were an avenue for 
Eaton ultimately to provide discounted prices to the OEMs.  
Accord Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 
F.3d 57, 79 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that tire manufacturer‟s offer 
of up-front payments to race sanctioning bodies to select 
manufacturer‟s tires presented no more a coercive threat than an 
offer of lower prices); NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 
452 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that defendant‟s cash 
payments to induce retailers to carry its product solely were 
“nothing more than price reductions offered to the buyers”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
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them.  These cases thus make apparent that the Court‟s 
reluctance to condemn above-cost pricing practices extends not 
only to direct price cuts but also to conditional pricing practices 
whether or not they are stated in written agreements.  The 
principle that above-cost pricing practices generally do not 
threaten competition in the marketplace remains true whether 
the plaintiff casts its claim in the verbiage of “predatory pricing” 
and alleges explicitly that defendant‟s prices are too low or 
whether it realizes it cannot do so because the prices were above 
cost so it instead couches its challenge in the language of 
exclusive dealing and attacks the agreements that offer the low 
prices. 
In practice, however, a defendant‟s pricing practices may 
include both price and non-price elements.  Further, I concur in 
the majority‟s conclusion that notwithstanding the Court‟s 
strong pronouncements favoring above-cost price cuts, the 
Supreme Court has not held that in every case in which a 
plaintiff challenges a defendant‟s pricing practices the Brooke 
Group test is dispositive and the plaintiff therefore must 
demonstrate that there has been below-cost pricing to succeed.  
See Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 901 (noting that “in 
neither Brooke Group nor Weyerhaeuser did the Court go so far 
as to hold that in every case in which a plaintiff challenges low 
prices as exclusionary conduct the plaintiff must prove that 
those prices were below cost”).17  But where a plaintiff contends 
                                                 
17Likewise, I concur fully with the majority‟s point that a firm 
may engage in anticompetitive conduct without engaging in 
below-cost pricing.  The antitrust laws proscribe an array of 
conduct that, of course, does not require as an essential element 
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that a defendant‟s prices alone were anticompetitive, the Brooke 
Group price-cost test provides the entire legal framework 
necessary to evaluate that claim because the Brooke Group 
price-cost test is designed to measure whether prices are 
anticompetitive or not.  Thus, where a plaintiff challenges a 
defendant‟s pricing practices as exclusive dealing or under any 
other theory of antitrust liability but in fact alleges only that the 
defendant‟s prices themselves operate as the exclusionary or 
anticompetitive tool, the Brooke Group test must apply and have 
dispositive effect.
18
  My conclusions in this regard largely mirror 
                                                                                                             
below-cost pricing.  For example, tying arrangements, unlawful 
mergers, and price-fixing agreements, to name a few, are all 
practices that may violate the antitrust laws regardless of the 
prices resulting from such conduct.  The Supreme Court has 
made clear, however, that where an antitrust plaintiff attacks a 
defendant‟s pricing practices, i.e. price cuts, rebates or the like, 
if those practices result in above-cost prices they generally do 
not threaten competition, regardless of the source or type of 
antitrust claim at issue. 
 
18
Appellees rely heavily on LePage‟s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), and contend that our decision in that 
case precludes the possibility that the price-cost test has any 
applicability outside of the predatory-pricing-claim framework.  
For essentially the same reasons the majority sets forth, I, too, 
believe that LePage‟s must be confined to its facts and in any 
event does not bear on the present factually-distinguishable case.  
 
 LePage‟s dealt with bundled rebates, a practice which we 
analogized to tying arrangements in its exclusive potential and 
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which we concluded may exclude an equally efficient but less 
diversified rival even if the bundled rebates resulted in above-
cost prices.  See 324 F.3d at 155 (“The principal anticompetitive 
effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that when offered 
by a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a 
potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally 
diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a 
comparable offer.”).  Above-cost single-product market-share 
discounts, however, do not present the same putative danger of 
excluding an equally efficient but less diversified rival by virtue 
of that rival‟s limited production alone.  For this exact reason, as 
I explain in further detail below, the same leading antitrust 
treatise upon which LePage‟s relied to analogize bundled 
rebates to tying concludes that single-product market-share 
discounts are more appropriately likened to straightforward 
price cuts and the Brooke Group price-cost test should control 
challenges to such programs.  Thus, I concur with the majority 
that our reasoning in that case necessarily is limited to a single-
product producer‟s claim that it has been excluded through a 
more-diversified competitor‟s bundled rebate program that 
conditioned discounts on the purchase of products that the 
single-product producer did not offer. 
 
 Additionally, while I believe that LePage‟s‟ bases for 
distinguishing Brooke Group stood on questionable grounds 
when we set them forth nine years ago, as the majority notes the 
Supreme Court‟s subsequent decisions have eviscerated those 
bases and counsel that we do not extend LePage‟s beyond its 
original parameters.  Furthermore, in concluding that LePage‟s 
must be confined to its facts, I think it appropriate to point out 
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those of the majority.  
Where I part from my colleagues, however, is with their 
conclusion that if a plaintiff challenges a defendant‟s pricing 
                                                                                                             
that there has been considerable academic criticism of our 
opinion in that case.  See, e.g., J. Shahar Billbary, Predatory 
Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 1231, 1246 (Fall 2010) (“[T]he main problem with the 
LePage‟s test is that it does not investigate whether a bundled 
discount is pro-competitive. . . .  [It] may in fact protect a less 
efficient competitor (as LePage‟s admitted to be.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The 
New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 49, 49, 61-72 
(Winter 2005) (criticizing LePage‟s‟ reasoning and noting that 
the case “shows the deleterious consequences that flow from the 
aggressive condemnation of unilateral practices”).  Moreover, 
another court of appeals specifically has declined to follow 
LePage‟s, see Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 903.  But 
perhaps most significantly, the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, a statutorily-created bipartisan group tasked with 
evaluating the state of antitrust law and setting forth 
recommendations to Congress and the President for its 
modernization, criticized LePage‟s as potentially “harm[ing] 
consumer welfare,” and proposed instead that courts adopt a 
three-part test modeled after Brooke Group‟s below-cost pricing 
test to evaluate the lawfulness of bundled discounts.  See 
Antitrust Modernization Comm‟n, Report and 
Recommendations 94-99 (2007) available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_
final_report.pdf. 
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practices but contends that the non-price aspects of defendant‟s 
conduct, rather than the prices themselves, constituted the 
anticompetitive conduct, the price-cost test is no longer relevant. 
 While the Supreme Court has not held that the price-cost test is 
dispositive of all claims that attack a defendant‟s pricing 
practices, it is undeniable that its reasoning in the above cases 
establishes that courts ought to exercise a great deal of caution 
before condemning above-cost pricing practices.  As the 
majority notes, in the precedent recited above the plaintiffs 
grounded their claims in the allegation that defendant‟s prices 
would cause or had caused them harm.  Yet the purpose of my 
summary and my quotation of that precedent in such detail is to 
bear out the fact that the Court‟s holdings rejecting the 
respective plaintiffs‟ challenges in those cases were grounded in 
the fundamental and broader principle that above-cost pricing 
practices, even those embodied in discount and rebate programs 
memorialized in written agreements, generally are not 
anticompetitive and it is that point that is so critical here.   
I believe that it is evident that the Supreme Court‟s 
reasoning with respect to above-costs pricing applies to a 
plaintiff‟s challenge to a defendant‟s pricing practices even if 
the plaintiff claims that the non-price aspects of the defendant‟s 
practices were the actual exclusionary tactics.  Regardless of 
what components of Eaton‟s rebate program that appellees 
identify as the anticompetitive conduct, whether it is the prices 
or the conditions that Eaton attached to those prices, the 
question the jury considered at the trial and that we face on 
appeal is whether Eaton‟s rebate program and conduct as a 
whole was procompetitive or anticompetitive.  See LePage‟s 
Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he 
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courts must look to the monopolist‟s conduct taken as a whole 
rather than considering each aspect in isolation.”) (citing Cont‟l 
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 
82 S.Ct. 1404 (1962)).  Our inquiry in that regard should be an 
objective one that focuses on the facts of the program and our 
answer to that question should not turn on the circumstance that 
appellees had enough foresight specifically not to protest 
Eaton‟s prices.19   
Eaton‟s prices were, of course, the crux of the rebate 
program and are an inextricable element of the LTAs.  Although 
appellees conveniently chose to ignore Eaton‟s prices in 
formulating their claims, in light of that economic reality and the 
Supreme Court‟s mandate that the inferior courts tread lightly 
when asked to condemn above-cost pricing practices, the nature 
of those prices must bear on the question of whether Eaton‟s 
rebate program as a whole was anticompetitive or not.  
Accordingly, I believe that if, as here, a plaintiff attacks both the 
price-based and non-priced-based elements of a defendant‟s 
pricing practices, a court should apply and give persuasive effect 
to the Brooke Group price-cost test such that a firm‟s above-cost 
pricing practices enjoy a presumption of lawfulness regardless 
of how a plaintiff crafts its claim challenging the practices.  This 
approach honors the Supreme Court‟s repeated admonition that 
                                                 
19In this regard I note that Eaton‟s rebate program existed in the 
same form, above-cost prices and all, on the day before 
appellees filed their claim as on the day after they filed their 
claim.  The program did not undergo an ontological 
transformation because appellees had enough prudence not to 
challenge the price aspects of the program.    
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above-cost pricing practices are generally procompetitive and 
that inferior courts must exercise caution before condemning 
such practices.  Furthermore, it has the added virtue of injecting 
a modicum of predictability into this muddled area of antitrust 
jurisprudence.  This principle is critical in this case.  
 I recognize, however, that as is always true with respect 
to any nonconclusive presumption, there may be an exception to 
the presumption of lawfulness of above-cost pricing if a plaintiff 
challenging a defendant‟s above-cost pricing practices 
establishes that the defendant‟s conduct as a whole was 
anticompetitive notwithstanding the pricing aspect of its 
conduct.  In this vein, I acknowledge that, as most contracts 
offering large-scale quantity discounts necessarily do, the LTAs 
had other provisions besides the reduced prices themselves, 
namely, the conditions Eaton attached to those reduced prices, 
i.e., the market-share targets and the data book placement 
provisions which appellees attack as anticompetitive.  Applying 
and giving persuasive effect to the Brooke Group price-cost test 
would not preclude appellees from arguing that the non-price 
aspects of Eaton‟s conduct were anticompetitive even in the 
absence of below-cost pricing.  In practice then, in a case such 
as this one, the Brooke Group price-cost test would operate only 
as one element, though a significant one, of a court‟s and jury‟s 
inquiry under the rule of reason.   
In at least implicitly recognizing the dubious footing of 
an antitrust mode of analysis that hinges entirely on how a 
plaintiff crafts its claim, the majority states that a plaintiff may 
not escape the Brooke Group price-cost test simply by 
characterizing its claim as one of exclusive dealing but it does 
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allow the plaintiff to avoid application of the test as long as the 
plaintiff brings an exclusive dealing claim and contends that the 
non-price aspects of the agreement offering the reduced prices 
operated as the exclusionary tool.  The result of the majority‟s 
approach is that the strong procompetitive justifications driving 
the Supreme Court‟s repeated charge that inferior courts 
exercise caution before condemning above-cost pricing practices 
suddenly disappear so long as the plaintiff is clever enough to 
claim that the non-price aspects of the defendant‟s pricing 
practices, not the prices themselves, were anticompetitive.  I do 
not believe that this is the result the precedent requires or 
prudence counsels.   
I reject the notion that a plaintiff may engage in such 
legalistic maneuvering in an effort to circumvent the Supreme 
Court‟s charge that a court look with a skeptical eye at attacks 
on above-cost pricing practices. The non-price aspects of the 
LTAs which appellees challenge, namely the market-share 
targets and the data book placement provisions, and indeed the 
LTAs themselves would not exist without the reduced prices 
that Eaton offered as an incentive for the OEMs to enter the 
agreements.  Conceptually severing the conditions Eaton 
attached to those prices ignores the economic realities of this 
case and allows a plaintiff essentially to commandeer a court‟s 
analysis through artificial distinctions.
20
  In concluding that the 
                                                 
20
Of course, the majority in effect if not intent encourages an 
antitrust plaintiff challenging a defendant‟s above-cost pricing 
practices simply to avoid any mention of defendant‟s prices.  In 
light of the majority‟s approach, it would be the rare case indeed 
in which a sophisticated plaintiff would bring an exclusive 
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Brooke Group price-cost test at least must have persuasive 
effect in a plaintiff‟s challenge to a defendant‟s pricing practices 
regardless of how a plaintiff casts its claim, I believe it 
appropriate to note that although I stand alone in this case, I 
nonetheless find myself in good company.  The leading antitrust 
treatise, on which the majority also relies,
21
 concludes that 
single-product market-share discounts that do not require 
exclusivity as a condition of the discount are pro-competitive 
and thus lawful so long as they remain above-cost.  Because that 
treatise cogently explains why above-cost market-share 
                                                                                                             
dealing claim against a defendant‟s above-cost pricing practices 
and allege that price itself functioned as the exclusionary tool 
for such a claim necessarily would be ill-fated under the 
majority‟s approach. 
 
21
The majority quotes from Areeda and Hovenkamp to explain 
the treatise‟s perspective that a dominant firm may employ 
exclusive-dealing contracts to preclude a young rival‟s 
expansion.  I do not doubt the truth of this statement but as I 
note above the treatise takes the position that market-share 
discount programs that do not condition the discount on 
exclusivity, which precisely describes Eaton‟s program, are, in 
fact, not exclusive dealing contracts and should not be treated as 
such.  Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest that where a market-
share discount program conditions the discount on exclusivity 
the standards applicable to exclusive dealing should apply.  See 
Fundamentals of Antitrust Law, § 18.03b, at 18-65 (“A discount 
conditioned on exclusivity should generally be treated as no 
different than an orthodox exclusive-dealing arrangement.”). 
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discounts are generally not anticompetitive and do not constitute 
unlawful exclusive dealing, I quote it at length:   
[U]nilaterally imposed quantity discounts 
can foreclose the opportunities of rivals when a 
dealer can obtain its best discount only by dealing 
exclusively with the dominant firm.  For example, 
discounts might be cumulated over lengthy 
periods of time, such as a calendar year, when no 
obvious economies result.  The effect of 
continuously increasing discounts varies, but they 
can resemble exclusive dealing in extreme 
circumstances.   
 Nevertheless, quantity and market share 
discounts differ from exclusive dealing in 
important respects.  First, the buyer need not 
make any ex ante commitment of long duration to 
deal with only one firm; as soon as other 
advantages outweigh the discount, the buyer can 
switch simply by paying the nondiscounted price. 
 The buyers can also switch if one or more other 
sellers can match the discount.  As long as the 
discounted price is above cost and not predatory, 
it can be matched by any equally efficient rival.   
 Second, the similarity to exclusive dealing 
is greatest when the product in question is 
fungible, with buyers indifferent to all 
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characteristics except price.[
22
]  If the product is 
differentiated, the buyer may wish to purchase a 
mixture from alternative sellers, notwithstanding 
one seller‟s progressive discount.  For example, 
an appliance seller who has customer demand for 
four brands of refrigerators is likely to stock all 
four, even though the seller of one offers 
progressive discounts for larger purchases. 
 The effective period over which a firm is 
„locked up‟ by a cumulating discount may bear on 
competitive effects, just as contract duration in 
excluding dealing cases. . . .  Discounts that are 
aggregated over a longer period — say, over all 
purchases made in one year — may be more 
problematic.  First, however, they cannot have an 
anticompetitive effect greater than exclusive 
dealing with one year contracts.  Where there are 
multiple buyers, numerous selling opportunities 
will come up anew each year.  Second, in the 
great majority of cases they exclude much less 
than the one-year exclusive dealing contract 
because an aggressive rival can steal sales by 
matching the cumulated discount, which will be 
                                                 
22
Of course, HD truck transmissions are not fungible products.  
Indeed, this fact is an unstated premise of appellees‟ claims 
because they contend essentially that the FreedomLine was far 
superior to Eaton‟s transmissions and that its failure in the 
marketplace can be attributed only to Eaton‟s anticompetitive 
conduct. 
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the same as the dominant firm‟s cumulative 
discount obligation.  Even in such a case, single-
item discounts can be matched by an equally 
efficient rival.   
 For single-item discounts, no matter how 
measured or aggregated, injury to an equally 
efficient rival seems implausible.  It is perhaps 
most plausible where there are a very small 
number of buyers, entry barriers into the buying 
market are very high, and buying requires the 
making of long-term commitments.  In that case, 
aggressive discounting by the monopolist could 
deprive a rival of most of its patronage.  Even 
here, however, we would hesitate to condemn a 
firm for making an above-cost sale that could 
readily be matched by an equally efficient rival.  
Competitive injury is not plausible when there are 
a large number of buyers, particularly when entry 
barriers into the buying market are low.  As the 
First Circuit did in Barry Wright [Barry Wright 
Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 
(1st Cir. 1983)  (Breyer, J.)], we would test 
illegality by the ordinary rules applying to 
predatory pricing and allow all above-cost single 
item discounts.   
Given that above-cost discounts can be 
matched by equally efficient rivals, 
anticompetitive effects are likely only when the 
large firm can offer a larger variety of products or 
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services than the smaller firm does.  The most 
common scenario resembles tying. 
IA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 
768b, at 148-50 (2d ed. 2000) (emphasis added). 
This discussion is set forth in the treatise‟s treatment of 
market-share discounts in the context of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  However, for the same reasons recited above, 
Areeda and Hovenkamp take the identical position in the context 
of Section 1 Sherman Act challenges to market-share discounts:  
One approach to [market-share discounts] . 
. . is to treat them as exclusive dealing contracts, 
with the contract period equal to the period over 
which purchases can be aggregated for purposes 
of measuring the size of the discount.   
. . .  
If exclusive dealing under equivalent 
structural conditions and subject to equivalent 
defenses were lawful, the discount arrangement 
should be lawful as well.  But the competitive 
impact must in fact be less because any equally 
efficient rival can take the customer by bidding a 
better price and even compensating the customer 
for the loss of the discount from the defendant — 
assuming, as we have, that the defendant‟s 
program results in above-cost prices at all 
discount levels. . . .  For these reasons we suggest 
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that discounts attached merely to the quantity of 
good purchased, and not to exclusivity itself, be 
treated as lawful, and not be subjected to the laws 
of exclusive dealing.   
The decisions to the contrary involve 
situations where the defendant aggregates the 
discount across two or more related products, 
while the plaintiff produces only one or a subset 
of these products.  
XI Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1807b2, at 132-33 
(citing LePage‟s, 324 F.3d 141) (emphasis added).23 
 The treatise‟s reasoning as set forth above is clear and 
needs little further elaboration from me.  While, as noted, the 
law allows a plaintiff to contend that non-price aspects of a 
defendant‟s pricing practices were anticompetitive under the 
rule of reason notwithstanding the defendant‟s above-cost 
prices, I believe that the treatise‟s extraordinarily detailed 
economic rationale for concluding that the price-cost test is 
appropriate in challenges to single-product market-share 
discounts show that my approach is on firm footing.  See also 
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 
(1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (Above-cost prices do not “have a 
tendency to exclude or eliminate equally efficient competitors.  
Moreover, a price cut that leaves prices above incremental costs 
                                                 
23
As I explain below, Areeda and Hovenkamp take the position 
that Section 3 does not encompass non-exclusive market-share 
discount programs. 
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was probably moving prices in the „right‟ direction — towards 
the competitive norm.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and 
Exclusion, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 841, 844 (2006) (“One of the 
factors driving the predatory pricing rule is that, as long as 
prices are above the relevant measure of cost, the discounts 
cannot exclude an equally efficient rival.  The same is true of 
single-product discounts.”). 
In sum, I reiterate that Supreme Court precedent requires 
that courts exercise considerable caution before condemning 
above-cost pricing practices and that in a challenge to a 
defendant‟s pricing practices the Brooke Group price-cost test 
should apply and be given persuasive effect regardless of 
whether a plaintiff identifies non-price elements of a 
defendant‟s conduct that it alleges were anticompetitive.  
Having discussed this critical point, I now turn to the question of 
whether under the rule of reason analysis and the standards 
applicable to claims of unlawful exclusive dealing appellees 
demonstrated that a jury could hold that Eaton violated the 
antitrust laws notwithstanding its above-cost prices.   
B.  Clayton Act Section 3 and Sherman Act Section 1 Claims
24
 
                                                 
24The majority collapses appellees‟ three claims into one 
analysis, and while that approach is not necessarily incorrect and 
the three provisions at issue overlap substantially, I believe it 
most prudent to address the claims separately as the provisions 
at issue have some distinct elements that require separate 
discussion.   
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Appellees contend that the LTAs were anticompetitive 
exclusive dealing arrangements in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  They claim that 
through the LTAs “Eaton engaged in de facto exclusive dealing 
agreements and other conduct that denied any other supplier the 
ability to compete for even 10% of the market.”  Appellees‟ br. 
at 43.   
In considering this argument, I start with the principle 
that even explicit exclusive-dealing arrangements, which 
preclude a buyer from purchasing the goods of another seller, 
are not per se unlawful.  See Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier 
Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 76 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Dentsply Int‟l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Indeed, “it is widely recognized that in many circumstances 
exclusive dealing arrangements may be highly efficient — to 
assure supply, price stability, outlets, investment, best efforts or 
the like — and pose no competitive threat at all.”  Races Tires, 
614 F.3d at 76 (quoting E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical 
Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass‟n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004)) 
                                                                                                             
 In this case, I make many more citations to the record 
than judges of this Court ordinarily would make in an opinion.  I 
do so because while deference to the jury‟s verdict requires that 
we not reweigh the evidence and that we view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to appellees, where, as here, the 
evidence supporting that verdict falls so short of the standard 
required to sustain that verdict I believe it appropriate to point 
not only to the absence of evidence supporting the jury verdict 
but also to the considerable undisputed evidence contradicting 
that verdict. 
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(internal brackets omitted); see also Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07, 69 S.Ct. 1051, 1058-59 
(1949) (listing advantages of requirements contracts to both 
buyers and sellers); Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 
F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There are . . . well-recognized 
economic benefits to exclusive dealing arrangements, including 
the enhancement of interbrand competition.”) (citation omitted). 
 As we stated in Race Tires, “[i]t is well established that 
competition among businesses to serve as an exclusive supplier 
should actually be encouraged.”  614 F.3d at 83 (citation 
omitted).  “[C]ompetition to be an exclusive supplier may 
constitute „a vital form of rivalry, and often the most powerful 
one, which the antitrust laws encourage rather than suppress.‟”  
Id. at 76 (quoting Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Marketing In-
Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004)).  Of course, 
“exclusive agreements are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.”  
Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 76.  “All exclusive dealing agreements 
must comply with section 1 of the Sherman Act.”  Barr Labs., 
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 978 F.2d 98, 110 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1239 
(3d Cir. 1975)).  “Contracts for the sale of goods . . . must also 
comply with the more rigorous standards of section 3 of the 
Clayton Act.”  Id.   
While Section 3 requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that 
it is “probable that performance of the contract will foreclose 
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce 
affected,” Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 
320, 327, 81 S.Ct. 623, 628 (1961) (emphasis added), under a 
Section 1 rule-of-reason case such as this case “the plaintiff 
bears the initial burden of showing that the [alleged] agreement 
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produced an adverse, anticompetitive effect within the relevant 
geographic market,” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 
212, 222 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations marks and citation omitted) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, if an arrangement “do[es] not 
infringe upon the stiffer standards of anti-competitiveness under 
the Clayton Act, . . . [it] will also be lawful under the less 
restrictive provisions of the Sherman Act.”  Barr Labs., 978 F.2d 
at 110 (citing Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1250); see also CDC 
Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“The conclusion that a contract does not violate § 3 of 
the Clayton Act ordinarily implies the conclusion that the 
contract does not violate the Sherman Act . . . .”) (citation 
omitted); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & 
Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 n.9 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A] greater 
showing of anticompetitive effect is required to establish a 
Sherman Act violation than a section 3 Clayton Act violation in 
exclusive-dealing cases.”) (citation omitted).25 
                                                 
25
In Tampa Electric, the Court indicated that if an arrangement 
is lawful under Section 3 of the Clayton Act it will be lawful 
under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  See 365 U.S. 
at 335, 81 S.Ct. at 632 (“We need not discuss the respondents‟ 
further contention that the contract also violates § 1 and § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, for if it does not fall within the broader 
proscription of § 3 of the Clayton Act it follows that it is not 
forbidden by those of the former.”) (citing Times-Picayune 
Publ‟g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09, 73 S.Ct. 872, 
880 (1953)).  In Barr Laboratories, however, we disposed of the 
plaintiff‟s Section 1 Sherman Act claim with its Section 3 
Clayton Act claim but we addressed the plaintiff‟s Section 2 
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To determine whether it is “probable that performance of 
the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of 
the line of commerce affected” in violation of Section 3, Tampa 
Electric Co., 365 U.S. at 327, 81 S.Ct. at 628, logically a 
plaintiff first must establish the share of the market, expressed in 
a percentage, in which the exclusive dealing arrangement 
forecloses competition.  As the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit stated in one of the more notable antitrust 
cases of the recent past, “[t]hough what is „significant‟ may vary 
depending upon the antitrust provision under which an exclusive 
deal is challenged, it is clear that in all cases the plaintiff must 
both define the relevant market and prove the degree of 
foreclosure.”  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“For the exclusive dealing contract, the first step would be [for 
plaintiff] to show the extent of foreclosure resulting from the . . . 
contract . . . .”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2002), aff‟d, 67 F. 
App‟x 810 (4th Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff makes out a prima facie 
case of substantial foreclosure by demonstrating first that a 
                                                                                                             
Sherman Act claim separately.  See 978 F.2d at 110-12; see also 
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 197 (concluding that the district court 
erred in stating that defendant had not violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act solely because it had concluded that defendant had 
not violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act) (citing LePage‟s, 324 
F.3d at 157 n.10).  For this reason, I subsume appellees‟ Section 
1 Sherman Act claim within its Section 3 claim but I address 
separately appellees‟ Section 2 Sherman Act claim. 
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significant percentage of the relevant market is foreclosed by the 
provision challenged.”).   
“The share of the market foreclosed is important because, 
for the contract to have an adverse effect upon competition, „the 
opportunities for other traders to enter into or remain in that 
market must be significantly limited.‟”  Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d at 69 (quoting Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 328, 81 S.Ct. 
at 628-29); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2, 45, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1576 (1984) (O‟Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint on 
trade [under Section 1 of the Sherman Act] only when a 
significant fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a 
market by the exclusive deal.”) (citation omitted); Chuck‟s Feed 
& Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1294 (4th Cir. 
1987) (“[T]he courts‟ focus in evaluating exclusive dealing 
arrangements should be on their effect in shutting out competing 
manufacturers‟ brands from the relevant market.”); Perington 
Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369, 1374 
(10th Cir. 1979) (“[A] complaining trader [challenging an 
exclusive-dealing arrangement] must allege and prove that a 
particular arrangement unreasonably restricts the opportunities 
of the seller‟s competitors to market their product.”) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, “[f]ollowing Tampa Electric, courts considering 
antitrust challenges to exclusive contracts have taken care to 
identify the share of the market foreclosed.”  Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d at 69 (citation omitted); see also E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (noting that “the requirement of a significant degree 
of foreclosure serves a useful screening function”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
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Nevertheless, the antitrust laws tolerate some degree of 
market foreclosure; Section 3 only condemns an agreement 
where the foreclosure represents a substantial share of the 
market.  See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co., 258 
U.S. 346, 357, 42 S.Ct. 360, 362 (1922) (“That . . . [Section 3] 
was not intended to reach every remote lessening of competition 
is shown in the requirement that such lessening must be 
substantial.”).  Thus, once the plaintiff demonstrates the portion 
of the market the exclusive-dealing arrangement forecloses, the 
court must ask whether that level of preemption constitutes a 
“substantial” share of the market.  See Tampa Elec. Co., 365 
U.S. at 328, 81 S.Ct. at 628 (In a Section 3 case, the Court must 
consider the degree of market foreclosure and “the competition 
foreclosed by the contract must be found to constitute a 
substantial share of the relevant market.”).  There is no fixed 
percentage at which foreclosure becomes “substantial” and 
courts have varied widely in the degree of foreclosure they 
consider unlawful.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 199 F. 
Supp. 2d at 388 (collecting cases and noting that “[c]ourts have 
condemned provisions involving foreclosure as low as 24% 
while provisions involving foreclosure as high as 50% have 
been upheld”) (citations omitted).   
Under Tampa Electric, however, “the degree of market 
foreclosure is only one of the factors involved in determining 
the legality of an exclusive dealing arrangement.”  Barr Labs., 
978 F.2d at 111 (citation omitted).  Indeed, while a negligible 
degree of foreclosure “makes dismissal easy,” a high degree of 
market foreclosure does not “automatically condemn” an 
exclusive-dealing arrangement.  Stop & Shop Supermarket, 373 
F.3d at 68.  Rather, once a plaintiff identifies the degree of 
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market foreclosure, to determine whether that preemption is 
“substantial,” a court considers not only the quantitative aspect 
of the foreclosure but also the qualitative conditions of the 
particular market, such as “the relative strength of the parties, 
the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to 
the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area,” and 
the effect “preemption of that share of the market might have on 
effective competition therein.”  Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 
329, 81 S.Ct. at 629; see also Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 111.  
Courts employing Tampa Electric‟s market analysis also 
consider the duration of the agreement, the ease of its 
terminability, the height of any entry barriers, alternative outlets 
competitors may employ to sell their product, and the buyer‟s 
and seller‟s business justifications for the arrangement.  See 
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1059; Omega Envtl., 127 F.3d at 
1163-65; Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 111; Barry Wright Corp, 724 
F.2d at 236-37; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d at 
389; see also XI Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1821d, 
at 183-88.
26
   
                                                 
26
In substance, the Tampa Electric standard for Clayton Act 
Section 3 claims differs very marginally, if at all, from the fact-
intensive rule-of-reason analysis that applies to this case under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Cf. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. 
ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The rule of 
reason requires the fact-finder to weigh [] all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice 
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.  The inquiry is whether the restraint at issue is one 
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.”) 
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In considering whether Eaton‟s conduct violated Section 
3, I note first that it is undisputed that the LTAs were not by 
their terms exclusive-dealing contracts.  The LTAs did not 
require the OEMs to purchase any amount, much less all, of 
their transmission needs from Eaton, and they did not preclude 
the OEMs from purchasing transmissions from appellees or any 
other manufacturer.  Additionally, the LTAs did not condition 
the rebates on the OEMs‟ purchase of 100% of their 
transmission needs from Eaton.   
In the past, we have expressed doubt as to whether an 
agreement involving less than all of a customer‟s purchases even 
falls within the ambit of Section 3.  See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 
110 n.24 (“An agreement affecting less than all purchases does 
not amount to true exclusive dealing.”) (citation omitted); see 
also W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 190 
                                                                                                             
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  Indeed, it appears more 
often than not that in a Section 1 case courts explicitly employ 
the Tampa Electric standard as the guiding framework for the 
rule-of-reason analysis.  See, e.g. Allied Orthopedic Appliances 
Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Under the antitrust rule of reason, an exclusive dealing 
arrangement violates Section 1 only if its effect is to „foreclose 
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce 
affected.‟”) (quoting Omega Envtl., 127 F.3d at 1162); see also 
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 1575 (O‟Connor, 
J., concurring) (“Exclusive dealing arrangements are 
independently subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
and are also analyzed under the Rule of Reason.”) (citing Tampa 
Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 333-35, 81 S.Ct. at 631-32).   
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F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that because volume 
discount contracts did “not preclude consumers from using other 
delivery services, they [we]re not exclusive dealing contracts 
that preclude[d] competition”); Magnus Petroleum Co., v. Skelly 
Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir. 1979) (“Because the 
agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not 
require plaintiffs to purchase any amounts of gasoline that even 
approached their requirements, they did not violate Section 3 of 
the Clayton Act.”) (citations omitted).   
Indeed, Section 3 explicitly applies only to those 
agreements entered into “on the condition, agreement, or 
understanding that the lessee or purchaser . . . shall not use or 
deal in the goods . . . of a competitor.”  15 U.S.C. § 14; see also 
Standard Fashion Co., 258 U.S. at 356, 42 S.Ct. at 362 (Section 
3 “deals with consequences to follow the making of the 
restrictive covenant limiting the right of the purchaser to deal in 
the goods of the seller only.”).27  I doubt whether a market-share 
                                                 
27Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 1 
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes the 
monopolization or attempted monopolization of trade or 
commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 2, do not contain Section 3‟s “on the 
condition” language.  Accordingly, the LTAs fall within the 
theoretical reach of those provisions.  Nevertheless, appellees‟ 
Section 1 and 2 claims fail because appellees did not introduce 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the LTAs 
were exclusive dealing contracts that foreclosed competition in 
the marketplace.   
  59 
discount program of the type here, which does not preclude the 
buyer from dealing in the goods of others and does not even 
condition the rebate on exclusivity, falls within the statutory 
reach of that provision.  See IIIA Areeda & Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶ 768, at 148 n.26 (noting that “only the Sherman 
Act applies” to a claim that a market-share discount amounts to 
exclusive dealing because “[w]hile § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 14, expressly covers the seller who offers a „discount 
from, or rebate upon‟ a sale in exchange for a promise not to 
deal with others, that is not the same thing as a quantity or 
market share discount, in which the buyer makes no promise not 
to deal with others”).28   
The majority bypasses this obstacle to appellees‟ success 
by stating that a plaintiff‟s allegation that a contract lacking an 
express exclusivity requirement nonetheless establishes an 
unlawful de facto exclusive dealing program sets forth a 
                                                 
28
In fact, even if the LTAs had required the OEMs to purchase a 
certain share but not all of their transmissions needs from Eaton, 
as the majority interprets them to do, it is still unclear whether 
Section 3 would have reached that agreement.  See Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 18.01c, at 18-17 
(“Literally, a „partial‟ exclusive dealing requirement appears not 
to be covered by § 3 of the Clayton Act at all.  For example, if A 
requires B to purchase „at least 60 percent‟ of its gasoline needs 
from A, B is still free to purchase the remaining 40 percent 
elsewhere.  As a result, there is no condition that B not deal in 
the goods of a competitor, as the statute requires.  Most of the 
courts take this position.”) (citations omitted).   
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cognizable antitrust claim.  In doing so, the majority also 
concludes that Section 3 encompasses contracts that require 
partial exclusivity.   
The notion of de facto exclusive dealing has its roots in 
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 
457, 42 S.Ct. 363, 365 (1922), in which the Court held that a 
contract lacking an express agreement not to use the goods of a 
competitor falls within the ambit of Section 3 if “the practical 
effect is to prevent such use.”  As noted, the majority appears to 
interpret this statement as meaning that a contract that has the 
effect of causing the purchaser to buy most of its needs from one 
seller falls within Section 3 because it induces near-exclusivity.  
I disagree with this interpretation and believe instead that United 
Shoe and its “practical effect” standard stands for the 
proposition that a contract that is not facially exclusive may 
nonetheless fall within the ambit of Section 3 if, in the 
implementation of its terms, it induces actual exclusivity.  
In United Shoe, the Court condemned as unlawful 
exclusive dealing a lease that included, among other things, a 
forfeiture provision to the effect that if the lessee failed to use 
exclusively machinery of certain kinds made by the lessor, the 
lessor had the right to cancel the lessee‟s right to use all such 
machinery, a provision that the lessee would not use the 
machinery on products that had not received particular 
operations upon certain of other lessor‟s machines, and a clause 
that required the lessee to purchase its supplies exclusively from 
the lessor.  See id. at 456-57, 42 S.Ct. at 365.  Lessees who used 
the lessor‟s competitors‟ machines in violation of the terms of 
the leases “had their attention called to the forfeiture provisions 
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in the leases, which was understood, by many of the lessees, as 
warnings, in the nature of threats, that unless discontinued these 
covenants of the leases would be enforced.”  United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Co., 264 F. 138, 145 (D.C. Mo. 1920). 
These provisions, which the Court noted amounted in reality to 
“tying agreements,” fell within the scope of Section 3 because 
they “effectually prevent[ed] the lessee from acquiring the 
machinery of a competitor of the lessor, except at the risk of 
forfeiting the right to use the machines furnished by the 
[lessor].”  258 U.S. at 457-58, 42 S.Ct. at 365.  Thus, in practice, 
the lease induced actual, total exclusivity.  Subsequent cases 
relying on United Shoe‟s "practical effect” formulation bear the 
point out.   
In International Business Machines Corp. v. United 
States, 298 U.S. 131, 135, 56 S.Ct. 701, 703 (1936), the Court, 
relying on United Shoe, concluded that a lease for tabulating 
machines that required the lessee to use only the tabulating cards 
of the lessor on its machines fell within Section 3 because in 
practice it required the exclusive use of the lessor‟s cards.  The 
Court explained that while “the condition is not in so many 
words against the use of the cards of a competitor, but is 
affirmative in form, that the lessee shall use only appellant‟s 
cards in the leased machines,” because “the lessee can make no 
use of the cards except with the leased machines, and the 
specified use of appellant‟s cards precludes the use of the cards 
of any competitor, the condition operates [to prohibit the use of 
the cards of a competitor] in the manner forbidden by” Section 3 
of the Clayton Act.  Id. (citing United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 458, 42 
S.Ct. at 365); but see FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 
463, 474, 43 S.Ct. 450, 453 (1923) (distinguishing United Shoe 
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and concluding that contract that required lessee of gasoline 
pumps not to use competitor‟s gasoline in lessor‟s pumps did not 
fall within Section 3 because the contract did not contain a 
provision “which obligate[d] the lessee not to sell the goods of 
another,” and “[t]he lessee [wa]s free to buy [pumps] wherever 
he cho[se]”). Similarly, in Standard Oil, the Court assumed that 
Section 3 encompassed “[e]xclusive supply contracts” that the 
defendant had entered with its dealers, in which the dealer 
promised “to purchase from Standard all his requirements of one 
or more products.”29  337 U.S. at 295-96, 69 S.Ct. at 1054.   
Accordingly, while Section 3 encompasses agreements 
that do not contain express exclusivity provisions but in reality 
induce actual exclusivity, it does not, as the majority seems to 
believe, encompass agreements that do not contain express 
exclusivity provisions and do not induce actual exclusivity.
30
  
                                                 
29
In Tampa Electric, the case most often cited for the “practical 
effect” standard, the Court considered a challenge to a 
requirements contract and “assume[d], but d[id] not decide, that 
the contract [wa]s an exclusive-dealing arrangement within the 
compass of § 3.”  365 U.S. at 330, 81 S.Ct. at 629.   
 
30LePage‟s and Dentsply, cases on which the majority relies, are 
not to the contrary.  Those cases dealt not with Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act but rather with Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
does not contain the same restrictive “on the condition” 
language as Section 3.  Furthermore, in LePage‟s, we concluded 
that 3M‟s bundled rebate agreements constituted unlawful de 
facto exclusive dealing arrangements because LePage‟s 
“introduced powerful evidence” that its prior customers refused 
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Here, not only did the LTAs lack any provision imposing a ban 
on the OEMs‟ purchase of Eaton‟s competitors‟ products, they 
did not contain a provision amounting to or having the effect of 
imposing such a ban.  Moreover, the evidence adduced at the 
trial demonstrates that the LTAs actually did not induce de facto 
total exclusivity on the part of the OEMs.  As noted, from July 
2000 to October 2003, ZFM‟s share of the HD transmission 
market ranged between 8% and 14%.  Thus, the majority, in 
interpreting the scope of Section 3 to encompass an agreement 
which neither explicitly forbids nor has the effect of precluding 
the OEMs from purchasing Eaton‟s competitors‟ products, has 
expanded the scope of Section 3 greatly beyond its intent.  
Section 3 only encompasses agreements that explicitly forbid or 
have the practical effect of precluding one party from using the 
goods of another.  Nevertheless, despite my serious misgivings 
on this threshold exclusive-dealing issue, which could justify 
terminating this discussion now and thus reversing the District 
Court‟s denial of judgment as a matter of law as to appellees‟ 
Section 3 Clayton Act claim, I will assume that the LTAs fall 
                                                                                                             
to meet with LePage‟s‟ sales representatives, refused to discuss 
purchasing LePage‟s products for “the next three years,” and 
3M offered bonus rebates to its customers upon achieving sole-
supplier status.  324 F.3d at 158.  And in Dentsply, we 
concluded that a provision that Dentsply imposed on its dealers 
that actually prohibited the dealers from adding its competitors‟ 
tooth lines as part of their product offering amounted to 
exclusive dealing.  399 F.3d at 193.  Here, as explained below, 
appellees fell woefully short of introducing evidence that the 
LTAs induced anything approaching actual exclusivity.   
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within the theoretical reach of Section 3 and proceed to analyze 
the LTAs under that provision.  My analysis, however, does not 
get very far before it becomes readily apparent that this 
fundamental flaw in appellees‟ case — that the LTAs were not, 
in fact, exclusive-dealing contracts — is fatal to their claim.  
As noted above, under Tampa Electric a plaintiff first 
must identify the degree of market foreclosure.  Despite a 
lengthy trial in the District Court, which has resulted in the 
creation of a nine-volume joint appendix and extensive briefing 
on this appeal, appellees do not identify clearly for us the precise 
degree of market foreclosure attributable to the LTAs.  The 
majority, however, attempts to make up for appellees‟ 
deficiency in this regard by stating that appellees‟ expert, Dr. 
David DeRamus, testified that the LTAs left only 15% of the 
market remaining to Eaton‟s competitors, or stated another way, 
that the LTAs foreclosed competition in 85% of the market.  In 
reality, however, Dr. DeRamus did not testify that the LTAs 
foreclosed competition in 85% of the market.  The testimony on 
which the majority apparently relies for that figure deals not 
with Dr. DeRamus‟ opinion as to the extent to which the LTAs 
foreclosed competition in the HD truck transmission market but 
rather with Dr. DeRamus‟ calculation of Eaton‟s market share 
during the relevant time period in the context of his 
determination as to whether Eaton had monopoly power.  See 
J.A. at 722 (Dr. DeRamus‟ testimony) (explaining the steps he 
took to ascertain whether “Eaton has monopoly power in the[] . . 
. [NAFTA HD truck transmission market”); see also J.A. at 
4758, 4760 (Dr. DeRamus‟ expert report) (setting forth the data 
reflecting Eaton‟s market share).  I think it obvious that the 
inquiry into Eaton‟s market share is a question separate and 
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apart from the LTAs‟ alleged foreclosure effect31 and that we 
may not simply borrow Dr. DeRamus‟ testimony as to Eaton‟s 
market share to adduce evidence of the LTAs‟ foreclosure 
effect.  
In point of fact, Dr. DeRamus aimed much higher with 
his estimation of the LTAs‟ alleged foreclosure effect by stating 
explicitly in his expert report that “Eaton‟s exclusionary 
agreements with all four of the heavy-duty truck OEMs — the 
only significant manufacturers of heavy-duty trucks in the 
relevant geographic markets at issue in this case — foreclosed 
nearly 100 percent of the North American market or markets for 
HD [t]ransmissions.”  J.A. at 4814 (Dr. DeRamus‟ expert 
report).  Dr. DeRamus arrived at this foreclosure percentage on 
the basis of the market-share targets the LTAs required for the 
                                                 
31
See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d at 229, 237 (observing 
that potential foreclosure effect of volume discount 
requirements contract between manufacturer, who had 83% to 
94% market share, and purchaser of mechanical snubbers was 
50% where purchaser‟s snubber purchases represented 50% of 
snubber market).  The distinction between these two inquiries, 
the question of Eaton‟s market share and the question of the 
LTAs‟ alleged foreclosure effect, is particularly critical in a case 
such as this one since prior to 1989 Eaton was the only HD 
transmission manufacturer and thus possessed 100% market 
share at a time before appellees contend that it engaged in any 
alleged anticompetitive conduct. 
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OEMs to receive the rebates.
32
    
In denying Eaton judgment as a matter of law, the 
District Court took a similar view that reliance on the market-
share targets was an appropriate method to ascertain the LTAs‟ 
foreclosure effect, concluding that there was sufficient evidence 
“that the contracts foreclosed a substantial share of the market” 
not because ZFM identified a specific foreclosure percentage 
but because “each OEM was required to order 80% or more of 
its transmissions from” Eaton to receive the rebates.  ZF 
Meritor, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
33
  While the majority‟s reliance 
on Dr. DeRamus‟ testimony regarding Eaton‟s market share to 
ascertain the LTAs‟ foreclosure effect is mistaken, it is clear that 
the majority likewise ultimately concludes that the market-share 
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Although Dr. DeRamus did not set forth explicitly in his 
expert report how he arrived at his foreclosure percentage or his 
arithmetic in that regard — a shocking oversight in a case that 
hinges on this very question — his testimony at trial illuminates 
that he relied on the market-share targets to arrive at his 
estimation of the LTAs‟ foreclosure effect, though notably he 
testified as to a different foreclosure percentage than that which 
he set forth in his report.  See J.A. at 858 (Dr. DeRamus‟ 
testimony) (explaining that he arrived at his opinion of the 
LTAs‟ foreclosure effect by relying on the market-share targets 
and opining that one could take a “simple average” of the 
market-share targets to yield a 90% foreclosure rate).   
 
33The District Court‟s statement in this regard was inaccurate as 
Volvo‟s LTA granted it rebates beginning at a 65% market-
share target.   
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targets may serve as a measure of the LTAs‟ foreclosure effect.  
For several reasons, however, the market-share targets do not 
reflect the LTAs‟ foreclosure effect, and, on this point, I find 
that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit‟s and the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit‟s treatment of Sherman Act 
Section 1 challenges to non-exclusive market-share discount 
programs are instructive.   
In Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care 
Group, 592 F.3d 991, 994-96 (9th Cir. 2010), a group of 
hospitals and health care providers alleged, among other things, 
that Tyco, a monopolist in the U.S. pulse oximetry sensor 
market, unlawfully foreclosed competition in the market in 
contravention of Section 1 of the Sherman Act through its offer 
of market-share discounts.  As here, the market-share 
agreements provided discounts conditioned on the customers‟ 
purchase of a certain percentage of the product in issue, i.e., 
pulse oximetry sensors, from Tyco, the discount increasing with 
Tyco‟s increasing market share.  “The agreements did not 
contractually obligate Tyco‟s customers to buy anything from 
Tyco . . . and [t]he only consequence of purchasing less than the 
agreed upon percentage of Tyco‟s products was loss of the 
negotiated discounts.”  Id. at 995.   
The court of appeals concluded that the agreements did 
not foreclose competition in violation of Section 1 because the 
agreements did not require Tyco‟s customers to purchase 
anything from Tyco and because “[a]ny customer subject to one 
of Tyco‟s market-share discount agreements could choose at 
anytime to forego the discount offered by Tyco and purchase 
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from a generic competitor.”  Id. at 997.34  Thus, Tyco‟s 
competitors “remained able to compete for Tyco‟s customers by 
offering their products at better prices.”  Id. at 998.   
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took a 
similar view of market-share discount agreements in Concord 
Boat.  In that case, a group of boat builders that sold boats to 
dealers alleged that Brunswick, the market leader in the 
manufacture of stern drive engines, violated Section 1 through 
its offer of market-share discount agreements with the builders 
and dealers.  The agreements offered reduced prices conditioned 
on market-share targets of 60% to 80%.  See 207 F.3d at 1044.
35
 
 As is true here with respect to the product in issue, none of 
Brunswick‟s programs “obligated boat builders and dealers to 
purchase engines from Brunswick, and none of the programs 
restricted the ability of builders and dealers to purchase engines 
from other engine manufacturers.”  Id. at 1045.   
The court employed the standards of Tampa Electric to 
conclude that the plaintiffs had “failed to produce sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that Brunswick had foreclosed a 
                                                 
34
The court also found significant the plaintiffs‟ expert failure to 
explain why “price-sensitive hospitals would adhere to Tyco‟s 
market-share agreements when they could purchase less 
expensive generic sensors instead.”  592 F.3d at 997.   
 
35
The plaintiffs also alleged that Brunswick had violated Section 
7 of the Clayton Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but the 
court likewise rejected these claims.  See 207 F.3d at 1043, 
1053, 1062. 
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substantial share of the . . . market through anticompetitive 
conduct” and failed to show that “Brunswick‟s discount 
program was in any way exclusive” in violation of Section 1.   
Id. at 1059.  The court reached that conclusion because the 
builders were “free to walk away from the discounts at any 
time,” and “Brunswick‟s discounts, because they were 
significantly above cost, left ample room for new competitors . . 
. to enter the engine manufacturing market and to lure customers 
away by offering superior discounts.”  Id.; see also Se. Mo. 
Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 612-13 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting Sherman Sections 1 and 2 and Clayton Section 3 
challenge to market-share discount program on the basis of 
Concord Boat where customers “were not required to purchase 
100 percent of their . . . needs from . . . [defendant] or to refrain 
from purchasing from competitors” or indeed to purchase 
“anything from . . .  [defendant]”); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. 
Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1258 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(affirming district court‟s directed verdict in favor of defendant 
on Section 1 and Section 3 claims where plaintiff “proved no 
instance in which a distributor honored an exclusive dealing 
arrangement by refusing to purchase . . . [plaintiff‟s] plugs, . . . 
there was no testimony that any distributor agreed to refrain 
from selling competing plugs for any specific period of time, . . . 
[and] [t]here was no evidence that a distributor who failed to 
abide by the agreement would be subject to any sanction”).  
As was true of the contracts at issue in Allied Orthopedic 
and Concord Boat with respect to what are suggested to be, 
wrongly in my view, mandatory purchase obligations, the LTAs 
did not obligate the OEMs to purchase anything from Eaton, 
much less 100% of their transmission needs, nor did they 
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preclude the OEMs from purchasing transmissions from any 
other manufacturer.  Rather, the agreements provided for 
increasing rebates and thus lower prices based on the percentage 
of an OEM‟s transmission needs that it purchased from Eaton.  
In such a circumstance, the LTAs did not foreclose competition 
in any share of the market because Eaton‟s competitors were 
able to compete for this business as the OEMs were at liberty to 
walk away from the LTAs at any time.  
Indeed, this point is precisely where the Brooke Group 
price-cost test comes into play.  In a situation such as this one, 
where the contract in terms is not exclusive and merely provides 
discounted but above-cost prices conditioned upon a market-
share target, any equally efficient competitor, including ZFM, if 
it was an equally efficient competitor, had an ongoing 
opportunity to offer competitive discounts to capture the OEMs‟ 
business.  If Eaton‟s discounts had resulted in prices that were 
below-cost, a charge that appellees do not make, then even an 
equally-efficient competitor might not have the opportunity to 
compete for the business the LTAs covered and thus it could be 
said that competition was foreclosed in that share of the market 
notwithstanding the non-obligatory and non-exclusive nature of 
the LTAs.  But we do not need to address that unlikely 
circumstance because Eaton‟s discounts resulted in prices that 
were above-cost and thus the LTAs “left ample room” for ZFM 
or new competitors to enter the market and “to lure customers 
away by offering superior discounts.”  Concord Boat, 207 F.3d 
at 1059.  As in Allied Orthopedic, “[t]he market-share discount 
agreements at issue here did not foreclose . . . [Eaton‟s] 
customers from competition because „a competing manufacturer 
need[ed] only offer a better product or a better deal to acquire 
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their [business].‟”  592 F.3d at 997 (quoting Omega, 127 F.3d at 
1164); see also Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 768b, at 
148-50 (concluding that above-cost market-share discounts do 
not exclude equally efficient rivals because “[a]s long as the 
discounted price is above cost and not predatory, it can be 
matched by any equally efficient rival”).  Absent evidence that 
notwithstanding the above-cost prices of the LTAs the non-price 
aspects of the LTAs rendered them anticompetitive, we should 
conclude that as a matter of law Eaton‟s LTAs were not 
anticompetitive.   
The majority dismisses as inapplicable the reasoning of 
Allied Orthopedic and Concord Boat by stating that “this is not a 
case in which the defendant‟s low price was the clear driving 
force behind the customer‟s compliance with purchase targets, 
and the customers were free to walk away if a competitor 
offered a better price.”  Typescript at 33.  But the reality is to the 
contrary as the testimony I have summarized establishes it is 
precisely the case that Eaton‟s low prices led the OEMs to enter 
the LTAs and to strive to meet the market-share targets.  
Likewise, it is clearly the case that the OEMs were free to walk 
away from the market-share rebates the LTAs offered at any 
time.  In attempting to overcome this crucial defect in appellees‟ 
claim and concluding that notwithstanding the LTAs‟ terms the 
LTAs were in fact mandatory agreements to which the OEMs 
were beholden against their will the majority sets forth two 
justifications.    
First, the majority downplays the possibility that ZFM 
could “steal” Eaton‟s customers by offering a superior product 
or lower price because that possibility did not “prove[] to be 
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realistic.”  Typescript at 47.  In other words, the majority 
appears to assume that because ZFM did not lure away Eaton‟s 
customers through offering superior products or lower prices, it 
could not have done so and the reason for its inability to do so 
was the LTAs.  I find the majority‟s treatment of this point to be 
an unpersuasive answer to the logic of Allied Orthopedic and 
Concord Boat. 
I hardly need make the logical point that one cannot 
assume that because an event did not happen it could not have 
happened.  It appears that ZFM did not lure away Eaton‟s 
customers.  That does not mean, however, that ZFM was 
incapable of doing so.  It is beyond dispute and indeed a central 
point to this case that ZFM did not offer lower prices than 
Eaton‟s prices and ZFM did not develop a full product line as it 
knew it had to do in order to compete effectively with Eaton.
36
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The majority states, without elaboration, that Eaton assured 
that there would be no other supplier that could fulfill the 
OEMs‟ needs or offer a lower price.  I note first that it is an 
undisputed fact that when Meritor entered into the joint venture 
with ZF AG at a time prior to any allegation of anticompetitive 
conduct by Eaton, Meritor did not offer a full product line of 
HD truck transmissions.  Thereafter, ZFM explicitly identified 
its lack of a full product line as a barrier to its market success 
and yet it did not develop a full product line.  There is no 
evidence that Eaton somehow prevented either Meritor or later 
ZFM from developing a full product line.  Furthermore, there is 
no evidence in the record indicating that Eaton prevented ZFM 
from offering more attractive discounts to capture Eaton‟s 
business and there is no evidence that other firms tried to enter 
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In other words, ZFM did not even engage in the type of 
competitive conduct that potentially could have lured away 
Eaton‟s customers.  Thus, we cannot say that it is not realistic to 
think that if it had engaged in that competition conduct ZFM 
could have been successful.
37
   
                                                                                                             
the HD truck transmission market but were thwarted by Eaton.   
 
37I recognize that appellees contend that  “[f]ar from offering 
low prices to seek competitive advantages . . . Eaton broke the 
price mechanism, so that ZFM could not compete even by 
offering discounts or other incentives notwithstanding that ZFM 
had a better product.”  Appellees‟ br. at 44.  But appellees‟ 
assessment of their product does not establish that the truck 
purchasers — the entities that actually made the ultimate 
decision as to which transmission to select for their trucks — 
would make the same assessment.  Indeed, some of the evidence 
suggests that both OEMs and truck purchasers held the opinion 
that overall Meritor‟s products were inferior to Eaton‟s, and 
Meritor does not point to evidence foreclosing the possibility 
that its relatively unfavorable reputation in that regard persisted 
despite the emergence of ZF Meritor and thereby tainted truck 
purchasers‟ view of the FreedomLine.  Moreover, even if the 
truck purchasers had come to the same conclusion as appellees 
regarding the FreedomLine‟s technical superiority, appellees‟ 
complaint holds no force as the purchasers‟ were at all times 
free to act on that opinion by selecting the FreedomLine for their 
trucks.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the record that other 
factors beyond possible technical superiority, including such 
considerations as price, service, and availability of the product, 
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Second, the majority attempts to overcome this absolutely 
fundamental defect in appellees‟ case by concluding that 
notwithstanding the fact that the LTAs were not by their terms 
mandatory and the fact that Eaton‟s prices after consideration of 
the rebates were at all times above-cost such that appellees, were 
they equally efficient competitors, could have matched them, 
there nevertheless was sufficient evidence that the LTAs 
foreclosed competition in a substantial share of the HD truck 
transmission market because “the targets were as effective as 
mandatory purchase requirements.”  Typescript at 42.  In this 
regard, the majority reasons that “[c]ritically, due to Eaton‟s 
position as the dominant supplier no OEM could satisfy 
customer demand without at least some Eaton products, and 
therefore no OEM could afford to lose Eaton as a supplier.”  Id. 
at 43.  Therefore, the majority reasons, “a jury could have 
concluded that, under the circumstances, the market penetration 
targets were as effective as express purchase requirements 
because no risk averse business would jeopardize its relationship 
                                                                                                             
could motivate a purchaser in making its decision as to the most 
advantageous transmission for it to purchase.  Lest this fact be 
doubted I merely need to point out that consumers regularly 
purchase inexpensive automobiles even though more highly-
priced automobiles might be technically better.  Overall, the 
point remains that if ZFM was an equally efficient competitor 
the LTAs simply did not preclude it from competing with Eaton 
and did not foreclose competition in any portion of the market, 
and thus a jury verdict based on a contrary conclusion simply 
could not survive Eaton‟s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law. 
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with the largest manufacturer of transmissions in the market.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Undoubtedly, there is evidence in the record that the 
OEMs required Eaton‟s products, to the end that an OEM could 
not have afforded to lose Eaton as a supplier.  However, there is 
not a scintilla of evidence that if an OEM did not meet its LTA‟s 
market-share target Eaton would have refused to supply it with 
transmissions.  First, as the majority notes, only the Freightliner 
LTA and the Volvo LTA granted Eaton the right to terminate 
the LTA altogether if the OEM did not meet its market-share 
targets.  Yet the fact that Eaton had the right to terminate those 
LTAs if those OEMs did not meet their targets — notably, a 
right that it did not exercise when Freightliner failed to achieve 
the market-share target in 2002 — is no more significant than 
the fact that Eaton would not have to pay the rebate if 
Freightliner did not meet the target.  Termination of the LTA 
simply made unavailable the rebates to those OEMs; it did not, 
as the majority implies, mean that Eaton no longer would 
provide transmissions to those OEMs.  It simply meant that 
those OEMs would not receive Eaton‟s transmissions at the 
discounted prices the LTAs offered. 
I understand that the LTAs are supply agreements that 
ensure that Eaton will meet the OEMs‟ transmission needs and 
do so at a certain price and under certain conditions,  and an 
OEM lacking a supply agreement may be in an unfavorable 
position as it would prefer a supply agreement to set the terms of 
its relationship with Eaton.   Nevertheless, although an OEM 
with a cancelled LTA would have lacked a supply agreement 
with Eaton, at least temporarily, one cannot infer from that fact 
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that Eaton would not have supplied the OEM with its 
transmissions.  Furthermore, the majority glosses over the fact 
that PACCAR‟s and International‟s LTAs did not include a 
provision granting Eaton the right to terminate the LTAs if those 
OEMs did not meet their respective market-share targets. 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether the LTAs granted 
Eaton a right of termination, the majority‟s suggestion that the 
OEMs faced losing Eaton as a supplier if they failed to meet the 
market-share targets is contradicted by the market reality that 
while Eaton was the largest manufacturer of transmissions in the 
market there were only four OEMs that bought Eaton‟s 
transmissions.  Accordingly, the idea that Eaton could or would 
have refused to deal with one of the OEMs in addition to being 
unsupported by the record is irrational from an economic 
viewpoint for if Eaton had done so it would have turned its back 
on a significant purchaser of its products measured in sales 
volume.  The notion is completely unjustified. 
Perhaps if appellees had produced evidence at the trial 
that Eaton had threatened to refuse to supply transmissions to an 
OEM that did not meet its market-share targets the non-
mandatory market-share targets would have taken on an air of 
the mandatory threats that the majority insists they actually 
were.  Literally the only evidence that I can identify relating to 
this contention is deposition testimony by a Volvo representative 
relaying an email he had received from one of his colleagues in 
which the colleague stated that Volvo needed to meet its market 
share target because if it was not successful it faced “a big risk 
of cancellation of the contract, price increases and shortages if 
the market is difficult,” J.A. at 688, and a sentence from an 
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internal Volvo presentation in which it speculated that if Eaton 
terminated its LTA it would have “[n]o delivery performance 
commitment (possibly disastrous),” id. at 2101.  While I 
understand that we view a jury‟s verdict through a deferential 
lens, even under that standard I cannot conclude that one 
sentence of second-hand speculation from a contracting party 
but not from Eaton as to whether Eaton might provide an OEM 
with an insufficient volume of transmissions in the event of a 
market shortage and an unidentified Volvo representative‟s 
statement that if it did not have a delivery performance 
commitment from Eaton it could be potentially disastrous is 
sufficient to sustain the inference that facially voluntary market-
share targets were in reality the mandatory, almost extortionary, 
provisions the majority makes them out to be.
38
 
I must address also an aspect of the majority‟s reasoning 
on this point that I find to suffer from a serious flaw with 
dangerous implications for antitrust jurisprudence.  Perhaps the 
majority does not believe that any evidence was required to 
rebut the reality that even though the market-share targets were 
                                                 
38
The majority appears to hang its hat to some extent on the 
notion that even if the OEMs did not actually face the threat of 
losing Eaton as a supplier they believed they might and that 
belief drove their compliance with the LTAs.  While, as noted, 
there is scant evidence, indeed, for the proposition that the 
OEMs‟ efforts to meet the market-share targets was driven by 
such a belief, that belief, if unfounded as it was here, does not 
support the majority‟s repeated statements to the effect that 
Eaton actually coerced the OEMs into entering the LTAs and 
meeting the targets.    
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facially voluntary, the mere circumstances that Eaton was the 
dominant supplier in the market and that no OEM could afford 
to lose it as a supplier sufficed to render the LTAs mandatory.  
The majority‟s reasoning in this regard literally would mean that 
had Eaton not been the dominant supplier of HD truck 
transmissions in the NAFTA market, there would not have been 
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the LTAs were 
de facto exclusive.  While I realize that monopolists may face 
more constraints on their conduct under the antitrust laws than 
less dominant firms, see LePage‟s, 324 F.3d at 151-52, it is an 
unfair and unwarranted leap to create the specter of coercion out 
of reference to Eaton‟s market dominance, cf. R.J. Reynolds, 
199 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (“The strong position of Marlboro, 
however, does not, standing alone „coerce‟ retailers into signing 
. . . [market-share] agreements.”).  In sum, I cannot ascribe to 
the view that a non-mandatory, non-exclusive contract is 
transformed magically into a mandatory, exclusive contract by 
virtue of reference to the firm‟s market position alone such that 
dominant firms must be wary when they enter voluntary 
contracts that offer rebates or discounts lest a court later permit 
a jury to interpret those contracts as mandatory simply due to 
that firm‟s dominant position.   
Apart from insinuating that Eaton‟s dominant market 
position coerced the OEMs into meeting the market-share 
targets, the majority adds to the picture of coercion it attempts to 
paint by stating that “there was evidence that Eaton leveraged its 
position as a supplier of necessary products to coerce the OEMs 
into entering into the LTAs.”  Typescript at 48.  Relatedly, the 
majority states that appellees “presented testimony from OEM 
officials that many of the terms of the LTAs were unfavorable to 
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the OEMs and their customers, but that the OEMs agreed to 
such terms because without Eaton‟s transmissions, the OEMs 
would be unable to satisfy customer demand.”  Id. 
In point of fact, there is not a trace of evidence beyond 
appellees‟ own baseless accusations and the majority does not 
bring our attention to any such evidence supporting its rather 
serious accusation that Eaton leveraged its position as a 
monopolist to force the OEMs to enter into agreements that the 
OEMs did not want to enter.
39
  Eaton‟s offer of lower prices to 
                                                 
39Appellees contend that the OEMs did not want to enter the 
LTAs and did so only in response to Eaton‟s coercion by citing 
to testimony that in fact weakens their case.  In this regard, 
appellees rely on a Volvo representative‟s testimony that it 
entered into the LTA with Eaton because ZFM did not have a 
full product line and thus Volvo would require Eaton‟s products 
even if it entered into an LTA with ZFM but if Eaton was not its 
standard partner it would not provide favorable pricing to 
Volvo.  See J.A. at 522; see also J.A. 2098 (noting that Eaton 
would not provide favorable pricing to Volvo if it selected ZFM 
as its partner).  In part for this reason, it elected to enter the LTA 
with Eaton.   
 
In business as in life we rarely are presented with a 
perfect option.  The fact that long-term supply agreements with 
ZFM and Eaton each had their respective advantages and 
disadvantages is hardly surprising and that Eaton would not 
have granted an OEM the generous discounts its LTA provided 
if it selected ZFM as its primary supplier is likewise not exactly 
an astonishing revelation.   That the OEMs had to weigh these 
  80 
the OEMs in the form of rebates and direct payments in an effort 
to gain their business is hardly coercion.  Rather, it is nothing 
more than legitimate good business practice.  See Race Tires, 
614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or 
improper interference for [suppliers] . . . to offer more money to 
[customers] . . . than it is for such suppliers to offer the lowest . . 
. prices.”).   
Likewise, there is no evidence that the LTAs represented 
unfavorable arrangements for the OEMs such that the OEMs 
only agreed to enter the contracts out of fear of losing Eaton as a 
supplier.
40
  Indeed, to the extent one may be tempted to infer 
                                                                                                             
factors in deciding whether to enter into an LTA with Eaton 
hardly amounts to coercion.    
 
40
In their brief, appellees point to the testimony of two OEM 
representatives who testified to the hardly surprising fact that 
they would have preferred upfront price cuts with no strings 
attached as opposed to conditional market-share targets but that 
the OEMs entered the agreements because they nonetheless 
offered the best prices.  See J.A. at 415-16 (deposition testimony 
of International representative) (stating that International 
preferred to have upfront discounts “in price” but “if a supplier 
is willing to offer [it] rebates” it would take that option if it 
believed it could meet the conditions for those rebates); see id. 
at 525 (deposition testimony of Volvo representative) (stating 
that during LTA negotiations Volvo “wanted no” market-share 
targets but it agreed to the 68% target because it believed it 
could achieve that target and it “wanted the savings and the 
equalization, and the rebates”).  That the OEMs would have 
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that the market-share targets were so high as to be unfavorable 
to the OEMs I note that the targets were actually very close to or 
in fact below Eaton‟s preexisting market share at three out of the 
four OEMs measured at a time before the adoption of the LTAs 
during which appellees do not claim that Eaton was violating 
any law.  See J.A. at 4779 (Dr. DeRamus‟ expert report) 
(Eaton‟s LTA with International began providing rebates at 80% 
market share but Eaton‟s market share of International‟s 
transmission needs prior to the LTA already was 79%); id. at 
4785 (Eaton‟s LTA with PACCAR provided rebates beginning 
at 90% but Eaton‟s market share “consistently hover[ed] around 
90% or higher for HD transmissions” with PACCAR prior to the 
LTA); id. at 4793 (Eaton‟s LTA with Volvo provided a rebate 
starting at 65% market share but Eaton‟s market share of 
Volvo‟s transmissions was 85% when they entered the LTA in 
2002.).  The reality that the market share levels that Eaton 
reached prior to the adoption of the LTAs makes it, in a word I 
do not like using but fits perfectly here, ridiculous to conclude 
that the LTAs had a coercive effect on the OEMs. 
                                                                                                             
preferred that Eaton simply cut its prices is hardly surprising.  
Customers faced with a buy one at full price and get one for 
50% off deal likely would prefer to have the option of buying 
one item for 50% off.  Yet, in the same way that the customer 
who purchases the two items to receive the discount on one 
cannot be said to have been “coerced” into that transaction, the 
OEMs‟ preference for unconditional price cuts hardly can be 
used as evidence that the terms of the LTAs were “unfavorable” 
to them, much less so “unfavorable” as to warrant the inference 
that the OEMs must have entered them as a product of coercion.  
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After studying the majority‟s treatment of the LTAs I am 
left with the impression that it pictures Eaton representatives as 
using coercion when they handed the OEM representatives the 
LTAs.  Yet the reality is that there is absolutely no evidence in 
the record suggesting that Eaton compelled the OEMs by the 
threat of punishment to agree to the LTAs or compelled them to 
meet the share targets.
41
  Quite to the contrary, the record is 
replete with evidence, as I have summarized above, that shows 
that far from cowering under Eaton‟s “threats,” the OEMs 
entered into the LTAs in furtherance of their own economic self-
interests and because those agreements provided the best 
possible prices and assurance of a full product line supply.  They 
worked to meet the market-share targets because by achieving 
those targets they received discounted prices. 
Tellingly, the evidence also shows that the OEMs used 
those arrangements to their advantage.  An illuminating example 
of this market reality is found in a letter an International 
representative wrote to ZFM in June 2002, in which the 
representative recounted the HD truck market‟s dramatic slump 
and stated to ZFM that: 
In the last 12 months, your competition has 
supported our need for cost control with price 
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Of course, the lack of coercion associated with the LTAs is 
significant.  While coercion is not “an essential element of every 
antitrust claim,” it is an important consideration where the 
relevant market players adopt their own business practices and 
the parties “freely entered into exclusive contracts.”  Race Tires, 
614 F.3d at 78. 
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reductions consistent with the trend in new truck 
pricing.  In addition, one of your competitors [i.e., 
Eaton] has offered International a compelling 
incentive to increase their sales at your expense.  
As a result, International is seriously considering 
shifting your portion of our buy to alternative 
suppliers.   
International values the relationship our 
companies have created over the years.  However, 
the relationship is in jeopardy if your lack of cost 
competitiveness cannot be overcome.  We 
therefore require a 5% across the board price 
reduction effective August 1, 2002. 
J.A. at 4596 (letter from Paul D. Barkus, International, to Robert 
S. Harrison, ZFM (June 18, 2002)).  In fact, the record shows 
that six months prior to this correspondence, International had 
attempted to use its relationship with Eaton as leverage to gain 
further cost reductions from ZFM.  See id. at 3727 (electronic 
mail from Paul D. Barkus, International, to Galynn Skelnik, 
International (Jan. 11, 2002)) (“I got a phone message from 
[ZFM] . . . stating that after much internal discussion they have 
decided not to offer any transmission reductions even though 
their list prices could be increased. . . .  Our strategy was to give 
Meritor the impression that our Partnership with Eaton provided 
us with HD reductions that would increase Meritor‟s list price if 
they didn‟t offset the widened price gap.  That started out as a 
bluff, but when we look at our option prices between the two 
supplier[s] there appears to be some cost/price inconsistency.”). 
 In sum, because appellees failed to produce evidence to show 
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that the LTAs and their voluntary, above-cost market-share 
target rebates could have or did foreclose competition in any, 
much less a substantial, share of the market, notwithstanding the 
jury‟s verdict it is obvious that appellees‟ claims must fail under 
Tampa Electric.   
 Before moving on, I think it appropriate to make a final 
point on the importance of the Tampa Electric standard and to 
illuminate fully why I depart from the majority‟s application of 
that case.  As I already have noted, exclusive-dealing contracts 
are not per se unlawful and, indeed, may lead to more 
competition in the marketplace as firms compete for such 
potentially lucrative arrangements.  Accordingly, one must ask 
why antitrust law ever would forbid such contracts.  The reason, 
as the Supreme Court‟s Tampa Electric standard makes clear, is 
that where there is such an agreement, the seller‟s competitors 
cannot compete for the percentage of the market that a purchaser 
needs because the purchaser has signed a contract to deal only in 
the goods of that particular seller (or has signed a contract that 
has that practical effect).  Even if the seller‟s competitors can 
offer a better deal to the purchaser, the purchaser is precluded 
from accepting competing offers because they have entered the 
exclusive-dealing arrangement.  Cf. Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 
314, 69 S.Ct. at 1062 (requirements contract violated Section 3 
because “observance by a dealer of his requirements contract 
with Standard does effectively foreclose whatever opportunity 
there might be for competing suppliers to attract his patronage, 
and . . . the affected proportion of retail sales of petroleum 
products is substantial”).  Therefore, competition is foreclosed 
in that percentage of the marketplace and under Tampa Electric 
the question is simply whether that foreclosure is substantial, 
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considering the quantity of the foreclosure and the qualitative 
aspects of the marketplace and the agreement itself.    
It is that foreclosure of competition, the elimination of 
the possibility that the seller‟s competitors can capture that 
portion of the market through vigorous competition,  with which 
Section 3 (and Section 1 of the Sherman Act in exclusive-
dealing cases) is concerned.  See Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 
328, 81 S.Ct. at 629 (emphasis added) (observing that “the 
ultimate question” is “whether the contract forecloses 
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce 
involved”).  The Tampa Electric market-foreclosure analysis 
thus assumes that a circumstance existed which appellees seek 
and fail to prove existed here: that there was an exclusive-
dealing arrangement between a market seller and purchaser.   
Now consider the case at hand.  The parties do not 
dispute that the LTAs did not require the OEMs to purchase 
anything, much less 100% of their needs, from Eaton and 
appellees do not contend that Eaton‟s prices were below cost.  
Accordingly, appellees remained free at all times to compete for 
the OEMs‟ (and the truck purchasers‟) business.  Appellees, if 
they were equally efficient competitors, were at liberty to offer 
lower prices, better products, more logistical and technical 
support, or any other myriad considerations to make their 
products more attractive to the OEMs, and the OEMs and the 
truck purchasers were at all times free to accept appellees‟ 
products and services.  Accordingly, the LTAs did not foreclose 
competition in any portion of the market.  This basic point — 
that the LTAs were not in fact exclusive-dealing arrangements 
that foreclosed competition in any portion of the market — 
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explains appellees‟ failure to identify before us any credible, 
precise percentage of market foreclosure.  Appellees‟ failure to 
meet their burden under Tampa Electric to prove any 
quantitative degree of market foreclosure should spell the end of 
their Section 3 and Section 1 claims. 
Although I believe that appellees‟ failure in this regard 
renders unnecessary discussion of the qualitative analysis under 
Tampa Electric, I note briefly that contrary to the majority‟s 
discussion, the qualitative inquiry elucidates further why the 
LTAs did not violate Section 3.  Contrary to the majority‟s 
statement that the long duration of the contracts added to their 
alleged anticompetitiveness, the duration of the LTAs is of little 
to no significance because they did not actually preclude the 
OEMs from purchasing competitors‟ products at any time during 
the life of the LTA.  Because the OEMs were free to walk away 
from the discounts at any time it does not matter how long Eaton 
promised to offer those discounts to the OEMs.   
Moreover, a claim of lack of ease of terminability is 
likewise a non-starter given the LTAs were terminable at will; 
the agreements simply would have lost their force once the 
OEMs decided to seek Eaton‟s competitors‟ products and forego 
the market-share rebate.
42
  The majority denies that the LTAs 
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Although I conclude that the LTAs did not foreclose 
competition in any portion of the market, if as the majority 
concludes, the LTAs did foreclose competition in the market, 
that alleged foreclosure effect necessarily was diminished by the 
fact that the LTAs at most blocked only one avenue of reaching 
the end-users, i.e., the truck purchasers.  Component part 
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were easily terminable by reasoning that “the OEMs had a 
strong economic incentive to adhere to the terms of the LTAs, 
and therefore were not free to walk away from the agreements.” 
 Typescript at 52.  I reject the majority‟s ipse dixit reasoning on 
this point.  While Eaton offered through the LTAs financial 
incentives that undoubtedly served as the OEMs‟ motivation to 
meet the market-share targets, the LTAs‟ promise of financial 
reward does not mean that the OEMs were not at liberty to leave 
the LTAs behind to take up a more attractive offer.  Economic 
incentives are by their nature fluid and the OEMs‟ incentives 
might have shifted in the face of a more financially appealing 
option.  
Additionally, “[t]he existence of legitimate business 
justifications for the contracts also supports the legality of the . . 
. contracts.”  Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 111.  In this regard, 
evidence that the defendant‟s actions were motivated by an 
ordinary business motive is significant.  See Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 105 S.Ct. 
2847, 2860 (1985) (noting that “[p]erhaps most significant . . . is 
the evidence related to [defendant] itself, for [defendant] did not 
persuade the jury that its conduct was justified by any normal 
business purpose”).  Eaton contends that the LTAs were 
designed to meet the OEMs‟ demands to lower prices by 
consolidating their component part suppliers and that the OEMs 
                                                                                                             
manufacturers, including ZFM, can and do advertise directly to 
truck purchasers and are able to offer discounts directly to those 
consumers as an incentive for them to select their parts from 
their data books, and truck purchasers were at all times free to 
select appellees‟ products.   
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entered the contracts because they afforded the best possible 
prices.  As I noted above, the record supports this assertion as 
representatives from each of the OEMs testified that the OEMs 
entered into the LTAs because those agreements were 
financially attractive, and ZFM itself noted in 2001 that the 
OEMs sought a single-source supplier.
43
  Additionally, an Eaton 
representative testified that when the OEMs increase their 
purchases of Eaton‟s products, Eaton is able to “translate that 
volume into [a] lower cost base, [and] come up with the funds 
and the revenue to give them [the OEMs] more competitive 
pricing, which is what they were asking for.”  J.A. at 1398. 
In a similar circumstance, we concluded that a defendant 
drug manufacturer offered valid business justifications to defeat 
its competitor‟s Section 1 and Section 3 claims, which attacked 
the defendant‟s offer of contracts that provided volume-based 
discounts to warehouse chain drug stores.  See Barr Labs., 978 
F.3d at 104-05.  We found that there were “legitimate business 
justifications for the contracts” because “the evidence 
established that the warehouse chains [that carried defendant‟s 
products] entered the contracts because of the inherent 
advantages they saw in them in price, convenience, and service” 
and “[t]he contracts also proved advantageous from Abbott‟s 
perspective in terms of reaping business goodwill, and as 
providing high volume, low transaction cost outlets for Abbott‟s 
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The majority states that the procompetitive justifications of the 
LTAs are diminished by the fact that no OEM asked Eaton to be 
a sole supplier.  My response to that assertion is as simple as 
remarking once more that the LTAs did not by their terms or by 
their effect make Eaton a sole supplier for any of the OEMs.   
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manufacturing capacity.”  Id. at 111; see also Virgin Atl. 
Airways, 257 F.3d at 265 (finding that defendant proffered pro-
competitive justification for market-share incentive agreement 
because such agreements “allow firms to reward their most loyal 
customers” and “[r]ewarding customer loyalty promotes 
competition on the merits”); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 237 
(finding legitimate business justification for requirements 
contracts because for the purchaser “the contracts guaranteed a 
stable source of supply, and, perhaps, more importantly, they 
assured [the purchaser] a stable, favorable price” and for the 
seller “they allowed use of considerable excess . . . [product] 
capacity and they allowed production planning that was likely to 
lower costs”).   
Undoubtedly, Eaton was motivated to tender the LTAs 
because of its desire to increase sales of its product.  Although 
such a motivation could not excuse otherwise anticompetitive 
conduct, the desire to sell more product is an ordinary business 
purpose, and the antitrust laws do not prohibit such motivation.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Cargill, “competition for 
increased market share[] is not activity forbidden by the antitrust 
laws.  It is simply . . . vigorous competition.”  479 U.S. at 116, 
107 S.Ct. at 492 (emphasis added); see also Concord Boat, 207 
F.3d at 1062 (noting that defendant‟s proffered reason that it 
was “trying to sell its product” through market-share discounts 
constituted valid, pro-competitive business justification for 
program); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 
518, 524 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing that defendant‟s explanation 
that “it was trying to sell its product” was valid business 
justification). 
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Tampa Electric makes clear that “it is the preservation of 
competition which is at stake” under Section 3.  365 U.S. at 328, 
81 S.Ct. at 628 (emphasis added and internal quotations marks 
and citation omitted).  Here, appellees remained free at all times 
to compete for the OEMs‟ business and directly for customers‟ 
business and yet the majority permits a jury to condemn the 
LTAs.  I cannot join in that conclusion.  Appellees failed to 
supply an evidentiary basis to establish that the LTAs had the 
probable effect of foreclosing competition in a substantial share 
of the market and thus they failed to produce evidence that could 
demonstrate that Eaton violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  
Because Section 3 of the Clayton Act sweeps more broadly than 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, appellees likewise failed to show 
that Eaton violated Section 1. 
C.  Sherman Act Section 2 Claim  
Appellees presented the same evidence and same de facto 
exclusive dealing theory on which they based their Section 2 
claim as they did to support their Clayton Act Section 3 and 
Sherman Act Section 1 claims.  In light of my lengthy analysis 
of appellees‟ other claims, I will abbreviate my discussion of 
their Section 2 claim.   
Section 2 targets defendants who “monopolize or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations.”  15 U.S.C. § 
2.  To establish a Section 2 violation, a plaintiff must show that: 
(1) the defendant possessed monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the defendant willfully acquired or maintained 
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that power “as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 
U.S. 451, 481, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2089 (1992) (quoting United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 
1704 (1966)).  Eaton acknowledges that it has monopoly power 
in the NAFTA HD truck transmission market, and thus I focus 
my discussion on whether it has maintained that monopoly 
through unlawful means. 
A monopolist willfully acquires or maintains monopoly 
power in contravention of Section 2 if it “attempt[s] to exclude 
rivals on some basis other than efficiency.”  Aspen Skiing Co., 
472 U.S. at 605, 105 S.Ct. at 2859.  “Anticompetitive conduct 
may take a variety of forms, but it is generally defined as 
conduct to obtain or maintain monopoly power as a result of 
competition on some basis other than the merits.”  Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted).  “[E]xclusive dealing arrangements can be an 
improper means of maintaining a monopoly.”  Dentsply, 399 
F.3d at 187 (citing Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.Ct. 1698; 
LePage‟s, 324 F.3d at 157).   
The District Court denied Eaton‟s motion seeking a 
judgment as a matter of law on appellees‟ Section 2 claim as it 
concluded that “[t]he jury found that [Eaton] had willfully 
acquired or maintained its monopoly power through LTAs that 
amounted to de facto exclusive dealing contracts having the 
power to foreclose competition from the marketplace.”  ZFM, 
769 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (emphasis added).  In this regard, the 
Court concluded that “„neither proof of exertion of the power to 
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exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential 
competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization 
under the Sherman Act.‟”  Id. (quoting LePage‟s, 324 F.3d at 
148).   
The District Court‟s finding on this point reflected its 
misunderstanding of the requirements of Section 2.  As we 
recently stated in Dentsply:  
Unlawful maintenance of a monopoly is 
demonstrated by proof that a defendant has 
engaged in anti-competitive conduct that 
reasonably appears to be a significant contribution 
to maintaining monopoly power.  Predatory or 
exclusionary practices in themselves are not 
sufficient.  There must be proof that competition, 
not merely competitors, has been harmed. 
399 F.3d at 187 (citing LePage‟s, 324 F.3d at 162) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted); see also Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 308 
(“[T]he acquisition or possession of monopoly power must be 
accompanied by some anticompetitive conduct on the part of the 
possessor.”) (citing Verizon Commc‟ns Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407, 124 S.Ct. 872, 878-
79 (2004)). 
Indeed, in Dentsply we made clear that a plaintiff‟s 
demonstration that the defendant merely possessed the power to 
exclude is not a sufficient basis on which to build a claim that 
the defendant is culpable under Section 2; a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant used its power to foreclose competition.  See 
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399 F.3d at 191 (“Having demonstrated that Dentsply possessed 
market power, the Government must also establish the second 
element of a Section 2 claim, that the power was used „to 
foreclose competition.‟”) (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 
U.S. 100, 107, 68 S.Ct. 941, 945 (1948)) (emphasis added).  As 
the Supreme Court explained in Trinko: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not 
only not unlawful; it is an important element of 
the free-market system.  The opportunity to 
charge monopoly prices — at least for a short 
period — is what attracts „business acumen‟ in 
the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth.  To safeguard 
the incentive to innovate, the possession of 
monopoly power will not be found unlawful 
unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct. 
540 U.S. at 407, 124 S.Ct. at 879 (emphasis in original).  
“Conduct that merely harms competitors . . . while not 
harming the competitive process itself, is not anticompetitive.”  
Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 308; see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458, 113 S.Ct. 884, 892 (1993) (The 
Sherman Act “directs itself not against conduct which is 
competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which 
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”).  To determine 
whether a practice is anticompetitive in violation of Section 2, 
we consider “whether the challenged practices bar a substantial 
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number of rivals or severely restrict the market‟s ambit.”  
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 191 (citations omitted).  Thus, the 
standard for ascertaining whether certain conduct is 
anticompetitive under Section 2 is quite similar to the market-
foreclosure analysis under Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  
“Conduct that impairs the opportunities of rivals and either does 
not further competition on the merits or does so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way may be deemed anticompetitive.”  
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 108 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Accordingly, for largely the same reasons that appellees‟ 
Section 3 and Section 1 claims fail, so, too, does their Section 2 
claim.  Because the LTAs did not obligate the OEMs to 
purchase anything from Eaton and did not condition the rebates 
on Eaton having a 100% market share and because its prices 
were at all times above-cost, the LTAs allowed any equally 
efficient competitor, including appellees, if they were equally 
efficient competitors, to compete.  Thus, the LTAs did not bar 
Eaton‟s competitors from the market nor did the LTAs impair 
their opportunities to compete with Eaton for the business the 
LTAs covered.  Cf. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452 
(6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
antitrust injury under Sherman Act Section 2 because 
defendant‟s rebates and up-front payments to retailers pursuant 
to exclusive dealing contract were above-cost). 
In this regard, the LTAs stand in stark contrast to the 
contracts at issue in Dentsply, a case on which appellees and the 
majority rely heavily.  In Dentsply we considered whether 
Dentsply, a monopolist in the field of the production of artificial 
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teeth, violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act through a provision 
called “Dealer Criterion 6” in its contracts with dealers, who, in 
turn, sold the products to dental laboratories.  See 399 F.3d at 
184-85.  The provision, which Dentsply “imposed . . . on its 
dealers” prohibited the dealers from adding non-Dentsply tooth 
lines to their product offering.  See id.  Dealers who carried 
competing lines prior to the implementation of Dealer Criterion 
6 were permitted to continue carrying non-Dentsply products, 
but Dentsply enforced Dealer Criterion 6 against all other 
dealers.  See id.   
We concluded that Dealer Criterion 6 violated Section 2 
because “[b]y ensuring that the key dealers offer Dentsply teeth 
either as the only or dominant choice, Dealer Criterion 6 ha[d] a 
significant effect in preserving Dentsply‟s monopoly.”  Id. at 
191.  We noted that “Criterion 6 impose[d] an „all-or-nothing‟ 
choice on the dealers” and “[t]he fact that dealers ha[d] chosen 
not to drop Dentsply teeth in favor of a rival‟s brand 
demonstrates that they ha[d] acceded to heavy economic 
pressure.”  Id. at 196.  Accordingly, we concluded that Dealer 
Criterion 6 harmed competition by “keep[ing] sales of 
competing teeth below the critical level necessary for any rival 
to pose a real threat to Dentsply‟s market share.”  Id. at 191.  
Criterion 6 so limited competitors‟ sales because Dentsply‟s 
competitors realistically could not hope to compete solely 
through direct sales to laboratories and because “[a] dealer 
locked into the Dentsply line [wa]s unable to heed a request for 
a different manufacturers‟ product . . . .”  Id. at 194.   
Unlike Dealer Criterion 6, the LTAs did not impose an 
“all-or-nothing” choice on the OEMs because they did not 
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prohibit the OEMs from purchasing or from offering to its HD 
truck purchasers non-Eaton transmissions.  Accordingly, the 
LTAs did not suppress sales of appellees‟ products because the 
OEMs were able to and, in fact, did heed truck purchasers‟ 
requests for ZFM‟s products.  Critically, at all times, truck 
purchasers retained the freedom to make the ultimate decision 
with respect to the transmissions they would select.  Thus, the 
situation here differs from that in Dentsply because the LTAs 
did not have the effect of making Eaton the only choice for truck 
purchasers nor did it impair the purchasers‟ choice in the 
marketplace.  See J.A. at 1530 (deposition testimony of Paul D. 
Barkus, International) (indicating that International‟s LTA 
included a clause explicitly stating that International was not 
precluded from dealing in Eaton‟s competitors‟  products 
because International “would never jeopardize a condition of 
sale based on a customer specifying a product that [it] would 
refuse to provide”). 
Adding to the specter of restricted customer choice, the 
majority states that the OEMs worked with Eaton to force feed 
Eaton‟s products to customers and to shift truck fleets from 
using ZFM transmissions to Eaton transmissions.  It appears that 
there is some evidence in the record for the unsurprising 
contention that the OEMs sought to meet the market share 
targets and thus obtain the rebates in part by persuading their 
customers to select Eaton‟s products.  Indeed, in all walks of life 
if a salesperson has more to gain by selling a customer product 
X as opposed to product Y it is to be expected that the 
salesperson will push the customer to select product X.  
Ultimately, however, the majority does not and cannot dispute 
the fact that the HD truck purchasers at all times were free to 
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select any transmission, including ZFM‟s transmissions, for 
their truck orders. 
Though appellees also assert that the LTA provisions that 
required the OEMs to list Eaton‟s products as the preferred and 
standard option in their data books constituted anticompetitive 
conduct, those provisions no more support appellees‟ case than 
the rebates that the LTAs provided.  Appellees claim that the 
provisions were anticompetitive because they required the 
OEMs to charge artificially higher prices for ZFM‟s products 
than for Eaton‟s.  This is not the case, however, because the 
terms of the LTAs only required that the OEMs ensure that 
Eaton was priced as the lowest-cost option, which, with respect 
to the OEMs, was at all times the case.   
As a PACCAR representative explained, a component 
part manufacturer “is going to get a preferred position in the 
data book as long as . . . [it is] competitive in the marketplace, 
and being competitive in the marketplace means that . . . [it has] 
the lowest total cost to PACCAR, total cost, not just price, total 
cost.”  Id. at 1553.  A competitor manufacturer‟s product will be 
listed “at a premium . . . because that other transmission . . . is at 
a higher cost to PACCAR.”  Id. at 1552.  Indeed, that 
representative confirmed that data book positioning was in fact 
“a leverage point for [PACCAR] to negotiate . . . [to] manage 
[its] supply base.”  Id. at 1553.  Accordingly, Eaton‟s demand 
that the OEMs preferentially price its products reflected the fact 
that those transmissions came at the lowest cost to the OEMs 
and the fact that Eaton had made certain price concessions to the 
OEMs in exchange for that favorable listing, a practice that was 
apparently commonplace in the HD truck transmission market.   
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  Furthermore, the demand had the added consequence of 
assuring Eaton that it receive the favorable promotion for which 
it had bargained through its price concessions.  If the LTAs did 
not include requirements regarding data book placement, an 
OEM would have been able to purchase Eaton‟s transmissions at 
a low cost while listing Eaton‟s products at a higher cost to the 
truck purchasers than ZFM‟s products in its data book, thereby 
reaping a greater profit on Eaton‟s transmissions.  It was entirely 
reasonable for Eaton to avoid this scenario by insisting that the 
OEMs‟ data books reflect that Eaton‟s transmissions were the 
lowest-cost, highest-value product.  
As the majority notes, it is unclear from the record 
whether the OEMs arrived at the preferential price by lowering 
the price of the preferred option or by raising the price of the 
non-preferred options until the preferred component part was the 
lowest-cost option.  The LTAs simply required that the OEMs 
list Eaton as the preferred option but they did not require that the 
OEMs take either path in doing so, and thus it appears that the 
OEMs had the discretion to decide in which way they would 
make Eaton the preferred option.  Of course, from the OEMs‟ 
perspective, keeping the price of Eaton‟s products stable and 
raising the price of Eaton‟s competitors‟ products was the more 
financially attractive option than keeping the prices of  Eaton‟s 
competitors‟ products stable and dropping the price of Eaton‟s 
products and, as the majority points out it appears there is some 
evidence in the record that the OEMs took the first path.
44
 
                                                 
44Thus, as the majority notes, in an email exchange between 
Eaton and Freightliner representatives a Freightliner 
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Nevertheless, to the extent that the OEMs in some 
instances may have decided to  ZFM‟s raise the cost of 
transmissions to arrive at the preferential price for Eaton‟s 
transmissions or to make Eaton‟s transmissions appear more 
favorable to their customers in an effort to achieve the market-
share targets and receive the rebates, such conduct reasonably 
cannot be attributed to Eaton as neither the LTAs nor Eaton 
elsewhere required that the OEMs do so.  Additionally, it is 
clearly telling with respect to data book placement provisions 
that prior to 2001 Meritor had a three-year LTA with 
                                                                                                             
representative stated that its LTA with Eaton required it to price 
ZFM‟s products at a $200 premium.  Yet, Freightliner‟s LTA 
did not require that Freightliner price ZFM‟s products at a 
premium; it simply required that Eaton‟s products be the lowest-
priced option.  In light of the silence of Freightliner‟s LTA as to 
this issue, I can interpret this exchange only to mean that 
Freightliner had elected to price Eaton‟s products preferentially 
by imposing the $200 premium on ZFM‟s products.  Likewise, it 
appears that International and PACCAR may have imposed 
charges on customers who selected ZFM‟s products but neither 
their respective LTA nor Eaton itself required them to do so.  In 
fact, as noted, at least in regard to International, there is 
evidence in the record that suggests that the data book price 
increases for ZFM‟s transmissions were a product of 
International‟s realization in 2002 that its current price for 
ZFM‟s products did not reflect accurately the cost of that 
product to International.  See J.A. at 3727 (e-mail from Paul D. 
Barkus, International, to Galynn Skelnik, International (Jan. 11, 
2002)) (proposing that International increase ZFM‟s list prices 
to bring them “in line with where they should be”).   
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Freightliner, under which Meritor reduced the prices of its 
component parts if Freightliner listed those parts as the standard 
option.  Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that as of 
June 2002, ZFM itself was attempting to achieve exclusive 
listing in PACCAR‟s data book.  See id. at 3394 (electronic 
correspondence from Tom Floyd, PACCAR, to Christian 
Benner, ZFM (June 4, 2002)) (noting that PACCAR was 
“extremely disappointed” with ZFM‟s business proposal in part 
because PACCAR was “very clear that” ZFM‟s proposal 
“should not include requirements regarding exclusive 
position[ing]” and that “it would require some extraordinary 
benefits for PACCAR in order [for ZFM] to receive 
consideration” in that regard).   
While Meritor‟s prior LTA and ZFM‟s own attempts to 
achieve exclusive data book positioning do not, in themselves, 
defeat appellees‟ claim that those tactics are anticompetitive, 
their actions are of some significance.  Cf. Race Tires, 614 F.3d 
at 82 (noting fact that plaintiff created and championed racing 
sanctioning bodies‟ rule that required the use of a single brand 
of tire during races and later alleged such rule violated the 
antitrust law); NicSand, 507 F.3d at 454 (plaintiff‟s prior use of 
exclusive-dealing contract undermined its attack on defendant‟s 
use of such arrangements).  At a minimum, ZFM‟s conduct 
belies its contention that the LTAs were far afield from the 
normal practice of the HD truck transmission market.   
In our consideration of this case we should remember that 
“[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular 
structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.”  Trinko, 
540 U.S. at 411, 124 S.Ct. at 881.  Practices from industry to 
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industry do not come on a one-size-fits-all basis.  Here, it 
appears that bargaining between the OEMs and their suppliers 
regarding data book positioning is quite typical of the 
marketplace with which we are dealing.  See Race Tires, 614 
F.3d at 79 (noting as relevant that it was “a common and 
generally accepted practice for a supplier to provide a sports 
sanctioning body . . . financial support in exchange for a supply 
contract”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062 (observing that 
“Brunswick‟s competitors also cut prices in order to attract 
additional business, confirming that such a practice was a 
normal competitive tool within the . . . industry”); see also Trace 
X Chem., Inc. v. Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261, 266 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (“Acts which are ordinary business practices typical 
of those used in a competitive market do not constitute conduct 
violative of Section 2.”).   
But appellees‟ case fails for one more reason than its 
failure to show that Eaton engaged in anticompetitive conduct, 
in that their case also did not include evidence that the LTAs 
harmed competition.  See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187 (“There 
must be proof that competition, not merely competitors, has 
been harmed.”).  Appellees contend that the LTAs harmed 
competition by depriving truck buyers of access to the 
FreedomLine, which appellees believe was a technologically 
innovative product, and by causing truck buyers to pay higher 
prices.   
With regard to the FreedomLine, it is enough to say once 
more that the OEMs and truck purchasers were at all times free 
to purchase that transmission as well as any other of ZFM‟s 
transmissions, whether or not those transmissions were listed in 
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the data books.  Additionally, with the exception of 
International, the LTAs permitted the OEMs to list all of ZFM‟s 
transmissions, including the FreedomLine, in their respective 
data books and the OEMs continued to do just that.
45
   
Appellees do not point to any evidence in support of their 
contention that truck purchasers paid higher prices as a result of 
                                                 
45I have not overlooked the fact that International‟s LTA 
required it to list Eaton‟s transmissions exclusively.  Yet, 
International continued to list ZFM‟s manual transmissions, and 
it is thus not apparent whether its decision not to list ZFM‟s 
automated and automated mechanical transmissions is 
attributable to the LTA.  Regardless, International‟s failure to 
list the FreedomLine, standing alone, did not deprive truck 
purchasers of access to the FreedomLine because truck 
purchasers were at all times free to specify the use of the 
FreedomLine transmission.  Furthermore, it is important to note 
that HD truck purchasers in many cases were sophisticated 
customers in the HD truck market that were aware that ZFM‟s 
transmissions were available.  Though I recognize that some 
purchasers likely were small operators perhaps owning only one 
HD truck who may have had limited knowledge of the 
differences in available transmissions, certainly the large 
purchasers, i.e., big trucking companies, would have been more 
knowledgeable with respect to available transmissions.  In any 
event, we are, after all, not dealing with consumers buying 
motor vehicles for their personal use.  The transmissions 
involved here were installed in vehicles intended for commercial 
use, and the owners did not acquire the vehicles to go to the 
grocery store.  
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the LTAs.  The only evidence that I can find in the record 
relevant to appellees‟ allegation in this regard is Dr. DeRamus‟ 
statement in his expert report offered by appellees that after the 
LTAs went into effect Eaton reduced its “competitive 
equalization” or incentive payments that historically it had paid 
to truck buyers as an incentive to them to select Eaton‟s 
transmissions.  See J.A. at 4830.  While Dr. DeRamus put forth 
data demonstrating that Eaton decreased its competitive 
equalization payments on average by about $100 (dropping from 
roughly $500 on average to just below $400 on average) from 
1999 to 2007, see id. at 4831, he did not present a scintilla of 
evidence that truck purchasers ultimately paid a higher price for 
Eaton‟s transmissions during the existence of the LTAs or 
following their expiration.  Overall, it is clear that his testimony 
in this regard as an inadequate basis on which to predicate an 
antitrust case.  In sum, appellees failed to put forth any — much 
less sufficient — evidence that Eaton engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct or that Eaton‟s conduct actually harmed 
competition, both of which are required elements of a claim 
under Section 2.
46
  
                                                 
46Even if a plaintiff establishes under Section 2 that “monopoly 
power exists” and that “the exclusionary conduct . . . ha[s] an 
anti-competitive effect,” “the monopolist still retains a defense 
of business justification.”  Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187; Concord 
Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062 (“A Section 2 defendant‟s proffered 
business justification is the most important factor in determining 
whether its challenged conduct is not competition on the 
merits.”); Stearns Airport Equip. Co., 170 F.3d at 522 (“The key 
factor courts have analyzed in order to determine whether 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
I offer a few final thoughts on this important case, which, 
though seemingly complicated, should have an obvious result.  
It is axiomatic that “[t]he antitrust laws . . . were enacted for „the 
protection of competition not competitors.‟”  Brunswick, 429 
U.S. at 488, 97 S.Ct. at 697 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1521 (1962)) 
(emphasis in original).  Yet as often as this refrain is repeated 
throughout antitrust jurisprudence, it appears increasingly that 
disappointed competitors, on the assumption that their deficient 
performances must be attributable to their competitors‟ 
anticompetitive conduct rather than their own errors in judgment 
or shortcomings or their competitors‟ more desirable products or 
business decisions, or on the assumption that they can convince 
a jury of that view, turn to the antitrust laws when they have 
been outperformed in the marketplace.  Of course, competitors 
can be and sometimes are harmed by their peers‟ anticompetitive 
conduct and when they show that is what happened they may 
have viable antitrust claims.  Yet often it is the case that a 
defeated competitor falls back on the antitrust laws in an attempt 
to achieve in the courts the goal that it could not reach in the 
                                                                                                             
challenged conduct is or is not competition on the merits is the 
proffered business justification for the act.”).  As with appellees‟ 
Section 3 and Section 1 claim, Eaton‟s valid business 
justifications for the LTAs undermines the notion that the LTAs 
constituted competition on some basis other than the merits in 
violation of Section 2.   
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properly-functioning competitive marketplace.  This case is a 
classic demonstration of that process, which so far with respect 
to liability even if not damages has been successful.  Indeed, I 
find it remarkable that appellees‟ case that is predicated on 
nothing more than smoke and mirrors has gotten so far. 
But the basic facts are clear.  Appellees do not bring a 
predatory pricing claim because they cannot do so as Eaton‟s 
prices were above cost.  Instead, they seek refuge in the law of 
exclusive dealing to challenge the LTAs, which based on the 
record could not be found to be either facially or de facto 
exclusive or mandatory.  After stripping this case of appellees‟ 
baseless insinuations that Eaton engaged in coercive or 
threatening conduct in regards to the LTAs, it becomes apparent 
that the core of appellees‟ claim really is their belief they had a 
superior product in the FreedomLine and the disappointing sales 
of that product relative to their expectations must have been 
attributable to Eaton‟s anticompetitive conduct.  See appellees‟ 
br. at 32 (“Eaton‟s conduct harmed competition and ZFM.  For 
the first time in this market, a better product, even combined 
with offers of discounts, could not elicit additional sales because 
Eaton‟s LTAs and other conduct had broken the competitive 
mechanism.”).  Appellees thus “appear[] to be assuming that if 
[Eaton‟s] product was not objectively superior, then its victories 
were not on the merits.”  Stearns Airport Equip., 170 F.3d at 
527.   
As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in 
Stearns Airport Equipment in confronting a similar type of 
claim, courts are “ill-suited . . . to judge the relative merits of” 
the parties‟ respective products.  Id.  “That decision is left in the 
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hands of the consumer, not the courts, and to the extent this 
judgment is „objectively‟ wrong, the inference is not that there 
has been a[n] [antitrust] violation . . . , but rather that the 
winning party displayed superior business acumen in selling its 
product.”  Id.  The truth is that neither judges nor juries have 
expertise in determining the best transmission to buy.  Certainly, 
the purchasers of trucks and transmissions should make 
transmission decisions for themselves and so long as appellees 
manufactured their transmissions they had a chance to be their 
supplier.   
I recognize that the record could support a finding that 
the FreedomLine was a technological innovation for which 
Eaton did not offer a technically comparable product, and I 
further recognize that Eaton engaged in vigorous competition 
through aggressive but above-cost methods to compensate for 
the possible deficiency of their transmission offerings in that 
regard.  But in the absence of anticompetitive conduct, the 
antitrust laws do not forbid Eaton‟s response.  See Ball Mem‟l 
Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1339 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (“Even the largest firms may engage in hard 
competition, knowing that this will enlarge their market 
shares.”) (citations omitted).  In reality, however, the record 
compels that the conclusion that Eaton was able to maintain its 
dominant market position in the face of the availability of the 
FreedomLine for myriad reasons, including its capability of 
offering the OEMs a full product line, favorable pricing, its 
long-standing, positive reputation, and various market forces 
that favored an established market player such as Eaton.  And it 
is also evident from the record, especially from ZFM‟s internal 
documents, that there were numerous intervening factors, such 
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as ZFM‟s precipitously falling market share, which tellingly 
predated the adoption of the LTAs, the market‟s drive towards 
full-product line manufacturers, the OEMs‟ hesitancy to 
purchase new products, and the severe market downturn, that 
disfavored ZFM.
47
  In the difficult market it faced, Meritor 
entered into a joint venture that needed to achieve an almost 
one-third market share within approximately four years of the 
venture‟s formation to maintain a viable business, an obviously 
ambitious goal indeed even when one overlooks the fact that the 
joint venture offered a limited product line and a flagship 
transmission that cost far more than other transmissions in the 
market. 
I note finally that courts‟ erroneous judgments in cases 
such as this one do not come without a cost to the economy as a 
                                                 
47
I recognize that as the majority points out, certain OEM 
representatives speculated that the LTAs damaged significantly 
ZFM‟s business and may have caused its ultimate demise.  As I 
have stated above, it is beyond peradventure to say that “[t]he 
antitrust laws . . . were enacted for „the protection of 
competition not competitors.‟”  Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488, 97 
S.Ct. at 697 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 
also Virgin Atl. Airways, 257 F.3d at 259 (“[W]hat the antitrust 
laws are designed to protect is competitive conduct, not 
individual competitors.”).  Even if the LTAs negatively affected 
ZFM‟s business, that circumstance is not the salient inquiry in 
an antitrust case.  The pivotal question is whether the LTAs 
negatively affected competition — not a particular competitor — 
in the marketplace, and for the reasons I have recited above, 
they could not be found to have done that.   
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whole.  Discounts of all varieties, whether tied to the purchase 
of multiple products, exclusivity, volume, or market-share, are 
ubiquitous in our society.  “Discounts are the age-old way that 
merchants induce customers to purchase from them and not 
from someone else or to purchase more than they otherwise 
would.”  Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 Utah L. 
Rev. at 843.  Indeed, market-share discounts can be particularly 
pro-competitive because they can result in lower prices for a 
broader range of customers as they extend to smaller purchasers 
discounts typically reserved for the largest of purchasers under 
more common volume-discount programs.  See IIIA Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶786b2, at 148.  “[L]ower prices 
help consumers.  The competitive marketplace that the antitrust 
laws encourage and protect is characterized by firms willing and 
able to cut prices in order to take customers from their rivals.”  
Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d at 231.  Accordingly, “mistaken 
inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 
594, 106 S.Ct. at 1360.   
Thus, as the Supreme Court has stressed, courts do not 
issue these decisions in a vacuum: once we file our opinion in 
this case firms that engage in price competition but seek to stay 
within the confines of the antitrust laws must attempt to use the 
precedent that we establish as a guide for their conduct, at least 
if they are subject to the law of this Circuit.  This is serious 
business indeed.
48
  For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
48
Of course, every decision we make is serious business and I do 
not imply otherwise.  However, particularly in light of the 
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“repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear rules in antitrust 
law.”  Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452, 129 S.Ct. at 1120-21; see also 
Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 
1990) (Breyer, C.J.) (Antitrust rules “must be administratively 
workable and therefore cannot always take account of every 
complex economic circumstance or qualification.”).  I confess I 
can glean no such clear rule from the majority‟s opinion.  I do 
not know how corporate counsel presented with a firm‟s 
business plan at least if it is a dominant supplier that seeks to 
expand sales through a discount program that might be 
challenged by competitors as providing for a de facto exclusive 
dealing program and asked if the plan is lawful under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts will be able to advise the 
management.  The sad truth is that the counsel only will be able 
to tell management that it will have to take a chance in the 
courtroom casino at some then uncertain future date to find out.   
If Eaton‟s above-cost market-share rebate program 
memorialized in the LTAs, which were neither explicitly nor de 
facto exclusive or mandatory, can be condemned as unlawful de 
facto partial exclusive dealing on the basis of literally a handful 
of disjointed statements that amount at most to unsupported 
speculation as to the possibility that Eaton may have stopped 
supplying its transmissions if the OEMs did not meet the targets, 
firms face a difficult task indeed in structuring lawful discount 
programs.  “Perhaps most troubling, firms that seek to avoid . . . 
liability [for market-share rebate programs] will have no safe 
harbor for their pricing practices.”  Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452, 
                                                                                                             
current economic climax, the reasoning of a precedential 
opinion with such obvious economic repercussions is crucial. 
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129 S.Ct. at 1121 (citing Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 22) 
(Antitrust rules “must be clear enough for lawyers to explain 
them to clients.”).  What I find most troubling is that firms will 
play it safe by not formulating discount programs and that the 
result of this case will be an increase of prices to purchasers and 
the stifling of competition, surely a perverse outcome.  It is 
ironical that the very circumstance that the majority‟s opinion is 
so thoughtful and well crafted that the risk that it poses is so 
great.  On the other hand, the approach I believe the Supreme 
Court‟s precedent compels — applying and giving persuasive 
effect to the Brooke Group price-cost test and granting a 
presumption of lawfulness to pricing practices that result in 
above-cost prices  — provides clear direction to firms engaging 
in price competition but still allows for an antitrust plaintiff to 
allege that a defendant has engaged in attendant anticompetitive 
conduct that renders its practices unlawful.  
 In sum, I conclude that Eaton was entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law on liability in all respects.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand this case 
for entry of a judgment in favor of Eaton.  My view of this facet 
of the case renders it unnecessary for me to consider the 
numerous other issues raised on this appeal, including the 
District Court‟s decision that appellees suffered antitrust injury, 
and its decisions regarding damages and injunctive relief.  Thus, 
I do not opine on the proper disposition of those matters.  
